

## [4] REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Appointed by the Secretary of War, pursuant to the Provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, to Ascertain and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to Make such Recommendations as It May Deem Proper. Also, To Consider the Phases Which Related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the Report of the House Military Affairs Committee, as Directed by the Acting Secretary of War, in His Memorandum for The Judge Advocate General, 12 July 1944.

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## LEGENDS

RR—Roberts Record. D—Document.  
R—APHB Record. Ex—Exhibit.  
Italics ours unless otherwise stated.

[1] CHAPTER I. PREAMBLE: AUTHORITY FOR THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD AND ITS ACTION TAKEN

This Board was appointed pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, by Letter Order A. G. O. 8 July 1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)) as amended by Letter Order A. G. O. 11 July 1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (10 Jun 44)) and Letter Order A. G. O. 22 August 1944 (AGPO-A-A 248.7 (2 Aug 44)), and as supplemented by Supplemental Letter Order A. G. O. 22 July 1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (21 July 44)) which order made reference to a memorandum for The Judge Advocate General of 12 July 1944—Subject: Report of House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944 alleging neglect and misconduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian and Canadian Defense Projects, and which was signed by Robert P. Patterson, Acting Secretary of

<sup>1</sup> Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

War. This supplemental order directed the Board to consider the phase of the report which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster.<sup>2</sup>

Composition of the Board:

Lt. Gen. George Grunert, O1534, USA

Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, O212769, USA

Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, O2871, USA

Col. Charles W. West, O12774, JAGD, Recorder (without vote)

Col. Harry A. Toulmin, O205520, AC, Executive Officer (without vote)

Maj. Henry C. Clausen, O907613, JAGD, Assistant Recorder (without vote)

[2] The Board interpreted these orders and the memorandum referred to as confining its investigation to the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The Board convened 20 July 1944 and was in continuous session from 24 July 1944 to 20 October 1944. It held hearings twice in Washington, D. C.; twice in San Francisco, California; and in Hawaii. It has heard a total of 151 witnesses and has interviewed many additional potential witnesses whom it found did not have any pertinent information. There has been no available document, witness, suggestion or lead which promised any materiality that has not been carefully investigated by this Board. Every witness has been invited to give, in addition to his testimony, any suggestions, opinions, leads to evidence, or any other information that might possibly be pertinent. It has been our purpose, and we believe we have effected it, to explore every available piece of information on this subject. We have not had the opportunity, nor the organization, to comb personally and exhaustively the official files, but we have called for the pertinent letters, documents, and memoranda. We believe that practically all of them have been secured, although we have found a few files from which important and vital papers are missing. In many instances we found these documents elsewhere or were able to prove them through copies in other hands.

This Board has been without power of subpoena, but in no instance has its invitation to appear and testify been ignored.

In view of the fact that the War Department appointed this [3] Board, under Joint Resolution of Congress,<sup>3</sup> to examine the Army's part in the Pearl Harbor disaster because Congress desired, as appears from the legislative history of the Joint Resolution, a more thorough study, it has been necessary to examine the record of the Roberts Commission and the Roberts Report in the light of the new testimony adduced by this Board, new witnesses, and new docu-

<sup>2</sup> See copies of orders and memorandum, Exhibits 65 to 69, inclusive.

<sup>3</sup> Public Law 339—78th Congress, Chapter 247—2d session, S. J. Res. 133, Joint Resolution: To extend the statute of limitation in certain cases.

*"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.* That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punishment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the extension provided for in Public Law 208, Seventy-eighth Congress.

"Sec. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify.

"Approved June 13, 1944."



ments; and to set forth wherein the Board's findings are in harmony with the Roberts Report; or, if in conflict, are correct and supported by fuller evidence.

The Board has made, therefore, a careful review of the record and exhibits of the Roberts Commission. This Board has been materially helped and enlightened by the Report and Record [4] of the Roberts Commission. We append to this report a section indicating the additional information and documents which have been made available as a result of our extended investigation, and which probably did not come to the attention of the Roberts Commission; or, at least, were not mentioned in either the testimony, documents or report of the Roberts Commission.

We have been greatly aided by the Interim Report, Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-eighth Congress, 2nd Session, pursuant to H. Res. 30, A Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Military Affairs and the Committee on Naval Affairs to Study the Progress of the National War Effort, and the committee's records, counsel, and investigators, with particular reference to the activities of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Hans Wilhelm Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, and others, as such activities had a bearing upon the Pearl Harbor disaster and what led up to it. We have been aided by the testimony of counsel from that committee and the complete record of the investigation of that committee on this subject and its exhibits. We have also heard testimony and investigated reports and reviewed affidavits of additional affiants, whose testimony came to light, or documents were discovered, after the conclusion of the investigation of the Committee on Military Affairs, as indicated in its Interim Report. We have also been aided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the Report of the Tenney Committee in California.

We transmit with this report the record of testimony of the witnesses consisting of 41 volumes and 70 exhibits. In the appendix to this report is a tabulation in detail of the [5] witnesses who testified and a list of the exhibits.

In order to facilitate the examination of the Board's record by the War Department and by any others who may have occasion to review the record and exhibits, we append to this report and make a part of it extensive analysis of the testimony of every witness, indexing each statement by reference to the record, and with cross references of those statements to different parts of the record where similar or different statements on the same subject were made by other witnesses. We have also added cross references to the same subject matter in the record of the Roberts Commission or the exhibits presented before that commission. It is, therefore, possible for anyone reviewing this report to have a complete and, we believe, exhaustive analysis of every phase of the Pearl Harbor matters, so that any part of the situation can be easily and promptly reviewed.

In formulating this report the Board has been conscious of the deep spiritual and moral obligation, as well as its professional and patriotic duty, to present an impartial and judicial investigation and report. This we have earnestly endeavored to do, and have spared no pains or effort to that end. With that spirit animating our actions, we have deemed it helpful and wise to present the state

of mind and the background against which the events of the drama of Pearl Harbor could be adequately judged; and to sketch in retrospect the events and the knowledge of such events of each of the principal actors on the scene, so that their actions might be more fully understood and justly evaluated [6] and judged. At no time, however, has the Board acted as a court.<sup>4</sup>

This is necessary because we are now passing upon the matter several years after the event. We have endeavored to effect this reconstruction to some degree in the second chapter entitled, "Background". The same considerations have been evaluated in the succeeding chapters, as this background affected the events and actions of those involved in the matters under consideration. In so doing, we hope we have avoided the human failing so aptly pointed out by St. Paul of

forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forth unto those things which are before.

In Chapter III we have presented the story of Pearl Harbor. This is a running chronological story of the events that took place leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack and through that fateful day and for a short period thereafter, so far as subsequent events reflected upon the conditions previously existing. We have discussed in this Chapter III the arguments for and against each principal proposition, have examined all of the representations and defenses of General Short and others involved in this matter. We have endeavored to state the surrounding facts and circumstances, the background, the considerations and factors which influenced each principal officer or official in the execution of his duties.

[7-8] Therefore, whoever reads this report will have before him all of the considerations for and against any proposition, all facts, any defense or any claim put forward by those interested, and answers to such questions of import to the services and to the public, in order to have the foundation for an impartial judgment.

In Chapter IV we continue the story in so far as it pertains to Washington. In Chapter V we relate the story concerning the Pre-Pearl Harbor construction activities and in Chapter VI come to Conclusions.

The Board was after facts; and the surrounding conditions, background, and atmosphere which influenced the actors in this drama and brought them to their fateful decisions. This we believe we secured successfully from military and naval personnel of widely varying ranks; from civilians of varied stations in life; and from official and other contemporaneous publications. The range of witnesses ran from men in the ranks to Generals and Admirals, and from the humblest in civil life to United States Senators and the President's Cabinet.<sup>5</sup> Each witness was invited, additionally, to express freely his views and opinions on the record, and to submit any facts or leads to the discoveries of facts which might be helpful to this Board.

We set out with no thesis to prove, nor person to convict. Our ap-

<sup>4</sup> Whenever any interested witness raised a question of proof that had not been previously discussed, or fully examined, or any newspaper report raising any question came to our attention, we endeavored to get an answer so that the whole truth would be known once and for all.

<sup>5</sup> Whenever there was a shadow or a shade of a doubt, we resolved it in favor of running down the suggestion and introducing proof, if it had any suspicion of materiality.



proach has been, we hope, diligently and completely factual; and also equally impartial. Our conclusions are those compelled by the clear weight of the evidence from the facts set forth in the record.

[9]

## CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND

### 1. Introduction

Confusion of Thinking, Organization, Conflict of Opinions and Diversity of Views; Nation Not Geared to War.

### 2. Public Opinion

Psychological Conditions and Their Effect; Army Dependent on Public Opinion and State of Public Mind and Its Readiness for War; American Public Reluctant to Consider A War; Japan Ready for War.

### 3. U. S. Policy (1922-1939)

Study of Long-Term Treatment of Japan Important; the Mandated Islands and Exclusion of the United States and Fortification of the Islands by Japan; the Navy's Efforts to Get Into the Islands and Its Relationship to the State Department; Diplomatic Status of Consular Agents of Japan in Hawaii and Their Spying Activities; Strong National Policy for the Protection of American Rights Lacking and Effect Upon the Army and Navy; the Effect of This Policy on the Japanese Oriental Trading Mind.

### 4. U. S. Policy (1939-1941)

Avoidance of a Conflict with Japan 1939-1941 by Avoiding Open Breach; Necessity for Delay to Prepare for War; Negotiations Based Upon Lack of Incidence.

### 5. Moral Embargoes Versus Japanese Expansion

Morale Embargoes; Economic Sanctions by Direct Embargoes; Coincident Forming of Public Opinion Against Japan; Japanese Making No Concessions and Proceeding with Aggressions; Threatening Hostile Action; Lack of Public Understanding of Importance of Hawaii; War and Navy Departments Making [10] Great Effort to Prepare for War with Grave Deficiencies; Diversion of Resources to Assist England and France Retarding our Own Rearming; Coordination of Action by the Government Through Conference in War Council, Etc.; Lack of Appreciation of Where Japan Would Attack and Miscalculation of Time of Attack; Japanese Full Understanding of Our Dilemma.

### 6. Public Demands Action Against Japanese

National Policy Against War; Attempt to Negotiate and Apply Economic Sanctions Put Government in Difficult Contrary Positions; Conflicting Elements of Policy Communicated to Field Commanders to Both Prepare for War and Not Precipitate an Incident Causing War; Public Opinion in 1941 More Belligerent Than the Preparations for War Justified Complicating Government Position.

### 7. Economic Sanctions Against Japan

The Economic Effect on Japan of Progressive Sanctions Considered in Detail; the Rising Tempo of Economic Disaster to Japan and the Decreasing Success of Negotiations; Inevitable Showdown Between Japanese Economic Strangulation and Military Action Approaching; the Impasse Reached on November 26, 1941; the State Department Passes Responsibility for the Nation to the War and Navy Departments.

### 8. The Hawaiian Population Problem

Sabotage Complex; the Japanese Population Conditions Analyzed in Hawaii; the Rising Dominance Economically and Politically of the Japanese Group; Sabotage of War Action Possible by the Hawaiian Japanese Group; the Difficulty of Alerts Without Disturbing the Civilian Japanese Population To An Overt Act; Effect of Japanese Atmosphere in Hawaii and Government Policy Against Overt Acts Upon the Responsible Commanders in Hawaii; the Local Opposition of Commercial Interests to [11] Putting Japanese Under Control; Official Reluctance to Put Local Japanese Population under Civilian Surveillance; Free Japanese Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in Hawaii.

### 9. *Hawaiian Press*

Constant Reiteration of Progressively Increasing Difficulties with Japan and Threats of War Accentuated the State of Mind of Local Commanders as to Difficulties with Local Population.

### 10. *Summary*

Preparatory Period Immense Effect Upon State of Mind of Public Officials and Commanders; Our Complacency Our Weakness; Our National Pride and Vanity our Weakness; the Result was Lack of Action, Coordination, Cooperation, Teamwork, and War Spirit; United States Was Unprepared Mentally, Physically, or as an Organization for War.

[12] 1. *Introduction.*—The purpose of this explanation of the background of public and private events as they existed in 1940 and 1941 is this. There existed during this critical period much confusion of thinking and of organization, of conflict of opinion and diversity of views. The nation was not geared to war, either mentally or as an organization. It was a period of conflicting plans and purposes. The winds of public opinion were blowing in all directions; isolationists and nationalists were struggling for predominance; public opinion was both against war and clamoring for reprisal against Japan; we were negotiating for peace with Japan, and simultaneously applying economic sanctions that led only to war; we were arming our forces for war and at the same time giving away much of such armament. The Administration, State, War and Navy Departments in their policies, plans and operations were likewise being pushed here and there by the ebb and flow of war events, public reactions, diplomatic negotiations and newspaper attacks.

The War Department by its actions and its organization was still on a peacetime basis; neither its management nor its general staff had perfected its organization for war or for the conduct of a large enterprise. The whole machinery of government was geared to a different purpose and tempo than war. Valiant and brilliant men were struggling to bring order out of chaos, rather as individuals or as small groups, attempting simultaneously both to establish policies and to accomplish practical things. As a result a few men, without organization in the true sense, were attempting to conduct large enterprises, take multiple actions, and give directions that should have been [13] the result of carefully directed commands, instead of action taken by conference. We were preparing for a war by the conference method. We were directing such preparations by the conference method; we were even writing vital messages by the conference method, and arriving at their contents by compromise instead of by command; that was the product of the time and conditions due to the transition from peace to war in a democracy.

Such was the confusion of men and events, largely unorganized for appropriate action and helpless before a strong course of events, that ran away with the situation and prematurely plunged us into war.

[14] 2. *Public Opinion.*—The disaster of Pearl Harbor and the responsibilities and courses of action taken by those connected therewith can better be understood when the background of public opinion and the state of the public mind are likewise understood. Psychological conditions had a material effect upon the events that took place. A brief review of the then state of mind of officials and the public; and the facts known to the public and to the government; and our national policy are all necessary in order to view the picture in its proper perspective.



Our Army, like other armies of democracies, in its policies and its actions to a degree was dependent upon and was influenced by public opinion and the state of the public mind. Successful war is waged through a state of mind and a state of public readiness for war. A recognition of this fact is necessary to the understanding of the background of public opinion and the state of our desire to make war, which undoubtedly had its influence on the War Department and the responsible commanders in Hawaii. A brief resume of that situation will lead to an understanding of what influenced the taking of certain actions, or the failures to take action, on the part of the Washington departments concerned and the higher commanders in the field.

For a long period of time prior to the war the public was reluctant even to consider a war.<sup>6</sup> There was a distinct [15] lack of a war mind in the United States. Isolationist organizations and propaganda groups against war were powerful and vital factors affecting any war action capable of being taken by our responsible leadership. So influential were these campaigns that they raised grave doubts in minds of such leadership as to whether they would be supported by the people in the necessary actions for our defense by requisite moves against Japan. Public opinion in the early stages had to be allowed to develop; in the later stages it ran ahead of preparation for war. There was little war spirit either amongst the general public or in the armed forces, due to this conflicting public opinion having its influence.<sup>7</sup> The events hereinafter recited must be measured against this important psychological factor.

At the same time, Japan was pursuing an opposite policy of preparation. It had been at war for several years in China; both its people and government were psychologically and physically geared to war and were implemented with a polished plan of action and equipment to do the job. It was animated by cunning, hatred and patriotism in a land where life is cheap; and nurtured in an atmosphere of insane nationalism [16] and oriental intrigue. Japan was a nation united for the single purpose of world conquest based on more than a thousand years of conflict.

As Ambassador Grew testified, from the time of his arrival in Japan in 1932, he constantly developed the theme of the grave necessity for adequate preparation militantly to implement our diplomatic policy, because of Japan's readiness for war. As he said to Mr. Stimson, then Secretary of State, in the latter part of 1932:

The Japanese Army has been built for war, it feels prepared for war, and it wants war.

And he continued:

At that time I said it would be criminally "short-sighted", I think not to recognize this fact and be prepared for anything that might develop in the Far East. Those warnings were, as I say, continued in my telegrams and dispatches throughout the ten years of my service there, right up to the end." (R. 4291.)

<sup>6</sup> The close vote of Congress on recalling the National Guard from active service and on a proposal to abandon Lend-Lease clearly reflect public opinion of that day and time in 1941.

<sup>7</sup> Rear Admiral McMorris testified as to the weak status of our fleet with respect to the strong Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor, and what would have happened if our fleet had gone out into deep blue water to fight: "A fight would have occurred in which our losses might have been even greater than actually occurred. \* \* \* our own losses would have been extremely heavy and might well have included the loss of both our carriers." (R. 2878.)

[17] 3. *U. S. Policy, (1922-1939)*.—The events leading up to the Pearl Harbor disaster can only be understood when we examine our national policy as administered by the State Department. That policy must be examined back a number of years to see the long-term treatment of Japan which had its bearing on the Pearl Harbor disaster.

An early step in a direction considered adverse to the interests of the United States was our failure to have a showdown with Japan on its fortifications of the mandated islands.

The Mandate for the German possessions in the Pacific Ocean lying north of the Equator under date of December 17, 1920, the Convention for the Control of Trade and Arms and Ammunition between the Allied Powers under date of September 10, 1919, and the Mandates between the United States and Japan regarding the former German Islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator and particularly the island of Yap under date of February 11, 1922, have the following in common:

a. "Full power of administration and legislation over the Mandated territory, including control of public works and services, the importation of arms, etc. In short, it was a 'government in trust.'"

b. "No military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory."

c. "The Mandatory . . . allow all missionaries, nationals of any state, member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the [18] territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling."

d. "Any dispute between Japan and the other nations signing the Mandates, whether it be the first two Mandates mentioned, or the one direct with the United States, are to be settled by a negotiation of 'The Permanent Court of International Justice.'"

e. "Vested property rights in the Mandated Islands shall be respected and in no way impaired."

f. "The existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be applicable to the Mandated Islands."

g. "The United States and its nationals shall have free access to the island of Yap on a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nations and their respective nationals and all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable, or over any cable which may be hereafter laid or operated by the United States or its nationals connecting with the island of Yap."

h. There are many other provisions of the same effect of entire freedom of action with respect [19] to Yap.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, advised this Board: "Japan was given under a League of Nations mandate full power to administer the Mandated Islands as an integral part of Japan and to apply Japanese laws in the islands. The United States had expressly agreed in a treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, to administration by Japan of the islands pursuant to the League mandate. Among the Japanese laws the operation of which was extended to include the Mandated Islands was that which stipulated that all ports and harbors shall be closed to foreign vessels except those that were specifically opened to foreign trade. The opened ports in the Mandated Islands were Saipan, Palau, Angaur, Truk, Ponape, and Jaluit.

"Article II (3) of the Treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated Islands provided that: 'Existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be applicable to the mandated islands.' Article IV of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded between the United States and Japan on February 21, 1911, contained the following provisions: 'The citizens or subjects of each of the Contracting Parties, equally with the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, shall have liberty freely to come with their ships and cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in the territories of the other which are or may be opened to foreign commerce, subject always to the laws of the country to which they thus come.'

"By an exchange of notes which took place concurrently with the signing of the treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated Islands, Japan assured the United States that 'the usual comity will be extended to nationals and vessels of the United States in visiting the harbors and waters of those islands'. The term 'usual comity' in its application to visits by the nationals and vessels of other countries means the courtesy which is normally accorded by a country to the nationals and vessels of other countries."



Had the United States successfully insisted upon Japan living up to those treaty stipulations, the entire naval and military structure in the key Pacific Islands erected by the Japanese might have been made impossible. Japan, without authority of international law and in violation of the treaties and mandates above referred to, for nearly twenty years successfully and completely excluded other nationals from the mandated territories, and during this time built up army, navy and air installations of tremendous strategical value.

[20] As a consequence of the foregoing, Japan gained the enormous advantage of a string of naval and air and army bases across our lifeline to the Philippines and rendered futile and impotent any fortification of our own islands, such as Guam, Midway, Christmas, Palmyra, etc. It also placed the dagger's point at the heart of the Hawaiian Islands because such a base as Jaluit in the mandated islands was a thousand miles closer to Hawaii than to the homeland of Japan.

Our policy through the successive years appears to have been based upon a combination of fear of the Japanese and of an obsession not to give offense to the Japanese; a policy which because of their temperamental characteristics, proved to be one of weakness rather than of strength; it was also a policy of endeavoring to treat the Japanese on the basis that they were civilized and that their word could be trusted and at the same time one which treated them as if they were uncivilized and could not be trusted, and consequently we excluded them from the United States.

We entered the year of 1941 with two purposes in mind: first, to avoid war and settle our troubles by negotiation, treaties, and contracts; and, while negotiating, we applied exactly the opposite remedy of economic sanctions.

Efforts to visit the Mandated Islands, presumably to glean information, were said to have been made and were unsuccessful. (R. Miles, 101-107; Pye, 1064-1065; Bloch, 1503, 1527-1529; DeLaney 1702-1703; Kimmel, 1807-1808; Layton, 3054-3055.) The State Department explanation concerning these efforts is set forth below. The net result was, however, that we did not get into these Islands; the Japanese fortified the Islands and in [21] consequence the United States suffered. The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, presented his Department's views as follows:

The matter of visits to the Mandated Islands by American nationals or private American vessels, just as visits in general by American nationals and American private vessels to ports and places elsewhere in the world, did not call for a procedure involving requests through diplomatic channels by this Government to the Japanese Government and would not therefore have come within the cognizance of the Department of State, except in cases where, because of a refusal of the Japanese Government to permit such visits, this Government had taken diplomatic action at the instance of the American parties at interest. No record has been found in the Department's files of any application having been made by the Department to the Japanese Government for permission for American nationals or American private vessels to visit the Mandated Islands during the year 1940-1941, the years concerning which you made inquiry. According to the information made available to the Department in 1940, an officer attached to the office of the Naval Attache in Tokyo inquired in August 1939 at the ticket office of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha Steamship Company with regard to possibilities of making reservations for passages were filled for a period of three months. His subsequent efforts to obtain passage were frustrated by dilatory tactics on the part of the Japanese. No request for diplomatic assistance was made in that instance.

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The procedure followed by this Government in asking permission from the Japanese Government for visits by public vessels to Japanese ports or ports in Japanese mandated areas was in accord with the procedure followed by this Government in requesting permission for visits by its public vessels to the ports of other countries.

No record has been found of any requests in 1940 and 1941 by the War or Navy Department to this Department that there be taken up with the Japanese Government proposals for visits to the Mandated Islands or of this Government's having approached the Japanese Government during those years in regard to visits to the Mandated Islands. In previous years the Navy Department at various times asked this Department to obtain permission for certain United States naval vessels to visit certain specified opened and unopened ports in the Mandated Islands. The Department of State promptly made representations to the Japanese Government requesting the necessary permission. With regard to applications made prior to 1936 the Japanese Government indicated its readiness [22] to permit American public vessels to visit the opened ports but not the unopened ports named in the lists submitted by the Navy Department. The Navy Department, however, canceled the proposed visits to the opened ports for which permission to visit had been granted. In the approaches made by this Government in 1936 and in 1937, the Japanese Government, on grounds of inconvenience, withheld its permission for United States public vessels to visit the opened ports as well as the unopened ports of the Mandated Islands.

In view of the fact that the Japanese Government in 1936 refused in actual practice to permit visits to the opened ports as well as to the unopened ports in the Mandated Islands and in view also of the fact that with the termination in 1936 of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament, signed at Washington in 1922, this Government became free to fortify the Aleutian Islands, this Government decided to adopt a more restrictive policy with regard to the admission of Japanese war or other public vessels to the Aleutians and to Alaska. After 1936 visits by Japanese public vessels were permitted only to Dutch Harbor, also known as Unalaska, and, on two occasions, to the Pribiloff Islands which the Japanese were permitted to visit because of special circumstances arising out of the Convention of 1911 for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals. Subsequent to 1936 permission was withheld for all visits by Japanese public vessels to the territorial waters of the western Aleutian Islands.

The Japanese consulate and its consular agents in Hawaii enjoyed diplomatic immunity. This gave them a free rein in their spying activities and unrestricted communication by radio and cable with the mainland of Japan in reporting upon the movements of our fleet and the status of our armed defenses in Hawaii.<sup>9</sup> Neither the Army, the Navy, nor the F. B. I. had [23] authority to tap these lines and find out what was going on because of our own legal restriction, the Communications Act of 1934.<sup>10</sup>

No better example of the failure to control consular agents and the results thereof can be found than the case of the consul general in Honolulu. This man had about 200 consular agents in the Islands. He used the commercial telephone and telegraph for reporting on our defenses and fleet movements with impunity. When he was arrested with his agents on December 7th, a large number of his messages were found in the wastepaper basket, torn up and partially burned. As a result of eight months' work in piecing a portion of these together,

<sup>9</sup> Admiral McMorris, head of the War Plans Division of Staff of Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, 1941, said: "I never entertained any doubt, any time during 1941, that the Japanese were fully informed of all military activities in this area." (R. 2882.)

<sup>10</sup> Memorandum of September 29, 1944, from James Lawrence Fly, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission: "The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of 1934, under which the Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which it derives its powers, prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages transmitted between points in the United States, including its territories, and a foreign country (Section 603). Since that prohibition upon the Commission had not been in any way superseded, the Commission did not intercept any messages over the radiotelegraph, cable telegraph or radiotelephone circuits between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan prior to December 7, 1941."



Colonel Fielder, G-2 under General Short and since that time G-2 in Hawaii, produced a number of these reconstructed messages which clearly revealed that military information was being gathered and transmitted to Japan. The day before this event took place a radio-phone message, that was monitored, between a Japanese doctor's house [24] in Honolulu and a newspaper in Japan was heard and reported, late on December 6, and was given extensive consideration by General Short and Colonel Fielder, G-2; but its exacting meaning could not be made out. This message is referred to as the Mori message. (R. 2961.) The next morning the Japanese struck. The evident trend of this message was to report upon the state of the naval defenses and the presence of the fleet as well as the Army defenses.

This Board believes that Japan's spying activities could have been determined, the intentions of the Japanese revealed and much important information gathered, which would probably have prevented in large measure the Pearl Harbor disaster, had the Army and Navy been permitted, with the F. B. I., to tap these lines and find out what was going on. If the consular agents were conducting commercial business, no harm would have been done; if they were not limiting their activities to consular business, we then had a right to know it and to take action accordingly, either by an open breach or by preparing ourselves to meet what they were doing.

Ambassador Grew has well stated that there are three lines of defense for a nation such as ours; the diplomatic line of defense, the Navy, and the Army. However, the diplomatic line—held by the State Department—ofttimes handicaps and influences the preparation for the Army and Navy defense lines. As an illustration, the policy of compromise between economic [25] sanctions and negotiations<sup>11</sup> in turn influenced War Department action, in that Short was told by the War Department, which in turn reflected the so he was told not to alarm the population nor to disclose intent.<sup>12</sup> There appears to be no evidence of a strong policy of standing up for American rights and boldly stepping out and making the Japanese behave themselves; and this in the face of the fact that it was well known that people of the character of the Japanese and their national attitude of mind respect only force and strength and do not respect a policy of good intentions nor demands of conduct without means to enforce same.

The Board is impressed with the necessity for a closer, more aggressive relationship between the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the War and Navy Departments, in using all of their facilities as a coordinated team for the defense of the United States.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said: "With regard to the lines along which this Government's foreign policy with respect to Japan was directed in 1941, a detailed record is given in Chapter XIV of *Peace and War* (a publication issued by the Department in 1943), and on pages 325-386 of Volume II of *Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941*."

<sup>12</sup> The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said: "With regard to your request for an expression of the Department's views touching upon the influence of foreign policy upon military directives, it was not the policy of this Government to take provocative action against any country or to cause Japan to commit an act of war against the United States."

<sup>13</sup> The State Department counter proposals of the 26th of November, which Japan considered as an ultimatum, the day before the Army and Navy, Marshall-Stark memorandum could be delivered asking no ultimatum, is a case in point. Mr. Hull said after delivering his ultimatum that he washed his hands of the matter and left it to the Army and Navy. (R. Stimson, 4051-4053, 4078-4079.)

[26] The Japanese policy was typical of the oriental mind, which is predominantly a bargaining mind, asking twice as much as they expect to get and then settling on a compromise. Any show of weakness merely strengthens the hand of the bargainer, and any crack in the bargainer's front causes him to lose face and bargaining power. Therefore the action of the United States in demilitarizing Guam by removing its guns and other equipment and thus attempting to show Japan the peaceful intentions of the United States, was undoubtedly considered by Oriental Japan as an evidence of weakness and merely served to put our interests backward instead of forward. (R. 3062.)

[27] 4. *U. S. Policy, (1939-1941).*—We had been following the policy immediately before the war which broke out between Germany, England, and France, of veering away from anything that would precipitate a conflict with the Japanese. In view of the tense international situation, particularly after the outbreak of the European War in August 1939, it became apparent that it would be necessary for us to redouble our efforts to avoid any open friction with the Japanese, both because we wished to devote what resources were available to the assistance of England and France, with whom we were in deep sympathy; and also, for the further purpose, that we were inadequately prepared to meet any attack from Japan in the Pacific.<sup>14</sup>

[28] As events became more critical in 1940 and 1941, the necessity of following a policy for delay and apparent appeasement of Japan increased to one of great national urgency. We were faced with a dual load of unpreparedness for any war and the necessity of sending England and France what equipment and supplies were available.

It was, therefore, natural with this factual situation to bow to the necessity of avoiding war by trying to appease Japan. We found it expedient to lean over backwards to avoid any appearance in Hawaii of a war-like or belligerent attitude, particularly, in view of and towards the large Japanese population of the islands.<sup>15</sup>

Our general national policy and, particularly the War Department policy, very naturally conveyed itself to the Commanders in residence in Hawaii. Their acts were colored and their dispositions tempered by the repeated cautions in this direction as we sought for time to prevent an untoward incident from precipitating war with Japan before we were ready to meet it. The fact that they were not more fully advised of the progress towards a critical international situation in the Pacific must be taken into account.

<sup>14</sup> Captain Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, gave this very significant testimony, when asked if the American Navy, with two of its carriers, had discovered the task force that attacked Hawaii and had attacked this force at sea, what would have been the outcome:

"Captain LAYTON. I think the American forces here would have taken the licking of their life, first, because the American people were not psychologically prepared for war.

"General RUSSELL. How would the psychology of the American people influence a naval engagement off of Oahu?

"Captain LAYTON. I am referring to the American Navy as a part of the American people, and I use this example: During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a portion of a squadron of American carrier planes were then flying in from a carrier to Ford Island. They were attacked by Japanese fighters, and it is to be observed that these planes were armed with machine gun ammunition and machine guns ready to fire, and I can find no record of any of these carrier planes firing one single shot at any Japanese plane." (R. 3047.)

<sup>15</sup> 160,000 Japanese were in the Islands, composing about one-third of the population. (R. 2947.)



This policy of avoiding any act to offend the Japanese was offset to some degree by one at right angles to it, of the application of commercial restrictions which tended to strangle her economic life and her preparation for war. For instance, the refusal to sell scrap to Japan, the abrogation [29] of Japanese commercial rights under treaty and the failure to renew that treaty with Japan, the oil embargo and similar incidents were at variance with this general policy.

The net result was a national policy towards Japan which reflected itself in the "Do-Don't" type of instructions that characterized the messages from the War Department to Hawaiian Commanders up until December 7, 1941.

The policy of our government as practiced by our public officials in their attitude towards Japan was not one of appeasement openly, but it was that in effect. Every effort was being exerted to prevent a rupture of relations with Japan, while presenting a show of face by economic sanctions to restrain Japanese aggression. Every effort was made to maintain the *status quo* until we were ready. Time was our most precious commodity in 1941.

[30] 5. *Moral Embargoes Versus Japanese Expansion*.—No competent understanding can be gained of the relationship with Japan unless we break down the problem into its essential aspects. Japanese industry had received a succession of serious blows by reason of our successive steps of not renewing the commercial treaty with Japan, the cutting off of scrap to Japan, the cessation of our trade in silk with Japan, the oil embargo, the freezing of credits and assets, and numerous other incidents. On the diplomatic front, strong efforts were being made to maintain the *status quo* leading up to the final visit of Japanese special Ambassadors to the United States terminating with Pearl Harbor. This situation generally trended, however, towards placating and appeasing Japan with such firmness as was necessary to keep the negotiations going.

During all of this period the government was not supported by a public that was war-minded; just the contrary. Public irritation was increasing, but it was still hoping to avoid war. On the contrary, Japan's attitude toward the United States was one of increasing hostility. Its policy was to conduct its aggressions starting in 1935 against China, as rapidly and as effectively as its resources would permit, while maintaining a diplomatic screen and pretense of considering the views of the United States. Being unable to agree with them, it had no intention of doing so whatsoever.

During this period Japan made no concessions. It was quite apparent that she would continue her course until the patience of the United States was exhausted; and the United States was forced into a position of an open breach—the time of that breach was stipulated clearly to the President [31] November 27 by General Mashall and Admiral Stark. The delivery of the counter proposals to Japan on November 26 anticipated that time—war came before we were fully prepared.

It was well known that Japan's entry into all wars of the past had been characterized by the first overt act of war coming simultaneously with the declaration. The services, both Army and Navy, were well aware of this Japanese characteristic. It was, therefore, to be

expected that an unexpected attack would be made by Japan as the first indication of a breach of relations. This is well expressed by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified:

General RUSSELL. Then you were not surprised at the air attack on the 7th of December?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I was not surprised, in one sense, in any attack that would be made; but I was watching, with considerably more care, because I knew more about it, the attack that was framing up in the southwestern Pacific. And I knew also that there was a concentration in the mandated islands—I know now, because I was shown by General Arnold the letter about the telegram, and an order; so that that was an additional threat, and that might fall on either Hawaii or Panama. (R. 4072.)

Indeed, Ambassador Grew on January 27, 1941, sent the State Department the following message:

TOKYO, January 27, 1941—6 p. m.  
(Received January 27—6:38 a. m.)

A member of the Embassy was told by my . . . colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese Military forces, in case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of *all* the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic.

GREW.

[32] Japan, well knowing the policy of the United States had been to avoid war to the limit of its endurance, took advantage of our situation. It was, therefore, obvious that the United States would have to avoid friction with Japanese nationals as that would be a ready excuse for Japan to precipitate the issue prematurely. On the other hand, sabotage was to be expected from these Japanese nationals. A large body of them, as in Hawaii, was a potential source of great danger, not only as to what they might do, but as the basis of precipitation of an international incident with Japan.

The public generally did not understand the importance of Hawaii. It had no appreciation of the danger except as the press became increasingly insistent in pointing out the progress of the advance towards war and the likelihood that this outpost would be involved in the conflict as one of the first line elements of our western defense.<sup>16</sup>

The War Department was urging officially and privately that every effort be made to delay the declaration of war by Japan because of our serious state of unpreparedness and because much of our available military resources were being utilized to assist the United Nations. The battle of the Atlantic was the predominant factor in the public mind and dominated the policy of the War Department, as evidenced by the transfer of a considerable part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic. Therefore, the entire consciousness of the war [33] Department was directed towards avoiding any incident that might precipitate war with Japan while, at the same time, exerting its efforts to prepare for such a war. The War Department was confronted with a grave lack of planes, antiaircraft guns, and other implements

<sup>16</sup> *Fortune* magazine polled the public in late 1939 and made a report in January which showed that 55% of those questioned were in favor of defending Hawaii; 25% not to defend; and the balance did not know what they wanted.



of war with which to equip Hawaii with an adequate defense mechanism. The previous delay in implementing our defense had left us, two years after war had started in Europe, gravely lacking in our preparations. The strong anti-war group in the United States made it unwise for the United States to take stronger action against Japan.

These general policies apparently were the subject of discussion of the War Council.<sup>17</sup> Its policies were reflected [35] in the actions of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, as to measures taken for defense in the Pacific. It is necessary to keep these factors in mind in reading the messages from the War Department to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. The handling of Japan had been a mixture of diverse policies; and this reflected itself in War Department messages to Hawaii, which both told Short to prepare for defense and at the same time to do nothing in preparing it that might precipitate trouble with the local Japanese population or excite the local public. As evidence of this was the fact that Short responded to the situation by selecting an anti-sabotage alert and the War Department took no exception to it. These two conflicting courses of action were reflected in the messages and in the policies of the War Department; they account in part for the attitude of mind of Short and others in the Hawaiian Department. Whether justified or not, we consider later.

Then, too, official War Department thought on the subject of Pacific defense was almost wholly concentrated as to what might happen

<sup>17</sup> There is some apparent confusion of that testimony in the use of this term, and the two bodies to which it refers. The situation was clarified by the testimony of Mr. Stimson, who said:

"The first subject that was listed here is that of the 'War Councils'. By the 'War Councils' we meant the meetings that were held by the Secretary of State, possibly the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, from time to time, to discuss the relations between the Japanese Empire and the American Government.

"The name 'War Council' is the name of a statutory body which was created in, I think, the National Defense Law of about 1920; but it was purely a War Department board. It did not have any members from the Navy or from any other department in it.

"The War Council was in effect and used to meet, usually on Wednesdays, in the times that we were talking over, but it consisted solely of myself, my assistants, civil assistants, and the Chief of Staff and such other officers as I invited in; and it had nothing to do with the Navy or matters outside of this Department. But we did have two sets of meetings—they can hardly be dignified by the 'organization'—but early, very soon after Mr. Knox and I came into the Government in 1940, we decided that we ought to meet regularly, and we ought to meet with the Secretary of State; we were approaching important matters; and so we went to the Secretary of State and asked him if he had any objection to meeting with us once a week. He agreed cordially, and accordingly we began meeting on Tuesday mornings at 9:30 every week, whenever we were present in Washington, or able to come, and those series of [34] meetings went on until Mr. Knox died; they lasted right through.

"They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were very regular, and we met once a week regularly; and during the time at which you are about to inquire, just before Pearl Harbor, we had extra meetings. In fact, we were in such a meeting on the Sunday morning that the Japanese attacked. The meetings took place in the State Department, Mr. Hull's office, and during that time the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Navy, and myself were in constant contact.

"The other set of meetings were meetings called by the President, which he usually called with great regularity—the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff—that was, of course, General Marshall—the Chief of Naval Operations, who was at that time Admiral Stark; and sometimes, General Arnold. Well, that was also improvised, so to speak; it had no custom before it. It was created in the light of the approaching emergency, and among ourselves, as a nickname we called it the 'War Cabinet,' or the 'War Council,' or something like that; and evidently Mr. Hull, from what you say, used that expression in his White Paper.

"There was no regular day set for the meetings of that body. They met on the call of the President, at his office; and during this time about which you particularly ask, the autumn of 1941, they were meeting very frequently, also; and, fortunately, I have records. I have kept records during the time that I am here, in which I have set down very briefly, and without much reference to good English sometimes, what was taking place, including everything that was important, that I deemed to be important; in regard to the crisis that was coming along; and including these meetings; so that I am in a position where I can give you dates of these meetings pretty fully." (R. 4041-4043.) (General Marshall, R. 5-6.)

to the Philippines, the intermediate islands, and Panama. It was there that the main attack, in the first phase, was expected from Japan. No early attack was expected on Hawaii. As the Chief of Staff testified, it was a surprise to him. (R. 9.)

All efforts were being made towards strengthening these outposts. Such modern bombing aircraft as could be made available was being flown to the Philippine theater. Likewise, efforts were being made to strengthen the defenses of Midway, Guam, Wake, and other localities judged to become the first [36] involved. The Hawaiian defense was clearly secondary at that time, although prior thereto it was considered as our strongest outpost and had first priority on equipment and maintenance. (R. 14, 184.)

Planes flown from the mainland as late as December 7, 1941 to Hawaii en route to the Philippines were not supplied with ammunition until they were ready to depart from Hawaii. General Arnold explains this was because of the necessity of carrying sufficient gas to insure a safe arrival. (R. 168.) This too led to a state of mind, both officially and personally, in the responsible officers of the Hawaiian Department, that, even if war with Japan was about to start, Japan would not initially attack Hawaii. It was felt that Hawaii was quite well down on the list of objectives of Japan, as those parts of American territory closer to Japan would be the first to feel the blow and that the implementing of other defenses must give way in priority to those thought to become the first involved. (R. 2872.)

Japan shrewdly calculated and estimated correctly this state of mind. It arrived at this conclusion and acted accordingly, temporarily by-passing the Philippines and the intermediate American islands, for a direct attack on Hawaii December 7, 1941, just as Ambassador Grew had clearly warned in his message of January 27, 1941. So clearly did Japan understand our national psychology that it selected Sunday morning, early, as the time for attack, well knowing this to be the best time to achieve surprise. Japan took, as the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force estimated, a 50 to 1 shot. Later, it will appear how well that venture was [37] prepared and executed, and how well timed as an answer to our counter proposals of November 26, which the Japanese considered an ultimatum; because it was on and after the delivery of that document against which General Marshall and Admiral Stark warned too late, that the task force of Japan that attacked Hawaii moved out of its rendezvous at Takan Bay on the 27th or 28th of November to launch the attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.<sup>18</sup>

[38] 6. *Public Demands Action Against Japanese.*—Our national policy has been to avoid war. The difficulty with our policy appears to have been its conflicting nature, in that in the case of Japan we desired to avoid war, to continue in business with Japan, and at the same time to prevent Japanese aggression by both negotiation and simultaneously to apply economic sanctions against Japan. As our nation was not prepared for war, it left the administration, particularly the State Department, without the full support of the public so it could proceed with a firm policy toward Japan; and it left the War and Navy Departments without sufficient means to implement a more aggressive policy towards Japan.

<sup>18</sup> The best attainable evidence supports this statement (R. 3033.)



The result of this conflicting situation made it extremely difficult for the State Department to handle negotiations with Japan, which well knew our national policy. It was difficult both to negotiate for a peaceful solution of differences with a nation such as Japan, and at the same time impede negotiations by applying economic sanctions such as the freezing of assets and credits, the cutting off of the supply of oil and scrap, and the termination of a commercial treaty with Japan.

This conflicting element of policy reflected itself in the actions directed by the War Department to its field commanders, who were required to both take all the necessary precautions to meet war and at the same time to take no steps either to excite the civil population or to precipitate war by overt acts. Such a policy was particularly difficult to carry out in Hawaii, where there was a very large proportion, some thirty percent, of the population of the nationality of [39] Japan. The danger, therefore, was great in carrying out the War Department policy, that in our preparations for war we would precipitate an issue with Japanese nationals in the Hawaiian Islands which would be an excuse by Japan to open hostilities.

This state of public mind was further inflamed to demand action by the Government against Japan, because of the latter's open aggressions in 1941; but effective action was impossible of fulfillment because of the long public policy of only maintaining a very modest army and navy. Public opinion can change far faster than a nation can make ready for war. The time element of making preparations for war is so long that it always lags behind a sudden change of public views, as in our case with Japan. Our public opinion had changed against Japan faster than preparations for war could be made.

This left the Department of State with the most difficult task of negotiation without means of enforcing its views by force of arms. It likewise left the War and Navy Departments unable to fully support the State Department in its negotiations. This led to a compromise solution, due to this public opinion as expressed by the press, in the form of a resort to economic sanctions.

But the difficulty with economic sanctions was that, while it indicated a firm policy on the part of the United States, it also so aggravated the situation in that it made negotiations difficult of either progress or consummation. At most, our national policy was one of defensive character while waiting for the preparations for war to catch up with the new state of the public mind that Japan should be made to [40] behave herself and that our government should do something about it.

7. *Economic Sanctions Against Japan.*—In 1938 and 1939 a series of "moral embargoes" or commercial sanctions were applied to Japan by the United States. During those two years there had been brought about a cessation of the United States' export to Japan of airplanes, aeronautical equipment, and certain other materials. There also resulted a state of decline of export to Japan of strategic materials, and as of July 1940, under the Export Control Act, the President had curtailed or prohibited the export of basic war materials. Licenses were refused for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of machine tools as of September 1940.

The testimony of Ambassador Grew throws light upon the effect and result of embargoes. He said:

During the period up to, I think it was, the autumn of 1940, I took the position that economic embargoes against Japan—and embargoes are in the nature of sanctions and therefore are always interpreted as international insults—I took the position that we should not put embargoes on Japan, until we were prepared to go all the way through with whatever might result from those embargoes. I pointed out that when we put embargoes against Japan into effect, our relations with that country were bound to go steadily down-hill and it might, and probably would, end in war; and that until we were prepared to go to war with Japan, I felt it would be very short-sighted to get into a situation where we might be obliged at a later date to withdraw those embargoes. There is nothing so conducive to a lowering of national prestige, reputation, and authority as to make threats and then have to recall those threats or modify those threats. We saw that working out in the relations between Great Britain and Italy at the time of the Abyssinian campaign.

[41] But, in the autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that I felt that time had then come, since Japan was threatening not only our national interests, but, I would say, our vital national interests; I felt that the time had come to consider, not whether we must call a halt to Japan's expansion, but when. It seemed to me at that time, whether we were fully prepared for war or not, that we must in our own interests put those embargoes into effect; and shortly thereafter, those embargoes were put into effect.

Our relations then started directly on a downhill course, and they ended in war; but at least we were more prepared for war at that time than we had been two years earlier.

It was in the fall of 1940 that we cast the die and adopted economic sanctions. And we find it significant that about June 1940 General Herron as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department upon Washington orders went into an all-out alert into battle positions with live ammunition for six weeks. (R. 212.)

In September the export of iron and steel scrap was prohibited. The effect of the United States policy was to cut off from Japan by the winter of 1940-1941 the shipment of many strategic commodities, including arms, ammunition, and implements of war, aviation gasoline and many other petroleum products, machine tools, scrap iron, pig iron and steel manufactures, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and a variety of other commodities important to a war effort.

Further parallel to this course of action by the United States was the decision in August 1941 between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression, that the United States would continue its conversation with the [42] Japanese government and offer her a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which that country was embarked.<sup>19</sup>

As was stated in the White Papers<sup>20</sup> as to economic sanctions, he (Grew) said that

considering the temper of the people of Japan it was dangerously uncertain to base United States policy on a view that the imposition of progressive and rigorous economic measures would probably avert war; that it was the view of the Embassy that war would not be averted by such a course . . . Finally he warned of the possibility of Japan's adopting measures with dramatic and dangerous suddenness which might make inevitable a war with the United States.

<sup>19</sup> "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-41," Department of State, Washington, p. 129.

<sup>20</sup> "Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. I and Vol. II: and Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, Department of State, Washington, D. C."



As Ambassador Grew testified in summary :

However, I can say, in brief compass, that the trend of our relations during the period you mention; that is, the years 1940 and 1941; was almost steadily down-hill; we, of course, in our embassy in Tokyo, leaving nothing undone to arrest that trend; and I think everything was done that could possibly have arrested it, in our work in Tokyo. But, we were up against what I would call a "tidal wave" of military extremism in Japan; and I think the results as culminating in Pearl Harbor proved that fact.

The testimony of Ambassador Grew as to his actions as reflected in the State Department's White Papers and in extracts from his diary indicate that he too was acting under what [43] apparently was a conflicting policy but with a full recognition of the inevitable date of a final trial of strength with Japan. A review of Grew's communications to the State Department in the year 1941 is an excellent perspective of the course of the fatal events that led to Pearl Harbor.

On January 27, 1941, he communicated by wire with the State Department indicating that an attack on Pearl Harbor by all means available to the military and naval forces of Japan was being discussed, and he felt that it was so serious that it should be reported, even though it was fantastic to consider it; on February 1 he said the outlook was never darker for peace; on July 25 the United States froze Japanese assets, causing bitter Japanese resentment; on August 18 he reported the Japanese protest on U. S. economic pressure; on August 29 the United States applied the oil embargo, decided to send oil tankers to Russia and a military mission to China; on September 6 Grew reported the statement of the Japanese Premier that if the United States continued its economic sanctions it would prevent any settlement for six months to a year after they terminated, and on September 29 Grew sent an important message to Washington that the Japanese could only be brought to a halt by a show of force. He pointed out that any agreement would be a mere breathing spell for Japan, that war was likely in any event, and unless results were shown in the negotiations, more than had been demonstrated to date, the Japanese would conclude the United States was only playing for time and would act accordingly. On September 30 Grew protested at the secrecy of our conversations with Japan as practiced by the United States without advising the public, [44] whereas it was common knowledge in Japan.

On October 9 he significantly reported that the frozen-credit policy of the United States was driving Japan into national bankruptcy and she would be forced to act. His prediction was correct, because Tojo, the only Japanese Premier to stay on the active Army list in that position, was made Premier on October 16. There was an indication of trouble when the Premier of Japan was a dominant military figure on the active Army list, and on October 25 he reported that the Emperor ordered the Privy Council before him and asked them if they intended war. When they refused to answer, he instructed them that there should be no war with the United States. This was the final effort by conservative Japanese to avoid war. The next step would probably be war itself.

Grew warned on October 30 that the situation was fraught with the greatest danger. On November 3 he said that war was not only possible but probable and that Japan was preparing for hostilities "with dangerous and dramatic suddenness." It was on that date that

Kurusu left for Washington, refusing to take a *later* clipper for "technical reasons", the significance of which was apparent.

On November 7 Secretary Hull informed the Cabinet

that relations between Japan and the United States were "extremely critical" and that there was "imminent possibility" that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force. (White Papers, p. 136.)

This was followed by warnings of the impending seriousness of the situation in speeches made by Secretary of the Navy Knox and Under Secretary of State Welles, November 11, 1941.

[45] The White Papers continue:

On November 17 Ambassador Grew cabled from Tokyo that we could expect a "sudden Japanese Naval or military attack in regions not then involved".

Secretary Hull on November 25 and November 28 at meetings of high officials of this government,

stated there was practically no possibility of agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for the purpose thereof. (White Papers, p. 144.)

It does not appear that such a statement was sent by the Army and Navy to their field forces.

On November 26 the Secretary of State handed the President's Ten Points of Settlement to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. These proposals were verbally rejected by the Japanese Ambassadors at once, but they inquired as to any other basis of negotiation or a *modus vivendi*. The following day, at the request of the Japanese Ambassadors, the President received them and Secretary of State Hull, at which time the President reaffirmed with finality the "Ten Points", stating the three primary considerations upon which the "Ten Points" were based. On the same day, General Marshall and Admiral Stark wrote a joint memorandum to the President requesting that no ultimatum be delivered to the Japanese as the Army and Navy were not ready to precipitate an issue with Japan, and notified him of the agreement reached with the British and the [46] Dutch for reciprocal action in the case either one of them was attacked.

The proof indicates that the Marshall-Stark memorandum of the 27th to the President did not reach him until after the meeting with the Japanese Ambassador on the 27th or possibly on the 28th of November. Whether or not the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, now disclaims that this document of the 26th was an ultimatum, Ambassador Grew testifies that the Japanese so regarded it. (R. 4208, 4215, 4221, 4222.) They so acted upon it and Mr. Hull likewise so acted because he so informed the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, on the morning of November 27. The latter testified, based on his diary of contemporaneous events, thus:

The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy."



General RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I don't like to disturb you, but I have become a little confused on dates, about this telephone call. Was that on the 26th of—

Mr. STIMSON. This was the 27th.

General RUSSELL. 27th.

Mr. STIMSON. The day after the 26th.

General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. STIMSON. The 26th was the day he told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it.

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. Or whether he would break it off; and on the morning of the 27th, by telephone, he told me that he decided to break it off.

I then called up the President and talked with him about it. (R. 4052-4053).

On November 29 Secretary Hull said to the British Ambassador,

The matter will now go to the officials of the [47] Army and Navy.

He warned that the Japanese action would probably be

a desperate gamble and require the utmost boldness and risk.

His predictions were uncanny. (White Papers, pp. 144-145). On November 29, Ambassador Grew relates that there had just reached Japan news that the President had made a proposition to settle Japanese grievances by giving her substantially most of what she wanted,<sup>21</sup> and on December 1 Grew reported Japan cold to the proposals, a fact Secretary Hull had found on the 26th when he handed the President's Ten Points to the Japanese Ambassador. On the same day, December 1, his diary shows that he had a conversation with a Japanese friend apparently high in that government, Grew saying

everything was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan.

On December 6 an address of Tojo was read for the Diet different from all others heretofore delivered by him, the tone of which clearly indicated Japanese intentions. The following day, on Sunday morning, the Pearl Harbor attack occurred.

[48] 8. *The Hawaiian Population Problem: Sabotage Complex.*—The conditions in Hawaii and the state of the public mind in Hawaii were considered apparently by the War Department to be primary factors to be taken into consideration in the carrying out of the military mission of the defense of the islands and defense of the fleet. As elsewhere indicated in War Department communications, this was a fact; and the responsible commanders in Hawaii in the Army also gave great weight to the state of the Hawaiian situation on the civil side.

It is significant that it had been the national policy of the United States to exclude Japanese nationals from the United States and its territories, both for self-protection and to protect American labor against cheap foreign labor of the yellow races. Yet in Hawaii, our fleet base and one of our most important defense outposts, we permitted the introduction into the population of the islands of Japanese, to the extent of 30% of the total population or 160,000.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> "Ten Years in Japan" by Ambassador Grew.

<sup>22</sup> There are three classes of Japanese population: (a) old aliens known as Issei, about 37,500; (b) Hawaiian-born Japanese who are sent back to the mainland of Japan for education known as Kibei, about 2,599; and (c) Hawaiian-born Japanese and Hawaiian-educated known as Nisei, composing the balance of 160,000. 95% of the Japanese children attended the Japanese language schools. Under Japanese Law no Japanese is released from Japanese citizenship until he goes through a formal procedure securing his release from that citizenship. Most Japanese in the Islands have not secured such a release and they therefore have dual citizenship in the United States and Japan. Approximately 50,000 Japanese attended the Shinto temples of which there were 55. Around these temples were centered the teachings of Japanese culture, patriotism, and family fealty.

[49] Many were Japanese of dual citizenship who, although born in the United States, had not yet taken the steps made available by Japan to become released from their Japanese citizenship. These Japanese laborers and artisans were comparatively economical in terms of performance, useful both in agricultural pursuits and as artisans, were highly prized by the great commercial interests in sugar cane, pineapples, shipping, and other interests of the Islands; and it was the urgent desire of these commercial interests apparently both to enjoy the protection and profits from the basing of the fleet in Hawaii and also to have no disturbance of such labor or to be led into any situation that would disturb these profitable labor relations.

This policy of encouraging the Japanese and permitting them to become dominant in the affairs of the Islands has even gone so far as to permit the Japanese to become important political factors with membership in both the Senate and the House of Hawaii, and to dominate, by way of majority, the Island governing councils in some of the islands of the Hawaiian Group. (R. 2941.)

Sabotage was a critical consideration by the local Army authorities. But up to December 7 there had been not a single instance of sabotage. On December 7 a number of illegal radio stations interfered with the radio operations of the Army. No other specific instance of sabotage or alien enemy action had been reported either by the War Department of Hawaii or by G-2 or the F. B. I. in Hawaii.

Additionally, the placing of the Army upon alert by War Department order to General Herron, by which his troops moved [50] into the field in battle positions with live ammunition in June 1940, had no effect upon the civilian population or their anxieties. Subsequent frequent alerts and maneuvers which were constantly going on, including Short's Alert Number 1 as to sabotage, had had no effect upon the civil population. All activities of the Army in disturbing the local populace paled by comparison with the contents of the local newspapers and their reports of the war news and the progressively increasing threats of Japanese action. Indeed, approximately a week before the attack at Pearl Harbor, a local newspaper in Hawaii carried a complete prediction of this attack on the following Sunday. (Exhibits 19-19a.)

The foregoing statement of fact as to background should be considered in connection with the communication of the War Department warnings as to sabotage, the action of General Short in placing the Department under the Number 1 Alert against sabotage on November 27, and the claimed reasons for not taking other defensive measures, because of the reluctance to disturb both the civilian population and the alien population of Hawaii.

The effect of such an atmosphere upon the policies and actions of the responsible commanders and their resulting state of mind is an important factor for consideration. As part of this state of mind, it was generally considered that Japan would never dare attack; and certainly, in the early stages of a war, she would not dare risk the major portion of her carriers for the launching of such an attack.

(R. 3919-3920.) See also Chapter I, "Gentlemen of Japan" by B. S. Haven, Ziff-Davis Publishing Co.; "Feudal Hawaii; Paradise, Ltd." by Stanley High, *Readers Digest*, June 1943, pp. 19-23; and "Are the Japs Hopeless?" by George Horne, *Saturday Evening Post*, September 9, 1944.



The probabilities were strongly against such a bold and possibly suicidal move by Japan.

[51] The state of mind engendered by the sabotage issue and the presence of the large Japanese population built up a sabotage consciousness in the responsible authorities as a more likely course of Japanese action than what was regarded as the more remote military operation of a direct air attack. This background is important to consider in evaluating the decisions arrived at by the Army commander and the actions taken by his associates.

The existence of this state of public opinion had its effect upon the evaluation by the Army of the Japanese capabilities. Likewise, it was supplemented by the American attitude that Japan would not dare attack the United States in what was regarded as its home territory in the Islands, in the presence of the fleet, which was considered an asset and not, in reality, a liability.

Senator Hill of the Hawaiian Senate testified (R. 2939-2940) as to the protests of local commercial interests to General Emmons when he proposed to take action in removing the dangerous Japanese from the sugar plantations after the Pearl Harbor attack. He said the political pressure brought to bear by these interests was sufficient to bring about a cancellation of this effort of General Emmons. It was significant of the propaganda pressure on the subject of doing nothing to offend the Japanese in the Islands and to let them alone so they could work for these Island industries and agriculture, which must have been imposed heavily upon General Short. The constant application of such pressure for a period of nearly a year upon General Short doubtless had a material effect upon his mind and upon his anxiety about the Japanese population, [52] about which he could do nothing. This was particularly reflected in his refusal to have legal action taken against those who failed to register as aliens. (R. 3255-3256.)

It was well known in Honolulu to both the F. B. I. and G-2 of the Army that there were certain Japanese activities that were inimical to the best interests of the United States in the Hawaiian Islands. A Japanese combines in his Shinto religion, centering about the Shinto temples, three things: patriotism, religion, and family fealty. Those three things compose his entire emotional, political, and family life.

The Shinto priests and the large number, 55, of Shinto temples in the Islands were the focal point of Japanese propaganda, patriotism, and disloyalty to the United States. This was all well known and could have been cured promptly by closing the temples and arresting the priests, as was done after December 7. Then there were the Shinto societies, and particularly the Black Dragon Society. The Japanese are well known as great organizers and they had countless organizations, many of which were of potential subversive character. The Japanese ran their own Japanese-language newspapers which promoted the same national spirit. They had Japanese-language schools in which they taught Japanese customs, family fealty, religion, and patriotism to Japanese children one hour each day after their regular education in the American schools. Here again our national policy, due to freedom of the press and freedom of religion and of education, permitted these people to jeopardize the defense of Hawaii. After December 7 the Japanese newspapers were put under strict control.

and used by the United States for propaganda agencies to control the [53] Japanese population, and the Shinto temples were closed.

9. *Hawaiian Press*.—The state of mind and the state of information in the Hawaiian Islands leading up to Pearl Harbor, and particularly before it, is not better illustrated than the articles appearing in the *Honolulu Advertiser* and the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*. A mere recitation of these headlines would seem to have been sufficient to have warned General Short and his subordinate officers of the critical international situation.

The newspaper headlines in question read as follows: "U. S. Waits Japan Reply" (29 Nov 41—*Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Japanese May Strike Over Weekend"; "Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready For Battle" (30 Nov 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*); "Hull, Kurusu In Crucial Meeting Today" (1 Dec 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*); "U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows"; "Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension"; "War Fears Grow in Philippines" (1 Dec 41—*Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace with U. S."; "Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations" (2 Dec 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*); "Huge Pincer Attack on U. S. By Japan, France Predicted" (3 Dec 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*); "Japan Spurns U. S. Program" (4 Dec 41—*Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today" (4 Dec 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*); "Singapore on War Footing"; "New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo"; "Civilians Urged to Leave Manila" (6 Dec 41—*Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China"; "Japanese Navy Moving South"; "Detailed Plans Completed for M-Day Setup" (6 Dec 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*); "F. D. R. Will Send Message [54] to Emperor on War Crisis" (7 Dec 41—*Honolulu Advertiser*).<sup>23 24</sup>

10. *Summary*.—We have learned a great deal about psychological warfare since this nation went to war. Looking backwards, it is possible to see that the psychological phases of the preparatory period for war leading up to the conflict with Japan had an immense effect upon the state of mind of our own public, officials and commanders; and upon what they did or did not do, prior to December 7. The deception of Japan and its actions based upon that deception in combination with our own failures to take precautions against the attack played no small part in the disaster of December 7th.

Our complacent nation appeared to be sure, in view of its wealth and industrial strength and its prestige and leadership, that no one would presume to attack it.

This national pride and vanity and sense of false security, so prevalent on the mainland, undoubtedly had its influence in Hawaii.

With the foregoing background it is possible to understand more accurately and judge the following story of Pearl Harbor from early January 1941 until the attack and shortly thereafter.

<sup>23</sup> Complete excerpts from the newspapers during this period will be found in Exhibits 19 and 19A.

<sup>24</sup> The editors of both papers were called and examined as witnesses. They testified that these headlines resulted from deductions based on current trends in international relations gleaned from news dispatches. No other factual data was available to them. (R. 3107-3108, 3169-3170)



[I]

## CHAPTER III. THE STORY OF PEARL HARBOR

## A. GENERAL

*1. Introduction: Scope of the Chapter and its Purpose*

Chronological story of the events, documents, and actions culminating in the Pearl Harbor disaster; statement of the facts and circumstances; two primary periods, from January through September and from October through December.

*2. Geographical*

Hawaii and outposts; reason for location of naval and military establishments in the Islands.

*3. Mission of Army in Hawaii*

Joint tasks, Army tasks; Navy tasks.

*4. Condition of the Hawaiian Department at the Time of Short's Assumption of Command and Just Prior Thereto*

Report of the Navy on weaknesses of Army Pearl Harbor defenses concurred in by the Army; action of the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of War.

*5. Organization of the Navy at Pearl Harbor*

Organization of the Navy complex, duties of Admiral Kimmel; duties of Admiral Bloch; duties of Admiral Bellinger; problem of Short in dealing with this complex organization.

## B. EVENTS FROM JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1941

*1. Selection of General Short*

Selection by General Marshall; instructions and basis of his action; correspondence between the Chief of Staff and Commanding General Hawaiian Department as to plans, policies, and status of defense in Hawaii.

*2. Short's Staff*

Selection of Colonel Phillips and his training for Chief of Staff, qualifications of Phillips; Short's relationship with his senior officers.

*3. Short's Actions in Building Defense Installations and Adding Equipment*

Short diligent in his demands for equipment, defense construction, and personnel; status of defenses summarized as of December 7, 1941.

[II] *4. Short's Reorganization of Divisions*

Reorganization of the Hawaiian Division into triangular divisions, unusually heavy fire power in the divisions.

*5. Short's Relationship With the Navy*

Efforts to carry out Chief of Staff's direction as to cooperation; resulting agreements with the Navy generally considered and their effect.

*6. Abandonment of Herron's Field Order #1: Adoption of Triple Alert System: Sabotage Issue*

Standard Operating Procedure of July 14 and November 5, 1941; the three alert system; the distribution of Standard Operating Procedure; the effect of the three alerts; the composition of the Japanese population in Hawaii and the sabotage issue; views on sabotage by the Japanese in the Islands from local leaders in Hawaii.

*7. Navy Long Distance Reconnaissance*

Short's assumptions as to the Navy's conducting long distance reconnaissance by air and water; Navy's acceptance of the responsibility for long distance reconnaissance; the long distance reconnaissance essence of defense of Oahu; failure to take steps to implement the agreement by the Navy to do long distance reconnaissance; effect of the failure to have long distance reconnaissance; relationship of Army's close-in reconnaissance; place of the Aircraft Warning Service in the reconnaissance system; the radio interceptor system; the failure of the reconnaissance arrangements.

### 8. *Agreements Between Army and Navy*

War plans, Joint Action of the Army-Navy 1935; Rainbow War Plan; Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier; category of defense D; Joint Air Agreement; Short's problem in dealing with Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger to fix responsibility of the Navy under the agreements; failure to implement the agreements; failure to put the agreements into operation; uncertainty as to when the agreements would go into operation; unity of command issue; agreements go into effect upon actual emergency too late without previous practice and organization of staff; training explanation as reason [III] for not putting agreements into effect; complete absence of ability to implement the agreement between the Navy and the Army.

### 9. *Estimate of the Situation*

Estimate pursuant to the Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941; operating plans by Bellinger and Martin April 9, 1941; joint estimate of the situation; Short's responsibilities under the estimate of the situation; concurrence by the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of War, Admiral Richardson, Admiral Kimmel, General Herron, and General Short in air attack the primary danger; Chief of Staff's repeated warnings that air superiority against air attack matter of first priority; responsibility of Short to provide defense to the primary threat of air attack.

## C. CRITICAL PERIOD OCTOBER 1 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

### 1. *Vital Messages*

Short's action in taking Air Force personnel and putting them on military police duty; Chief of Staff's objections supporting the Air Force; Navy message October 16, warning Japanese relations deteriorating; War Department radio of October 18, 1941 Japanese deteriorating relationships, November 24, 1941 radio Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet doubtful outcome of negotiations with Japan and warning surprise attack possibility; November 26, 1941 War Department radio instructing Short special photo mission Jaluits; November 27, 1941 Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet "war warning"; November 27, 1941 Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, negotiations with Japan terminated practical purposes; instructing action to be taken; November 27, 1941 G-2 War Department to G-2 Hawaiian Department possible hostilities may begin; Short's selection of Alert Number 1 and reply to War Department advising such selection November 27, 1941; knowledge of the War Department of his decision; significant Navy messages of December 3, 4, and 6, 1941.

### 2. *Analysis of the Situation From November 24 to November 27*

War Council action on the 25 November 1941; War Council and Secretary of State action with the Japanese on November 26, 1941; absence of the Chief of Staff from Washington from evening of the 26th to the 28th; draft of message of 27th by Chief of Staff on 26th; counter proposals handed by the Secretary of State to Japanese Ambassadors 26 November 1941; construction of the counter proposals by the Japanese and their action; the Marshall-Stark memorandum.

### 3. *The Drafting of the Message #472 of the 27th*

Meeting with the Secretary of War to modify the message to be sent General Short; authorship of various parts of the message identified; Short's position as to the position with reference to long distance reconnaissance; Short's claim of ambiguity in the message considered; Gerow's recollection of the conferences of the 27th; communication of the contents of the message by Short to his principal commanders; the question of secrecy and method of transmission considered.

### 4. *Analysis of the November 27, 1941 Message*

Parts of the message considered in light of Short's responsibilities and knowledge; message considered in connection with estimate of the situation; message considered in connection with the alert to be adopted; message considered in connection with the communication of its contents in view of restrictions on Short.

### 5. *Messages 28th November to 6th December, Inclusive*

G-2 message November 28, 1941 #484; War Department message November 28, 1941 #482; Short's reply to #482 on 28 November, 1941; December 3, 1941 Navy message on destruction of codes; Navy message of December 4, 1941 on codes; Navy message December 6, 1941 on codes; Short's position as to reception of this information.



6. *December 7, 1941 Message*

Its method of sending, status of communication; what happened in transmission; other means of communication available.

7. *Failure of Navy To Advise Short of Enemy Submarine in Pearl Harbor on Morning December 7, 1941*

Submarine reported sunk by the Navy about 7:15 a. m.; no report made to Short.

8. *Failure of Aircraft Warning Service To Advise of Approaching Planes, December 7, 1941*

Status of aircraft warning system, detection of the approaching planes; efforts of the mobile station to communicate the information to higher authority; Lt. Tyler's disposal of the matter.

9. *Navy Failure To Advise Short of Suspected Naval Concentration in the Jaluits*  
Loss of radio contact 25th of November to December 1.

10. *Navy Account of the Japanese Task Force That Attacked Pearl Harbor: Sources of Information to Japanese*

Origin of information of the attacking forces; history of the attacking forces and the dates of its movement; intelligence sources to the Japanese as to the disposition; activities of the Japanese consulate; maps of the Japanese based upon intelligence information; Japanese information of the disposition from Alert Number 1.

11. *Information not Given Short*

Jaluit task force; information on negotiations with Japanese; no disapproval of his selection of sabotage alert number 1; additional information available in Washington.

D. STATUS OF THE PRINCIPAL HAWAIIAN DEFENSES IN 1941 AND THEIR STATE OF READINESS ON DECEMBER 6, 1941 OR THE REASONS FOR THEIR LACK OF READINESS

1. *Aircraft Warning Service and Interceptor Command*

Service operative prior to December 7, 1941; operations of the service on December 7, 1941; nature of technical difficulties; state of training of the personnel; probable effectiveness of interception. [VI] Necessity for immediate use not appreciated in Hawaii by senior commanders; doubtless whether would have been used by Department commander even if in perfect condition.

2. *Status of the Aircraft Warning Service on December 7th*

System operative for month prior to December 7; Department commander would not turn operations over to Air Force and take it away from the Signal Corps; mobile radio stations and information center in a reasonably operative condition prior to December 7; lacked full manpower to operate this service; Department commander holding on to it using it as training stations instead of operating station; cooperation of the Navy, permanent construction did not hold up putting the aircraft warning service into operation; Short's action in putting the aircraft warning service on a partial operating basis insufficient; relationship with the interceptor command and the information center.

3. *Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses*

Composition of the force; relationship to the interceptor command; status of the mobile antiaircraft and its ammunition; mobile batteries seldom placed in combat position prior to December 7.

4. *Ammunition Issue: Short's and the Ordnance Department's responsibility*

Short refused to permit the timely issuance of antiaircraft or artillery ammunition; small arms ammunition issued to divisions; insufficient small arms ammunition issued to Air Force to meet the attack.

5. *Status of Aircraft Defenses*

Deficiency in aircraft spare parts, etc.; efforts of General Martin to secure equipment; relative status of Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska in equipment; priorities on airfield construction; use of Hawaii as a training ground by the Air Corps.

## [VII] E. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON SUNDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 7TH, 1941

1. *Army Aircraft*

Under Alert Number 1 aircraft was substantially grounded and assembled wing to wing; Navy had no PBY's in the air that morning.

2. *Naval Long Distance Reconnaissance*

Navy had insufficient means of conducting adequate long distance reconnaissance by air; Navy reconnaissance by air was confined to observation of maneuver areas for the fleet with particular reference to submarines; Navy's fleet maneuvers were for the purpose of training and such aircraft reconnaissance was primarily antisubmarine.

3. *Aircraft Warning Service*

Service working from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. on December 7, 1941; one station continued in operation beyond 7 o'clock for the training of Elliott; interceptor command was operating daily but no formal orders had gone out from Short.

4. *Antiaircraft defenses*

Mobile guns had seldom gone into battle position; ammunition was not issued to mobile guns; it took up to six hours to draw and distribute the ammunition.

5. *Summary*

## F. THE ATTACK ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

1. *Japanese Intelligence*

Japanese submarines in the harbor prior to Pearl Harbor attack; completeness of Japanese maps; completeness of Japanese information as shown by the maps.

2. *Nature and Composition of the Attacking Force*

Strength of the attacking force; planning done by the attacking force; the submarine phase of the attack; the planning phase of the attack.

## G. TIME ELEMENT IN THE EXPECTED ATTACK, THE EFFECT OF USING HAWAII AS A TRAINING GROUND IN ADDITION TO ITS BEING A COMBAT OUTPOST

1. *Attack a Surprise*

Chief of Staff, Navy and Army witnesses all admit the attack was a surprise; accuracy of Japanese estimate of the situation; the Japanese gamble.

[VIII] 2. *Time Element—The Important Factor in All Estimates*

Estimate of the attack by Air Force; error in the estimate was in the time it would occur which led to unexpected results.

3. *Expected Time to Continue Training*

Error in estimate of the time of the attack brought decision to continue training; Hawaiian forces disposed for training at the time of attack; personnel organized for training rather than combat at time of attack.

4. *Shorts' Trust in Navy to Give Him Timely Notice: Time Element Again*

Short's relationship with the Navy; Short's belief that naval forces were doing long-distance reconnaissance; Short's belief that the Navy planes were doing long-distance reconnaissance; Short's belief that the Navy was not withholding any evidence from him; Short's policy of not pressing for information from the Navy.

## H. WHAT WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK?

1. *Reason for Analysis of Action Taken After 7 December 1941*

To determine how effectively General Short was able to use the materiel, personnel and facilities after the attack which he had before the attack; and to determine what Washington supplied Hawaii after the attack which it could have supplied before.

2. *Hawaii and Washington Action*

Troop dispositions and troop increases; increased activation of all engineering; increased equipment in the air sent from the mainland; activation of the interceptor command; dispositions of the antiaircraft artillery and coast artillery; condition of readiness of the interceptor command and aircraft warning service; reorganization of the District Engineer's Office and delegation of authority by the Corps of Engineers; treatment of the civilian Japanese population; lack of check on the Hawaiian situation by Washington.



## I. SUMMARY

[55]

## CHAPTER III. THE STORY OF PEARL HARBOR

## A. GENERAL

1. *Introduction: Scope Of The Chapter And Its Purpose.*—This is a running story of the principal events, documents, and actions taken leading up to Pearl Harbor. We accompany this story with a discussion of the pro's and con's of each situation in order that all arguments for and against every explanation and the circumstances surrounding every set of facts may be clearly understood and evaluated. Against such a background, all claims, arguments, facts and explanations can be considered. We believe this chronological history of the entire transaction will make our succeeding conclusions clearly stand forth.

After setting forth some general considerations in this chapter, we direct attention to the two primary periods, from January through September and from October through December. As will be noted elsewhere this is a logical chronological division. In the latter part of the year 1941 there seemed to be a change of understanding, appreciation, and apprehension of forthcoming events on the part of those in Hawaii. In reading this chronological history this should be observed because it is an important factor in what was done or not done in Hawaii.

2. *Geographical.*—The Territory of Hawaii comprises an island group of which the Island of Oahu is the primary element. Oahu contains Pearl Harbor, located on its southern rim. Pearl Harbor is the base for the Pacific Fleet, and was also the headquarters during 1941 of the Commander-in-Chief of the [56] Pacific Fleet and Headquarters of the 14th Naval District, which had naval jurisdiction over the Hawaiian Islands and our other island possessions in the Pacific including Midway and Wake but not the Philippines. Oahu was also the location of one of the largest troop concentrations in the national defense system of the United States while other national defense elements are located on the adjacent islands.

It is important to emphasize that Hawaii was an *outpost* in the American Defense system. In view of that fact, certain fundamental requirements of action resulted which were incumbent upon the commander of the Hawaiian Department to follow. Hawaii is both an outpost for defense and offense, and is one of the primary bastions of our national defense system. In priority of importance it is rated on a par with the Panama Canal.

The primary mission of the Army was the defense of Hawaii and particularly of Pearl Harbor and the fleet there, when in residence; and the fleet sea and air base at all times. Aside from the necessity of preventing these islands from falling into the hands of other nations as a springboard for an attack upon the United States, the foregoing primary mission was that incumbent upon General Short at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The whole reason for having this outpost was that it should be on the alert to repel attack and to furnish the springboard from which attacks could be launched upon our enemies. For this reason this

outpost was implemented with the major portion of the fleet and very substantial Army installations in order that the mainland might rest securely [57] and be protected. There is no other fundamental reason for the great concentration of naval and military power on the Island of Oahu and associate islands. The very location of the Hawaiian Islands, approximately 2,000 miles from our Pacific Coast, makes it an admirable location for naval, air and ground forces for it gives, by reason of its position, a scope and flexibility of attack and defense, sufficiently remote from the Pacific Coast to insure the maximum latitude of action against our enemies and the maximum protection of the mainland of the United States.

3. *Mission Of Army In Hawaii.*—The Army in Hawaii had a mission and a duty to perform. As stated in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan this was:

a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, to support the Naval forces.

c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein, to support the Army Forces.

The Army's mission was primarily that of protecting Hawaii, because it was the sea and air base for the fleet; and, when the fleet was in the harbor, it was there to render such protection as it could to the fleet. The protection of the Islands, other than for these purposes, was secondary and only necessary to the extent of making it possible for the Army to execute its primary mission. It should be observed that the very fact of the fleet being in the harbor increased the responsibilities of the Army, because of the dual facts [58] that the fleet when in the harbor was not in a position to support the Army forces either by reconnaissance or by the protection incident to its being at sea in waters adjacent to the islands, and when in the harbor itself needed protection for its ships that were temporarily immobilized and particularly vulnerable to air attack.

4. *Condition Of The Hawaiian Department At The Time Of Short's Assumption Of Command And Just Prior Thereto.*—With the above mission in mind, the condition of the Hawaiian Department just prior to the assumption of command by General Short and Admiral Kimmel is a matter of interest. Admiral Richardson was the Senior naval officer in command of the fleet, and General Herron the senior Army officer in command of the Hawaiian Department. These officers jointly reviewed the situation as to the Army. As a result Admiral Richardson addressed a letter on the 25th of January, 1941, as to the status of the Army's deficiencies for the defense of Hawaii, which was sent to the Secretary of the Navy. (R. 1802.) The Secretary of the Navy, in turn, wrote to the Secretary of War, and called his attention to the serious conditions existing.<sup>25</sup>

Admiral Kimmel summed up the situation in his testimony:

*He was "astounded at the then existing weaknesses" of the Pearl Harbor defenses,*<sup>26</sup> and collaborated with his [59] predecessor in the preparation of a letter dated 25 January 1941 to the Chief of Naval Operations. This letter pointed out:

<sup>25</sup> See p. 99 in this chapter for a discussion of this correspondence.

<sup>26</sup> *Italic by the Board.*



(a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of Ship's A. A. guns while in port.

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, etc.

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore. (Roberts Rec. 544.)

He communicated this information to General Short. (R. 1768.)

It is therefore apparent from the considered investigations by Richardson and Herron, which conditions were concurred in by Short, that the lack of adequate defense equipment and what was needed to bring it up to a satisfactory status, were clearly known to both the Army and the Navy in Hawaii and to the War and Navy Departments. Short, therefore, came to the command on the 5th day of February, 1941, with a clear and unmistakable recognition by all concerned of the condition of the Department of which he had assumed command.

General Herron, who preceded General Short, had been directed on June 17, 1940, by Washington, to institute an alert. (R. 213.) This alert lasted six weeks. (R. 214-215.) After it was suspended at the end of six weeks it was reinstated for a period. The alert was an all-out alert with complete dispersion of forces into combat positions and with full equipment and ammunition.

[60] General Herron testified that there was no disturbance of the civilian population by the use of this all-out alert which was instituted under conditions similar to those which later prevailed for General Short's alert.

When asked as to the Alerts 1, 2, and 3 of Short, he disposed of these alerts with the following language:

General HERRON. That was a refinement that the training men put over on General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any such thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was a total alert, and then I would do it in accordance with the situation. But the training men liked refinements, and they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three kinds. But they did not get to the real point of the thing. The Navy has three kinds, but the all-out alert is number one, always. Now they ease up into two and three; but these young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put over the three and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Number 1, which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change, I don't suppose, and it turned out to be vital. It was too much of a refinement. (R. 226-227.)

In this connection, General Herron made a significant observation on the responsibility of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

General GRUNERT. I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you received a directive from the War Department to alert the command: Did that leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the future the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it up to your judgment?

General HERRON. I always felt that I was entirely responsible out there and I had better protect the island. (R. 228.)

5. *Organization of The Navy At Pearl Harbor.*—Before proceeding to a consideration of the Army's problems and the action taken by the Army in preparing the defenses of Hawaii, it is necessary to understand the organization of the Navy with whom General Short was to deal extensively and with which he was to [61] enter

into various agreements and understandings, which have a material bearing upon which was done or was not done.

To an Army man the organization of the Navy at Hawaii appeared to be quite complex. Admiral Kimmel was Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Bloch was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. Admiral Bloch's duties consisted of the following:

*a.* Commandant of the 14th Naval District, reporting directly to the Navy Department; the 14th Naval District was a decentralized Navy Department for local affairs, dealing with administrative matters such as plans, buildings, work of the Navy Yard, repairing ships and the like, and providing for the Fleet oil, docks, water protection and such services as minesweeping, antisubmarine patrol, and the like.

*b.* An officer of the Fleet, reporting to Admiral Kimmel, and acting as a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel; his duties related to the preparations for the offensive and defensive actions in time of war and to purely military matters.

*c.* Administrative control over Admiral Bellinger, Commander of the Base Defense Air Force.

*d.* Commander of Task Force No. 4 in control of the naval installations at the outlying island bases, such as Midway, Wake, Guam, etc.

It will be noted from the foregoing that Admiral Bloch dealt directly with the Navy Department on certain phases of [62] his work. He was primarily charged as the Naval Defense Commander of the naval installations on shore. He was also a Task Commander under Admiral Kimmel. He was the responsible commander over the shore-based naval air forces, which were charged with the mission of naval long-distance reconnaissance.

Additionally, Bloch, in his capacity as a Defense Commander, had administrative control over Admiral Bellinger, the Naval Air Officer, who was responsible for cooperation in the air with the Army, but he had no power of disciplinary control over Admiral Bellinger, who was under Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Bellinger's duties, in turn, were as follows:

*a.* Commander, Hawaiian Base Patrol Wings, and Commander, Patrol Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2.

*b.* Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 and 2, plus other units as assigned by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for conduct of Pacific operations.

*c.* Commander, Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities of this function included administrative authority in local matters over all Fleet aircraft actually based ashore.

*d.* Liaison with Commandant, 14th Naval District, for aviation development within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands.

*e.* Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. In connection with the above five major duties, Admiral Bellinger operated under the following senior officers:

[63] (1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as Fleet Commander for patrol wings was based at San Diego.

(2) Commander, Scouting Force, the 4th Command of which Patrol Wings 1 and 2 were a part.



(3) Directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in his capacity as Commander, Task Force 9.

(4) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(5) Commanders of Fleet Task Forces 1, 2, and 3 of patrol planes assigned to those forces for specific operations.

To summarize, Admiral Bellinger indicated that he held six positions in Honolulu on December 7, 1941, namely—

- (1) Commander, Base Patrol Wing.
- (2) Commander, Patrol Wing 2.
- (3) Commander, Task Force 9.
- (4) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor.
- (5) Liaison Commander with the 14th Naval District.
- (6) Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force.

In these various capacities he was responsible to the—

- (1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force.
- (2) Commander, Scouting Force 1 and 2.
- (3) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for his duties in connection with Task Force 9.

[64] (4) Commander of the 14th Naval District, for his duties in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(5) Commander-in-Chief, the Pacific Fleet, for his duties with respect to Patrol Wings 1, 2, and 3.

In Admiral Bloch's testimony he testified that he (Bloch) wore three hats. He was in command of the 14th Naval District, in which capacity he reported direct to the Navy Department. In another capacity, as an officer of the Fleet, he was directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. And again under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in another capacity, with respect to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, as Naval Defense Commander.

As may be realized, in this organization in which there were two governing heads, Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, with whom General Short had to do business, and their respective staffs with whom Short's staff had to deal, as well as the many-titled Admiral Bellinger with whom General Martin dealt, the problem of cooperation was made somewhat difficult.

By way of contrast, the Navy only had to deal with General Short as the sole responsible commander over all activities, both ground and air. General Martin was in command of the Army Air Forces and presented a single air commander with whom the Navy had to deal; and Martin was under the direct command of Short. When the agreements and methods of operation arrived at between the Army and Navy are examined hereinafter, these relationships will become important in understanding what was done and what was not done and some of the reasons for the failure of the competent defense of Hawaii.

[65] B. EVENTS FROM JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1941

1. *Selection of General Short.*—General Short was selected for his high post of command by General Marshall. Upon being notified of this selection, he was called to Washington to confer with General Marshall, to receive special written instructions from him and to confer with the sections of the General Staff and particularly the War

Plans Division. The purpose of this visit and these conferences was to equip him with the latest and most up-to-date information and instructions as to the responsibilities of his new command.

Thereafter, General Short proceeded to Hawaii, arriving there on the fifth day of February, 1941. He assumed command on February 7, 1941. Both Short and Herron concur that the latter fully advised Short of the problems and conditions with which he was confronted.

At the time of General Short taking over command, there existed certain basic documents constituting fundamental instructions for his guidance in the conduct of the command, such as the Joint Army and Navy Plan of 1935. This was modified by the subsequent agreements between Short and Kimmel, Bloch and Short, and Bellinger and Martin.

Coincident with the assumption of command by General Short on February 7, 1941, a letter was written on that date by General Marshall to General Short comprising a full presentation of the problems confronting General Short in his new command. The letter was based upon a conversation with Admiral Stark, then Chief of Naval Operations, and said in part:

[66] Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns . . .

What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel throughout the Army and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army. The fullest protection for the fleet is *the* rather than *a* major consideration for us, there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. . . .

You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army's defenses of the naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. . . .

. . . However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses will discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the naval concentration and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues on National defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. . . ." (R. 14-17.)

Thus General Short was provided by his chief with both sound advice and an admirable set of clear-cut signposts to guide him. Such being the measure of his instructions, it is interesting to observe in what particulars he complied with [67] them or varied from them and the reasons for his actions. In conformity with the instructions as to the Navy, General Short proceeded to establish cordial and cooperative relationships, the exact nature of which is discussed elsewhere. By the 19th of February he "had made a pretty thorough inspection or survey" (R. 321), and on that date wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff as to things that required immediate attention, which were:



As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes:

- (1) Cooperation with the Navy.
- (2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.
- (3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense.
- (4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.
- (5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.
- (6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.
- (7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers.
- (8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops.

The interim from February 19 to December 7 is replete with the efforts of Short to secure approvals and money for improving the defenses of Hawaii. It is also replete with various instances of his being turned down by the War Department, particularly because of lack of money in connection with permanent installations.

Undue weight should not be given, however, to the aspects of the equipment, as General Marshall said in his letter of February 7th,

Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army, and the fundamental question to be considered is: What did Short do with what he had to meet the attack?

[68] As elsewhere stated, he was granted his request for the construction of many types of installations, including the important aircraft warning system. (See the discussion of supply of equipment and construction, and also the delays in construction.) (P. 256.)

Again on March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General Short as to the air situation in clear, unmistakable language:

I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system or coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority. (R. 19.)

On March 6, General Short wrote General Marshall, with particular reference to Aircraft Warning System and the delays in its construction, and delays in sites due to the Department of Interior delays:

One of the first projects which I investigated in this department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands. At the present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be detected is about five miles. The radio detector equipment of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this distance to one hundred and twenty miles, and in these islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by which the detection distance can be increased. With the present international situation it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here.

The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the fleet in Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. \* \* \* I believe that this matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War to see if permission can not be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submitting detailed plans for consideration by the National Park Service.

Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the [69] early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a board of officers in this department who made several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions as to locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized

and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details to expedite its completion.

On March 13, General Marshall wrote General Short:

The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most gratifying. \* \* \*

The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General requesting personnel, materiel and funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiating projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including \$3,000,000 in the estimates now being prepared.

On March 15, General Marshall again wrote General Short as to the Aircraft Warning Service, showing the delays due to the necessity of getting approvals from the Department of Interior regarding matters pertaining to its National Park Service:

The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the aircraft warning service stations in the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those cases where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, but they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of the reservation.

I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941, outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time.

[70] On March 15 General Short wrote General Marshall a letter showing full appreciation of the necessity for the dispersion and the protection of aircraft. Among other things he said:

On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work has been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but in no case have arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked for money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited cruising radius. (R. 21-22.)

In this letter he also discussed at length the question of anti-aircraft defense.

On March 28, 1941, General Marshall replied to this letter as follows:

Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sufficient details to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for those purposes will be included in estimates.

On April 14, General Short again wrote General Marshall and amongst other things reported progress, as follows:

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreements made with them:

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.
2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement.
3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement.



I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral [71] Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.

We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command. (R. 26-27.)

On May 2, 1941, Short wired General Marshall as to the sums of money needed for the construction of airports and other defense projects totaling over \$27,000,000. General Short followed this up with a letter on May 2 to General Marshall in further explanation of his radiogram forwarding supporting data.

On May 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short acknowledging the receipt of these estimates and supporting data, saying:

The matter of locating strongpoints at various points throughout the Island looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land parcels was radioed on April 22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into the matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an answer for you in a short time.

\* \* \* \* \*

It is most gratifying to have you say that everything is going along extremely well and do not hesitate to write at any time. (R. 28.)

On May 29, 1941, General Short furnished General Marshall a complete report on current maneuvers, the plans for the organization of the ground and the construction of field fortifications, and the plans for repelling a serious attack, and reporting his theory of the defense of Hawaii, saying:

- [72] My theory of the defense of Hawaii is based upon the following:
1. Complete organization of the ground at all important points.
  2. Holding of the most important field fortification lightly.
  3. Holding of large mobile reserves centrally located with sufficient motor transportation to move all reserves at once if necessary.
  4. Detailed plans for the employment of reserves with complete reconnaissance and reserves actually rehearsed in carrying out of the plans.
  5. All troops to be highly trained in delaying action and counter-attack.

On July 7 The Adjutant General sent General Short the following wire:

For your information stop Deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups stop This policy is present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action against the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval comma army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out stop The Neutrality Pact with Russia may be abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first of August stop Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned end.

This wire contained notation by the Chief of Staff of July 7, 1941.

On July 11, 1941, General Short asked the location of a new airfield on the Island of Oahu.

On July 25, 1941, General Short reported to General [73] Marshall the Joint Air Arrangements of the Army, Navy, and ex-

change of facilities such as airfields. On July 25, 1941, a very significant message was sent by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations as a joint dispatch to General Short warning him of the application of economic sanctions against Japan on July 26, particularly saying:

Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japanese through the use of military means, but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against any possible eventualities.

On August 19, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short as to the establishment of an airfield base for the 15th Pursuit Group and his reasons for so doing. This brings to conclusion the communications between the Chief of Staff and General Short to October 1, 1941.

2. *Short's Staff.*—Short brought one, Colonel Phillips to Hawaii with the view to making him his Chief of Staff, and to train him for that assignment he placed him successively in various sections of his General Staff. On November 1 Colonel Phillips was made Chief of Staff. Evidence indicates that Phillips failed to measure up to that most responsible and important assignment—the “alter ego” of the Commanding General; that he was but a weak echo of his Commander and failed to furnish him, as his principal adviser, with vigorous and candid advice of high professional character and with a competent vision and knowledge of what was taking place or might take place.

His administration of the staff, as we view it, was weak [74] and reflected itself in the work of the several General Staff sections and in the output thereof as a whole. While the various Assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short.

Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too weak for a position of such importance.<sup>27</sup> Short's selection of Phillips appears to have been a mistake. An examination of Phillips' testimony as to his conception of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of the matter. (R. 1134-1144.) In justice to Phillips it should be pointed out that while he was Chief of Staff he never was present at important Navy conferences. (R. 393-394, 534), and that information of important and vital events came to him second-handed.

Although Short did not insulate himself from his staff, he had Phillips conduct most of the staff conferences and apparently rarely dealt directly with his principal staff officers. He delegated to his staff little more than mere routine duties. His direct relationship with his G-2 seemed particularly inadequate in view of the then existing tense situation. (R. 393, 519, 520, 521.) Although he frequently visited and consulted with his principal subordinate commanders he held no periodic conferences, and his second [75] in command, General Burgin, was not taken into his confidence as to existing conditions nor was his advice sought. (R. 2625.)

<sup>27</sup> R. 265, 1408-1409, 1946, 1977-1978, 2625-2626.



3. *Short's Actions In Building Defense Installations And Adding Equipment.*—There is no question that Short made many demands for equipment, defense construction, and personnel. He was active and diligent in this matter. Except as to aircraft and antiaircraft, his command appears to have been well supplied. In many instances, long delays were incurred in the approval of defense construction and making funds available therefor and some of the recommended defense construction was disapproved by the War Department.

4. *Short's Reorganization of Divisions.*—Short converted the square division, known as the Hawaiian Division, into two triangular divisions and equipped them with unusually heavy fire power in both artillery and machine guns as a basis for future expansion in time of war.

General Maxwell Murray, commanding the 25th Division, testified:

General GRUNERT. And in your division you had what artillery?

General MURRAY. I had the Eighth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Field Artillery, but it is not generally known that we had practically doubled the gun strength of the brigade before the 75-mm. gun batteries; the Eighth and the Thirteenth were 75-mm. gun regiments, and each of those batteries had eight guns to the battery instead of four. The Eleventh was the 155-howitzer regiment, but they were in addition manning two batteries of 155 guns, and some 240-mm. howitzers. The 75 regiments both had 240-mm. howitzers assigned to them, too. (R. 3076-77.)

[76] 4. *Short's Relationship With The Navy.*—Turning from Short's efforts to build up the physical installations and equipment of Hawaii and his staff, and the successful conversion of his single square division into two triangular divisions on which his staff seemed primarily engaged, we come to his actions with the Navy. Acting upon General Marshall's instructions and admonitions of February 7, 1941, which seemed to greatly impress him, Short succeeded in establishing an amiable relationship with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch and Admiral Bellinger.

As stated hereinafter, he entered into a series of agreements with the Navy. Suffice it to say that these agreements, while admirable in concept and in many particulars equally admirable in the proposed plan of administration, under the handicap of joint action by cooperation instead of unity of command, were of quite limited effectiveness because neither the Army nor the Navy had sufficient means to properly implement them.

The agreements were difficult of execution. To make them effective would have taken skilled professional officers of both services, guided by a well organized composite staff, and practiced in operational tests.

The agreements themselves were not to go into effect until either a period of strained relations occurred, or M-Day was declared, or in the actual event of war. Neither the Army nor Navy seemed to appreciate this defect.

Short apparently mistook the conduct of "war by contract" for a conduct of "war by command".

Even without the full means of putting these agreements physically into effect, had the equipment and materiel available been utilized, had there been in existence a [77] detailed plan of operation of the staff and lower echelons, and had sound judgment been exercised in the selection of the alert, the disaster of Pearl Harbor un-

doubtedly would have been materially mitigated, if not wholly avoided.

(For a full discussion of the agreements see p. 88 to p. 97.)

6. *Abandonment of Herron's Field Order #1: Adoption of Triple-Alert System: Sabotage Issue.*—A further step, and one of great import, taken by Short was the study that he initiated through his staff with a view to abandoning the Field Order No. 1, in vogue under the regime of General Herron, and substituting his temporary Standard Operating Procedure, which was published tentatively on July 14, 1941. The final draft of this vital document came out on November 5, 1941 (R. 283), and provided for three types of alerts, which are defined by Short as follows:

Our Alert No. 1 was a defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities without any threats from the outside.

Alert No. 2 included all these sabotage measures in No. 1, and, in addition, defense against air attacks and surface and submarine attacks.

Alert No. 3 was a defense against an all-out attack where everybody moved to their battle stations and carried out their duties as if there was a possible attempt at landing in sight. (R. 283.)

Short says that he sent ten copies to the Navy. (R. 395, 400.) He says he sent a copy to Washington. (R. 431.) Alert No. 1 was purely antisabotage. Its effect when executed was to concentrate the planes in groups, wing-tip to wing-tip, where they were vulnerable from the air but less vulnerable from sabotage on the ground. He said he did this because of [78] his deficiency of personnel in protecting his planes against sabotage. If they had been put in dispersed positions about the fields within bunkers, they would have been less vulnerable to wholesale destruction from the air. This alert concentrated equipment and personnel and in effect set up almost perfect conditions for a successful enemy air attack.

Alerts Number 2 and Number 3, on the contrary, constituted wide dispersion of men and equipment in battle positions, with ammunition at the guns and troops and planes in positions of readiness for action and maximum protection. Under Alert Number 1, the earliest time in which planes were planned to get off the ground was four hours, while under Alerts Number 2 and Number 3 available aircraft is ready and can take to the air in from seven to eight minutes. Likewise, in connection with putting into action the antiaircraft guns and other similar establishments, the contrast between Alert Number 1 and Alerts Numbers 2 and 3 was the difference between minutes and hours.

As the entire attack upon Pearl Harbor did not extend beyond approximately three hours, it is obvious that the selection of the correct alert was vital. Historically, and by way of precedent, Short had before him the action of General Herron in the preceding year of an all-out alert under Filed Order No. 1 of Herron by which complete dispersal of planes and troops and guns was effected, with ammunition at the guns. The record shows (Colonel Capron and other witnesses—R. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2728, 2772–2773, 3096–3097) that there was no disturbance of the civilian population as a result of the action by Herron. This is significant, in view [79] of the fact, as will later appear, that General Short gives that explanation as one of his primary reasons for the selection of Alert Number 1, because he might alarm the population. (R. 427–428, 532–533.)



It should be kept in mind that the civilian population was accustomed to the continued movements of the Army and Navy in their frequent maneuvers and practice operations. Much of the civilian population in this instance was living practically in the midst of one of the greatest military and naval installations anywhere, so that their state of mind would be far different from that of people on the mainland unaccustomed to such sights. Then, too, the newspapers oftentimes contained much more exciting news, threats and disturbing events, than anything that an alert could stir up, either by the Army or Navy or both. The explanation therefore lacks both substance and credibility.

At this point the question of sabotage which led to the selection and implementation of Alert No. 1 should be examined. No single instance of sabotage occurred while Short was in command up to December 7. It was true that there were 35,000 aliens of Japanese origin and there was a total of 160,000 or about 37% of the population of Japanese origin or affiliations (R. 289), but in no case was there any instance of misbehavior, despite a very exhaustive investigation being made constantly by the F. B. I. and by G-2, as well as by Naval Intelligence.

We have investigated the state of mind and the information as to the actions of the Japanese population in an endeavor to understand why it was that General Short adopted his anti-sabotage alert on November 27 in the face of the [80] increasing international tension, and of his own estimate and that of the Navy that an air attack was the most dangerous form of attack likely to be encountered. We therefore resorted to the testimony of a great variety of witnesses in all walks of life in Honolulu, resident there during 1941, and inquired of their feelings and views and the whole situation as to the Japanese population.

We could find no substantial evidence of any fear by these witnesses, including some of the best-informed leaders in the civil life of the Islands, that the Japanese would commit acts of sabotage. Their knowledge was based upon long residence in the Islands and experience with the Japanese. Governor Poindexter, newspaper editors like Raymond S. Coll, of the *Honolulu Advertiser*, United States District Attorney Angus Taylor, Shivers, head of the F. B. I., General Wells, executive vice-president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, and Walter Francis Dillingham, president of the Oahu Railway and Land Company and owner or director of many other enterprises in the Islands, concurred with many other witnesses such as ranch owners, government officials, leaders in business, that the risk of sabotage, so long as the Army and Navy were in a predominant position, before an actual landing and show of success by the Japanese, was a relatively minor matter. However, the Army was sabotage-minded. There appeared to be no substantial basis for this fear other than speculation as to what a large body of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry might do in case of stress.

[81] 7. *Navy Long-Distance Reconnaissance*.—He assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance, and in this he was joined by a large group of ranking subordinates, but an inquiry by him, if it had been made, would have soon revealed the fact that his as-

sumption that the task forces went out for conducting reconnaissance at long distance was not true. Such reconnaissance as they were conducting was only incident to the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet, who were operating for training purposes and were looking for Japanese submarines so as not to interfere with their training operations. The Navy was submarine- and training-minded. (R. 1527, 1600, 1725, 1773, 1802.)

It should have been apparent upon examination of the facts by him that any such operations of the task forces were not only intermittent and limited in scope but they could not possibly cover the entire 360 degrees around the Island. A further understanding by him of the actual facts would have disclosed very promptly, as it did to his air force subordinates, that the Navy did not have any means for such long-distance reconnaissance, nor did the Navy get from the Army any such assistance, even though under the agreements the Army on call was to supply a substantial portion of the long-range aircraft for this purpose. In fact, the Army had at the time of Pearl Harbor available for this purpose only six planes capable of this work.

The Navy acceptance of responsibility for long-distance reconnaissance is set forth in paragraph 18 (i) of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which provides:

[82] 18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

\* \* \* \* \*

i. Distant reconnaissance. (R. 1745.)

The purpose of long-distance reconnaissance, which the Navy assumed in its agreements with the Army, was to discover hostile naval forces and particularly carriers before they could launch an attack. The area of search extended two to six hundred miles from the shore. It was assumed by Short that the presence of task forces of the Navy at sea insured such reconnaissance being conducted. Long-distance reconnaissance was obviously the very heart of the defense of Oahu because upon its results would depend not only the opportunity to destroy the carriers and carrier-borne planes of the Japanese but also put the forces on Oahu on the alert for an effective reception of the attack if it got through. But, as elsewhere stated, this long-distance reconnaissance was not being conducted by the Navy and such air reconnaissance as was being conducted was for the purpose of clearing the area of submarines where the fleet was in training. The inshore reconnaissance by the Army, up to twenty miles from shore, was substantially for the same purpose.

The record showed it was the well-considered estimate of the Army and Navy commanders and their staffs that carriers and their supporting craft would attempt to approach Pearl Harbor, arriving in position at dark preceding the dawn of the day on which the attack was to be made. (R. 106.) Under the protection of darkness 300 additional miles could be covered so that at dawn the attack could be launched within [83] approximately 300 miles from shore. This is apparently substantially what actually did happen. (Roberts Record 556-F.)

The conception and estimate of the situation was correct; steps taken to meet it were either absent completely or so defective as to amount to little. The Navy had available for long-distance recon-



naissance, from November 27 to December 7, 1941, 50 PBV's and the Army had six heavy bombers while at least 270 planes would have been required as a minimum for conducting such a reconnaissance if a 360-degree area around Oahu was to be covered. (R. 1762, 1766.) It is significant that in the joint Army-Navy plan of 1935 distant reconnaissance was made a mission of the Army but Short and Bloch agreed early in 1941, in the joint plan for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier and for the employment of the Army-Navy Air Forces, to place the responsibility for distant reconnaissance on the Navy, leaving to the Army reconnaissance only to about 20 miles from shore. This is due to the fact that almost all of the planes suitable for distant reconnaissance were naval. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was O. K'd by Kimmel and approved by the War Department.

The result was that the critical band of sea around Hawaii (the 600- to 900-mile area) was not patrolled. Observations therein were infrequent and incidental. Admiral Kimmel reached a decision that the few planes available would be wholly ineffective for this purpose and employed them otherwise. (R. 1763.)

Both Admiral Kimmel and Genreal Short were conversant with these conditions. (R. 375, 1763, 4438-4439.) It was obvious, [84] therefore, that a Japanese task force with carriers could launch an attack upon Oahu with a reasonable certainty of success since its discovery prior to such launching would have been purely accidental and its chances of discovery remote.

An early alert by the Navy to the Army would have permitted of a dispersion of its planes with the result that they could have been aloft, ready to intercept the attack, and the damage done would have been greatly lessened.

The remaining factor for reconnaissance and detection was in the Aircraft Warning System, which was a responsibility of the Army.<sup>28</sup> The Army had put into operation in the fall of 1941, on a training basis, which was operating for all practical purposes, a number of mobile radar sets and an aircraft information center. That it was in operating condition, even with the state of training of the personnel that then existed in late November and early December 1941 was amply proven by the successful operation of the system during previous tests and exercises and of the station that discovered the attacking Japanese force 132 miles from the Island and the correct interpretation by the two enlisted men operating the station, who duly reported the presence of a strange force but were told by an inexperienced and only partially trained Air Force lieutenant to "forget it". This was at 0702 on December 7, 1941.

If this information had been transmitted to the Air Force and to the Navy the latter would have had the anti-aircraft weapons on its ships in action, since only three to five minutes were required for that purpose, the Army anti-aircraft [85] system could have been alerted and many of the Army planes dispersed and some could have gotten off the ground.

The only other reconnaissance instrumentality available was that being operated by the Navy, known as the Radio Intercept System.

<sup>28</sup> See p. 147 for complete story of construction difficulties of an aircraft warning system, signal difficulties, and how the enemy fleet was discovered.

It was functioning officially in the latter part of 1941 and was constantly supplying information of the greatest value to important naval commanders, a part of which information was communicated to General Short by Admiral Kimmel. (R. 1771-1772.)

The one notable and tragic exception was the failure to advise General Short that on or about November 25 a Japanese task force was discovered in the Marshall Islands, in which force there were reported as present two or three carriers, 15 to 20 submarines, and possibly other vessels. (R. 361.) About the first of December radio contact was lost with this force as it apparently went into radio silence, which was known to be by the Navy the third and last and most dangerous phase of the movement of the enemy fleet. (R. 1654-1655, 1662.) The loss of such contact of a threatening fleet in the year preceding was the occasion for a directive from Washington for an all-out alert by which all troops went into the field with live ammunition and remained there for six weeks.

So here again, as in the case of the Army radar system, there was a failure of transmission of the information by the Navy to the Army as the Army had failed to transmit its radar information on the morning of December 7th to the Navy. Such a Japanese task force in the Marshall Islands was 72 hours away from Pearl Harbor and nearly a thousand miles closer to Pearl Harbor than the Japanese fleet resident in Japan, from whence [86] the main attack was expected if it ever did arrive. (R. 106-107.)

After extensive testimony had been given before this Board on the Jaluit task force and the fact that there was long belief that it was from Jaluit that the attacking force had moved against Pearl Harbor, there was produced in Hawaii the more certain proof that this force had assembled at Takan Bay in northern Japan and had moved from that point eastward and then southward for the attack, leaving Takan Bay on the 27th-28th of November 1941. If this proof be accepted of the later naval witnesses as against the testimony of the earlier naval witnesses, who seemed equally well informed, it does not change the situation. The Navy failed to give to the Army a very vital and important piece of information.

In conclusion, the last element in the tragic situation was the failure of the subordinate officers of the Navy to report to the Army the presence in the outer harbor, on the early morning of December 7, at about 0630, of a Japanese submarine which was sunk by naval action (the destroyer "U. S. S. Ward" and a naval patrol plane) about 0633 to 0645 hours, which would have indicated that something was on the move and the whole naval and military establishments should have been correspondingly alerted. The "Ward" reported this action to the naval base watch officer at 0712 hours, who notified the Naval Chief of Staff. The Army was not notified. (R. 536-537; Roberts Record 1725.)

The situation as to this reconnaissance is best set forth in excerpts in testimony from senior commanders. The [87] long-distance patrol of the Navy consisted of only two or three PBY's and it was "nothing to amount to much." (R. 1820.) General Martin said:

I complained to Admiral Bellinger about the lack of patrolling that was being done. "Well," he said, "this is all that I have. This is all I can put up." (R. 1822.)



General FRANK. But so far as there having been a reconnaissance for the actual protection of Oahu, such continuous reconnaissance had not been done?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct; and that was a matter subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. I think that might as well be cleared. He would be the man to order that, in my opinion. (R. 1527.)

As to Army reconnaissance, General Mollison testified that such reconnaissance as was being conducted from Bellows Field did not operate on Sundays, saying:

I'm sure it did not. It may have on this Sunday, but I doubt very much if it did. (R. 812.)

So far as inshore patrol is concerned, he said that the Army Air Forces did so little that it would amount to "a token payment only". (R. 824.)

General RUDOLPH. On that particular Sunday morning I understood they didn't have a boat out—an airplane, seaplane. (R. 1232.)

General FRANK. But you understand that they were not out on that morning?

General RUDOLPH. So I was informed. (R. 1233.)

General GRUNERT. Then, according to the instructions under which you were functioning you had no responsibility for distant air reconnaissance?

Admiral BLOCH. There was no distant air reconnaissance ordered in that order. That is the only order that I know which was operative.

[88] General GRUNERT. But actually was there some distant air reconnaissance being made from time to time or continuously?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not know. I do not know whether there was or not. That would not be under me. (R. 1484.)

With reference to distant reconnaissance, means of performing it under the joint air agreement, Admiral Bloch testified:

So I had no implements to perform distant reconnaissance in the 14th Naval District force. (R. 1484.)

General GRUNERT. Do you know on the morning of the 7th of December whether any such planes were in the air on any reconnaissance mission?

Admiral BLOCH. I heard planes taking off. I do not know exactly what missions they were on, but there were planes in the air. (R. 1494.)

So now let us turn to the agreements upon which Short placed such reliance for protection by Naval long-distance reconnaissance and joint air action with the Navy.

8. *Agreements Between Army and Navy.*—The basic document governing the relationship of the Army and Navy in the formulation of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands is contained in the document entitled "War Plans, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935". This was prepared in pursuance of the directive of the Rainbow War Plan. It covers the over-all policies of the functions and agreements between the Army and Navy as to their relative responsibilities in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

The category of defense in this document which applied to Hawaii was Category D. This category was defined as "Coastal Frontiers That May Be Subject to Major Attack." Under this [89] category the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application.

... In addition, antiaircraft defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; ... Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided. ... (Page 39.)

And the purpose of coastal frontier defense was stated to be

Protecting our Military and Civil Installations and Facilities; . . . Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to military, industrial and commercial operations.

It was also provided that there be furnished

a communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service among the elements of the land defense with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

This was a responsibility of the Army.

Pursuant to the foregoing plan, an agreement was entered into entitled "Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan." (Prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District.) This agreement was signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short and provided the fundamental plan for the defense of Hawaii.

The third agreement was that entitled "Joint Air Agreement", signed March 28, 1941. This document was prepared by Major General Martin, U. S. Army Air Force, and Admiral Bellinger, as Base Defense Air Force Commander, and signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short. It provided for the combined air action as follows:

[90] Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army Bombardment strength to participate in each mission, etc.

Defensive air operation over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practical. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status, until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control. (Roberts Record 555.)

This Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941, signed by Bloch and Short, was implemented by certain additional documents signed by Bellinger and Martin as operating plans. The date of these operating plans was April 9, 1941. (Roberts Record 556a-O Vol. 5.)

Under this agreement Admiral Bloch, not an air officer, was acting on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief in signing the document, and there operated under him Admiral Bellinger, who had the command of the planes, so far as the Navy could implement the Agreement, as Commander of the Air Base Force. Bellinger, however, was under the command of Admiral Kimmel, and Bloch, who was charged with the responsibility for the operation orders and plans of operation for the base defense air force, had no air force with which to implement the Agreement. Bellinger had the job to do and such means as existed to do it with was Fleet aviation. Bloch had supervisory control over Bellinger, but the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel, had to approve the Agreement. (R. 1522.)

[91] Bloch was called upon to designate the condition of readiness of the aircraft, but did not have control of the aircraft, the readiness of which he was to determine. The confusion inherent from the Navy's organization is best expressed in the following question:

General GRUNERT. Who would the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, hold responsible in case something went wrong? Would he hold you or Bellinger?  
Admiral BLOCH. I do not know. (R. 1522.)



This agreement was the result of a report of a Joint Army and Navy board dated October 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian Islands. This report was signed by Major General Martin and Admiral Bellinger. (R. 1581.)

Under such circumstances the Army had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility.

Plans which must wait to be put into practice and only become operative when war strikes under all the unexpected and changing conditions of an attack inevitably prove unsound in practice. The basic difficulty of the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements was inherent in all such agreements, as they constituted a vain paper attempt to predict war procedure without having properly tested out the proposed arrangements in training and by joint staff action to see if they were practical measures.

The proof of the soundness of the plans is whether they work, and the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements were never tested out far enough to find out if their plans were sound in practice. There was inadequate practice of them to enable [92] the respective organizations to acquire that automatic facility in their execution so that the plans would be carried out effectively despite all the stresses, strains and unexpected developments to personnel and equipment that were incidents of a conflict. We desire to emphasize this synthetic structure of agreements and plans based upon them. The following analysis of these agreements shows that:

There were two joint agreements. The first was known as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. It was based on the war plan and the "Joint Action of the Army and Navy" of 1935. The second agreement was the Joint Air Force Agreement signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short and based upon it as Appendix #7 was an operating plan worked out by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger.

As Admiral Bloch said:

Ordinarily it would not be operative. (R. 1478.)

He also testified:

The plan was never operative as a plan because the War and Navy Departments never ordered it to become operative, either in part or in whole. The local commanders never mutually agreed to have it become operative in part. (R. 1474.)

And again he testified:

General RUSSELL. So that respecting missions of the Army and Navy, according to your construction of the agreement, reconnaissance missions were not effective until December 7, 1941?

Admiral BLOCH. Under the circumstances that obtained, that is the way it happened. I will say that I accepted the responsibility in that agreement for distant reconnaissance for the Navy, and I did my utmost to implement my responsibility by demanding patrol plans for that purpose, but I never had any; I never had one. (R. 1487.)

The agreements entered into between the Navy and the Army [93] had two basic defects. First, they did not become operative until an emergency arose. The agreement said (paragraph 15 (c), 2):

Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders. (R. 1584.)

The local commanders as testified to by Admiral Bellinger were understood to be General Short and Admiral Bloch. These commanders apparently took no action to "mutually agree" to implement parts of the plan and, evidently were going to let the agreements go until an emergency arose, when they became operative automatically. As Admiral Bellinger testified:

That could have been done at any time by the commandant of the 14th Naval District, who was Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, if it was approved by and agreed upon by General Short. (R. 1591.)

But it was not done. The selection of M-Day to initiate the putting of the joint plan and agreements thereunder into effect according to the terms of the agreement just quoted was a function of the War and Navy Departments. They took no action to put it into effect although a copy of this agreement was forwarded to the War Department and presumably to the Navy Department. (R. 1474.)

The consequence was that not until the morning of December 7th did the agreement become operative, when it was too late to have gotten the benefit of the cooperative action that it implied, and the training which would result from this close teamwork by the Army and Navy. As Admiral Bellinger testified:

The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, did not have the authority to place that organization in the functioning status, except in case of an actual emergency. (R. 1582.)

[94] This brings us to the second defect: unity of command. If that had been put into effect as provided in paragraph 9 (b) of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan this air agreement would have become effective by reason of such unity of command. As Admiral Bellinger again testified:

I was not satisfied with the setup under the estimate and directives concerning the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I thought that it was necessary to have a unity of command to make such an operation a success.

General FRANK. You mean a unity of command before something happened?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General FRANK. Rather than when it happened?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes. (R. 1589.)

Under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the unity of command could be put into effect either by the President of the United States or by joint agreements of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy or when the commanders of Army and Navy forces agreed that the situation required unity of command and who was to exercise it. No one of these agencies took steps to effectuate what all of the witnesses have concurred in stating was the principal cause of difficulties on December 7, 1941, and the events leading up to and causing those difficulties, that is, unity of command. (R. 1587-1588.)

It is interesting to observe the reason why this air agreement was not put into effect, in addition to lack of equipment to make it effective. As Admiral Bellinger testified:

The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a functioning status [95] would have necessitated the substantial cessation of training activities in order to concentrate on defense. (R. 1582.)

Likewise General Short testified:

General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should do nothing that would interfere with the training or ferrying group. The respon-



sibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to get the ships there and get them there without loss; and we could not do it if we started them out with untrained crews.

That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1, rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3. (R. 286.)

As I say, none of these fixed stations was in operation. We had gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we got them we started using them right away; and when this message of the 27th came along, I prescribed that the Aircraft Warning Service would function those hours (4:00 to 7:00 A. M.). In addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained then from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4. (R. 298.)

By making it 4 hours (time for aircraft to get into the air) it gave the possibility to the men going ahead with recreation and athletics without being worried about getting that alert. They could go right ahead with their normal functions. They might have been out on a problem where it would take them an hour to get back in. (R. 460.)

Alert No. 2 would have practically stopped the training of the Air Corps and the Antiaircraft Corps. It would not have interfered seriously with the training of the infantry divisions. (R. 528.)

The reason for not so doing is shown by Kimmel's words:

We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had received no orders to mobilize. (R. 1811.)

Admiral Kimmel observed that while the responsibility was on the Commandant, 14th Naval District and himself, on behalf of the Navy, for putting this plan into effect, yet it would have been necessary to refer to Washington for a decision. When asked why this would be so, he said:

[96] It would have alarmed the population. It might have been considered by Japan an overt act. It would have tended to upset the Japanese-American relations, which we had been enjoined to maintain in status quo; and it would have required, so far as the Navy is concerned, certain movements of the fleet and certain action which should not have been taken without reference to the Department. (R. 1756.)

Therefore it is apparent that the local commanders waited for Washington and Washington took no action under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, relying upon Hawaii to do so; and that in turn meant that the Martin-Bellinger Air Plan of Cooperation, which depended upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, did not go into operation.

The second reason why the air plan was ineffective was that Admiral Bloch, Commandant of the 14th Naval District, as testified by Admiral Kimmel, "had no planes assigned to him at this time." (R. 1751), so that he could do nothing to carry it out. As to the Army, Admiral Kimmel pointed out:

There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to be any. (R. 1753.)

When asked why the Navy accepted the responsibility for distant reconnaissance without any effective means of carrying it out, Admiral Kimmel testified,

he accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible. (R. 1753.)

Admiral Bellinger confirms Admiral Kimmel's statement on long-distance reconnaissance means not being available. (R. 1595, 1606.) Therefore, paragraph 18 in the air agreement providing the Navy will furnish distant reconnaissance was without effect. (R. 1605-

1606.) Bloch had no planes and such planes as Bellinger had were under command of Kimmel and were [97] being used for other purposes in connection with reconnaissance with the fleet for protecting maneuver areas against submarines.

For the dual reason that the instrumentalities were not available and to the extent that any planes were available the use of them would have interfered with training, and for the further reason that the agreements were not to go into effect until an emergency, the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and the Martin-Bellinger Air Agreement signed by Short and Bloch were ineffectual. The Army and Navy agreed that when and if the time came that they had to put the plan into effect, the documents could only show what the working scheme would be. The inherent weakness in making such plans was the fact of their not being operative in time to meet the attack. Neither the local commanders nor Washington took steps to make them operative as they could have done. (R. 1606-1607, 1609.) However, unity of command in Washington would have been a condition precedent to unity of command in Hawaii.

9. *Estimate of the Situation.*—The best indication of what the Army and Navy recognized as the primary danger to the defense of Hawaii is found in the estimate of the situation in the implementing, operating plans signed by Bellinger and Martin on April 9, 1941, in execution of the Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941. This estimate was prophetic in its accuracy and called for vigorous implementation to meet the worst the enemy could do, as estimated in this document. The document says:

b. In the past Orange (Japan) has never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war.

c. A successful, sudden raid against our [98] ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective defensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

d. It appears possibly that Orange (Japan) submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service. . . . II (a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines, and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. . . . III (b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. . . . (e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start. . . . (Roberts Record 556-D-F.)

It is also significant that in this estimate of the situation it was stated:

Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. (Roberts Record 556-F.)

It will be recalled that a submarine appeared off the entrance to Pearl Harbor and was sunk at about 6:45 a. m. on December 7th, but was not reported by the Navy to the Army. Such a report would have been a sure warning of an hour before the attack of what was coming as recognized by paragraph 3 (d) of the Estimate of the Situation, forming a part of the Martin-Bellinger Plan.



In reviewing the situation as Short knew it in order to judge of the information that he had upon which to premise a successful course of action, it is necessary both to take into consideration the background in the first chapter and of the official communications and official actions of those estimates [99] of the situation at the time.

It will be recalled that Ambassador Grew had warned the State Department on January 27th by wire of the possibility of an air attack upon Pearl Harbor. This possibility had already been apparently thoroughly considered by the War and Navy Departments, and it had been concluded that that was the strongest danger to Hawaii. In early January, Admiral Richardson, with the concurrence of Admiral Kimmel and General Herron, had written at length to the Navy Department on this subject, with particular reference to the weaknesses of the Army defenses against air attack. This letter and the resulting correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War must be read in the light of the Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan of 1935, which places upon the Army the following mission:

*b. Army*—Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces and against hostile sympathizers.

General Marshall testified, however, as follows:

We anticipated, beyond a doubt, Japanese movement in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack. (R. 9.)

As a result, Secretary of Navy Knox wrote to Secretary of War Stimson on January 24, 1941, in part as follows:

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports [100] from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo-plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack on the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibility of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisioned in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo-plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gunfire.

Defense for all but the first two appears to have been provided for satisfactorily.

It will be noted that an anxiety of Secretary Knox was as to air attack and that he was satisfied that precautions as to sabotage were sufficient by the Army. It will be recalled that Admiral Richardson's letter stimulating this letter of Secretary Knox was based on Richardson's personal inspection and knowledge of the Army situation.

Secretary Knox concludes his letter with the following recommendations to the Army:

Assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii . . . that the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty exists.

So this letter clearly outlined the considered judgment [101] then existing that the most serious threat was an air attack and that all means should be taken to implement against it.

On February 7, 1941, the Secretary of War replied to this letter of the Secretary of the Navy under the subject "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," and said:

In reply to your letter of January 24, 1941, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the fleet or naval base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and of the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort . . .

(6) With respect to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and of this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

On the same day another communication was addressed to General Short, and this time by General Marshall:

Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Navy materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to anti-aircraft guns.

The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid and by submarine, constitute the real peril of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands, as long as we have air superiority.

And not satisfied with this first letter, General Marshall on March 5, 1941, again addressed General Short, saying:

I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a *matter of first priority*.

And to that General Short replied on March 15, 1941, at length with reference to the vulnerability of Hawaii to air attack and the measures being taken to meet this situation. [102] He points out that antisabotage measures and suppression of local disorders could be handled by battalions of National Guard, which come from the islands. The rest of the letter dealt with defenses against air attacks. His estimate of the situation was:

The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack.

Short realized the necessity for the dispersion of planes, the use of emergency fields on the outlying islands and the preparation of bunkers to protect the dispersed planes, as he discusses such a problem at length and its solution. (R. 21-25.)

On April 14, 1941, Short wrote the Chief of Staff sending him the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and 14th Naval District. Annex No. VII. Section VI, Joint Security Measure;



Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement, and Field Orders No. 1-NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the Joint Agreement. (R. 26-27.)

He also stated that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and himself felt all steps had been taken

which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together with the unity of command as the situation requires. (R. 27.)<sup>29</sup>

This statement was in error at the time it was made, as the agreements could not be implemented for lack of means to do so in any material way and there was no unity of command, none [103] proposed and none was ever put into effect under these agreements. Open hostilities were necessary to make the agreement operative.

This communication was acknowledged by General Marshall on May 5th.

This brings us to the estimate of the air situation thus transmitted to the Chief of Staff on April 14th as indicating the best judgment in estimating the situation by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger and approved by General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch.

It is a familiar premise of military procedure in estimating a situation *to select the most dangerous and disastrous type of attack the enemy may make and devote your primary efforts to meeting this most serious of the attacks.* (R. 1121, 2662.) In the present instance, it was clearly recognized, not only in the foregoing correspondence, but in this formal joint estimate by the Army and Navy of the situation, *that the most serious attack to be met by the Army and Navy was an air attack by Japan.* Herewith is the following statement from that estimate signed by the Army and Navy through General Martin and Admiral Bellinger and approved by Kimmel, Short and Bloch. This estimate is prophetic in its accuracy and uncanny in its analysis of the enemy's intention.

## 2. Assumptions:

\* \* \* \* \*  
c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or attack on Oahu.

\* \* \* \* \*  
[104] e. Our most likely enemy, Orange, can probably employ a maximum of six carriers against Oahu.

\* \* \* \* \*  
c. \* \* \* The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy.

2. a. The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the *action upon which we should base our plans of operation*, is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule.

(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before attack.

(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack.

\* \* \* \* \*

<sup>29</sup> Excerpts from letter dated April 14, 1941 (R. 27).

4. \* \* \* The sole purpose of the existence of the military establishment on Oahu, ground, and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying naval base. \* \* \*

It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive action.

[105] C. CRITICAL PERIODS OCTOBER 1 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

1. *Vital Messages*.—In view of the foregoing, the estimate of the situation showed that an all-out attack by air was the judgment of the best military and naval minds in Hawaii. Under established military doctrine, that called for preparation for this worst eventuality. (R. 436-437) Short so admitted that this was the correct procedure. (R. 436-437)

The contrast between the written statements of many of the responsible actors in this matter prior to Pearl Harbor and after Pearl Harbor, as to their estimate of an air attack by Japan on Oahu, is startling.

The Secretary of the Navy wrote on January 24, 1941, to the Secretary of War:

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) air bombing attack.
- (2) air torpedo attack.
- (3) sabotage. (Roberts Record, 1824-1825.)

However, when Secretary of the Navy arrived in Hawaii a few days after December 7, following the Japanese attack, Admiral Pye testified his (Secretary Knox) first remark was:

No one in Washington expected an attack—even Kelly Turner.

Admiral Kelly Turner was in the War Plans Division of the Navy and was the most aggressive-minded of all. (R. 1070.)

General Marshall, in a letter to General Short on February 7, 1941, said:

The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and submarine constitute the real perils of the situation. (R. 17.)

[106] On October 7, 1944, General Marshall testified before this Board:

We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack upon Hawaii. (R. 9.)

It will be recalled that Admiral Bellinger and General Martin were responsible for the Joint Estimate, particularly with reference to air, and that this was based upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. In that estimate they put attack by air as the primary threat against Hawaii.

Contrast what Admiral Bellinger said on this record:

If anyone knew the attack was coming, why, I assume they would have been in a functioning status. (R. 1626.)

Contrast what General Martin said:

I didn't see any more danger from attack than General Short did, that is from a surprise attack with the information we had. (R. 1827.)



Admiral Kimmel said :

We had no reason to believe, from any intelligence we had, that the Japanese were going to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor or even that any attack was going to be made on Pearl Harbor. (R. 1771.)

The foregoing statement by Kimmel was in 1944 before this Board, whereas the joint agreements he entered into with the Army and the instructions from the Secretary of the Navy as well as his own recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy show that an air attack was the principal concern.

Likewise, Admiral Bloch, who signed the Joint Air Agreement based on the air estimate of Bellinger and Martin, testified as follows:

General FRANK. Was the attack a complete surprise to you?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. (R. 1518.)

General Short was the signer of the agreements specifying [107] the air attack as a primary threat and he had received the Marshall letter of February 7, 1941, and similar letters of General Marshall, and had replied setting forth in letters that the air attack was his primary concern.

Witness what General Short says on this record to the contrary :

General GRUNERT. Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you?

General SHORT. It was. (R. 536.)

We must therefore conclude that the responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down to the Generals and Admirals in Hawaii, *all expected an air attack before Pearl Harbor*. As a general statement, when testifying after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it.

Apparently the only person who was not surprised was the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified :

Well, I was not surprised. (R. 4072.)

Short's Standard Operating Procedure, which he had formulated with his staff in July and finally put into complete form on November 5, 1941, (R. 333) had been sent to the Chief of Staff. (R. 431.) General Marshall wrote General Short on October 10th that it had just come to his attention and that upon an examination of the Standard Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, containing those three alerts.

I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. (R. 29.)

He objected to the assignment to the Hawaiian Air Force of the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all [108] airfields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks, and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty. He thereby clearly warned General Short that the air force should not be used for antisabotage, for General Marshall further said in his letter :

This (the action of using the air force for antisabotage duty) seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. (R. 29.)

General Short replied on October 14, as follows :

The plan was to use them (Air Force personnel) for guarding certain essential utilities. . . . However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon.

General Marshall again wrote General Short on the 28th of October, and in it he clearly indicated to Short that he should change his alert plan (of which there was no proof that he ever did) and only use the Air Force for guard during the last stage when the Air Force as such had been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. General Marshall further indicated that no potential ground duty should be used as an excuse for not continuing the specific Air Force training, saying:

I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their own specific training requirements.

It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned. (R. 30.)

[109] Here, again, General Marshall cautioned Short to use his Air Force for its normal purposes and not upon antisabotage guard duty and emphasizes that the use of the Air Force must be free and unfettered.

On October 16 Short received the following Navy message:

The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the C.N.O. which I have been directed to pass to you. Quote: "Japanese Cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be anti-American and extremely nationalistic. If the Konoye Cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include reapproachment with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the United States are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack those two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan." (R. 279.)

On October 18, 1941, a radiogram was sent by the War Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, reading as follows:

Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remain strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent. (R. 4258.)

This message was dated October 18, 1941, according to the Gerow statement, Exhibit 63, but in the copy of communications produced by General Marshall, the same message was dated October 20, 1941, as #266.

On October 28, General Marshall wrote General Short as to details of the training of the air corps personnel.

On November 24, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message that Short thinks he saw, reading as follows:

[110] There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military force is, in our opinion, that a *surprise aggressive movement in any direction*, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a *possibility*. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action. \* \* \* inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. (R. 4258.)



On November 26, 1941, the following secret cablegram was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval vessels including submarines X X X before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns. (R. 4259.)

On November 27 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message which was delivered by the liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, to G-3 of General Short, which reads as follows:

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo. (R. 1775.)

And on the same day the Chief of Staff sent the following radio to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

[111] No. 472. "Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." (R. 280-281, 4259-4260.)<sup>30</sup>

This completes the pattern of the communications and information that was in Short's possession when he made the fatal decision to elect the antisabotage Alert No. 1 and not select either Alert No. 2 or No. 3 which would have constituted the defense against the most serious attack that could be made upon him in view of the previous estimate of the situation and warnings he had received from all quarters of an air raid.<sup>31</sup>

On the same day, November 27, 1941, but *after his decision to select Alert No. 1* and the sending of a reply to the message, Short received from G-2, War Department, through his G-2, Hawaiian Department, the following message:

Advise only the C. G. and the C. of S. It appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. *Also possibilities that hostilities may begin.* (R. 4260.)

<sup>30</sup> A full discussion of the message follows.

<sup>31</sup> Significant naval messages from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, under dates of December 3, 4, and 6, 1941, relating to the destruction of codes and secret documents by Japanese consulates and instructions regarding destruction of similar means of our own evidently never reached General Short. (R. 424-425.)

[112] Short was asked what were his reasons for his action. The following colloquy is important:

General FRANK. I would like to develop this thought for just a minute. This is in consideration generally of military operations. In estimating the situation with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?

General SHORT. Yes.

General FRANK. That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our War College teaching and our actual practice in the organization. Now, in coming to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy action of what character?

General SHORT. The worst.

General FRANK. The worst. Now, can you tell me why that was not done in this instance?

General SHORT. Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at that time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action and there was no comment that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it. They had a lot more information than I had. (R. 436-437.)

\* \* \* \* \*

General FRANK. All right. Now, you have given considerable testimony about how you arrived at your conclusion of the adequateness of Alert No. 1, and in general may we say that you came to this conclusion as a result of your faith in the effectiveness of naval operations and the influence of Naval opinion and to a certain extent of the line of thought as a result of what was contained in messages between the 16th of November and the 27th?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. And that was later confirmed by, may I add, actions of the War Department in not replying to my message and stating they wanted more, and in sending planes without any ammunition.

[113] General FRANK. All right. Did you feel that the wording of messages coming in there to you indicated an effort toward a supervisory control?

General SHORT. I thought that it indicated very definitely two things: That they wanted me to be extremely careful and not have an incident with the Japanese population that would arouse Japan, and the other thing was not to violate territorial laws in my eagerness to carry out defensive measures.

General FRANK. The question has arisen in the minds of the Board as to why, when that air estimate anticipated just exactly what happened, steps were not taken to meet it. I assume that the answer—

General SHORT. You mean the estimate of the year—you mean the year before?

General FRANK. No. The Martin-Bellinger estimate.

General SHORT. Oh.

General FRANK. Of 1941.

General SHORT. Yes.

General FRANK. I assume the answer is the answer that you gave to the question asked two or three questions back.

General SHORT. Yes. (R. 471-472.)

General Short within an hour after receiving the message from the Chief of Staff of November 27 ordered the No. 1 Alert, which continued up to the attack on December 7. (R. 282.) His message in reply to General Marshall was:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy. Reuard four seventy two Nov. 27th. (R. 38, 286.)

The indorsements so appearing on this reply are as follows: In the handwriting of the Secretary of War there appear the words "Noted HLS", written in pen; "Noted—Chief of Staff", stamped by a rubber



stamp on the message without initials; and a rubber stamp "Noted, WPD" (in red ink) followed by pen initials "L.T.G." (R. 38, 4287.)

[114] An examination of the wire received from General MacArthur, in response to a similar message sent to General Short,<sup>32</sup> shows the same indorsements, including "Noted—Chief of Staff," with a rubber stamp but no initials. However, this message has written in General Marshall's handwriting the words "To Secretary of War, GCM." This indorsement does not appear on the following message that came from Short. (See General Marshall's explanation below.)

The message from Short to the Chief of Staff indicates that it was the "Action Copy" as noted in pencil at its foot "OCS/18136-120."

When questioned about this vital message, the Chief of Staff said:

General RUSSELL. Subsequently General Short sent a reply to that message in which he refers to the November 27 message from you over your signature by number. That message of General Short reporting action merely states:

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD four seven two twenty-seventh."

The original of General Short's report indicates that it was initialed by Secretary Stimson and has a stamp "Noted—Chief of Staff," and was initialed by General Gerow.

The Board has been interested to know the procedure in your office as it relates to stamping documents which do not bear your signature. Does that indicate that you did or did not see those messages?

[115] General MARSHALL. Well, I think if you look at the preceding message from the Philippines you will find that same rubber stamp on there, "Noted—Chief of Staff."

General RUSSELL. That is true.

General MARSHALL. And you will find it at the top of the message. You will find my initials.

General RUSSELL. Yes; I do see them.

General MARSHALL. But not on the other one. I do not know about that. I do not know what the explanation is. I initial them all; that is my practice. One goes to the particular section that has the responsibility for working on it, which in this case was the War Plans Division, now the Operations Division, and then one comes to me. I initial it and then it goes out to the record. Where I think the Secretary of War ought to see it, and if he is not in the distribution, I check it to him. Where I think there is somebody else that should be notified, I indicate on the face of my copy who else is to be informed of this. As a matter of routine one agency is charged with the execution of the matter pertaining to the message. But in this particular case I do not know. I have no recollection at all.

General RUSSELL. The fact that it reached the Secretary of War's office and was by him initialed—would that or not indicate that you had sent it up to him or that it might have been sent up to him by someone else?

General MARSHALL. In this connection I invite your attention to the fact that this was filed behind a message from General MacArthur. I note that I did not initial it. They evidently came in together.

General RUSSELL. If they were together you might or might not have seen them?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection at all. The presumption would be that I had seen it. (R. 38-40.)

No one of these persons, or any of their subordinates, have any record, either internally in the War Department or externally, of any message to Short showing the slightest exception taken to his course of action. It will be noted as to the Chief of Staff, that while he did not

<sup>32</sup> On November 27th the War Department sent messages similar to one sent to General Short, to MacArthur in the Philippines, Andrews in Panama, and DeWitt on the West Coast, each of which called for a report of measures taken. All replies except that from Short indicated the taking of measures of greater security than those envisaged in the Hawaiian Alert No. 1.

initial the Short reply, he did initial the top message from General [116] MacArthur on the same subject, and apparently they both went together to the Secretary of War, as they had come at substantially the same time in answer to the same message from the Chief of Staff. The inference from General Marshall's testimony is that possibly he only initialed the top one, but that is speculation, as he said,

I do not know what the explanation is. (R. 39.)

2. *Analysis of the Situation from November 24 to November 27*—The vital message of November 27, #472, heretofore quoted as having been sent by the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, can be understood and its proper place in this narrative determined only when we know the events which led up to its being sent; when we know by whom drafted and by what procedure the drafting was accomplished; and the circumstances under which it was forwarded. Its relationship to surrounding circumstances and other documents must also be understood before we proceed to analyze the message and the meaning of each part of it.<sup>33</sup>

[117] The War Council met on the 25th of November 1941. Fortunately, we have the advantage of the contemporaneous diary of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who has pictured in his diary with great clarity and precision the events as they transpired, which were material to this issue. This diary reads:

At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic. . . . We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall. Then at twelve o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem. (R. 4050-4051.)

This was the end of the discussions on the 25th of November, 1941 (R. 4050-4051), with the exception that when the Secretary of War returned to his office, he found a G-2 message that a Japanese expedition had started southward, south of Formosa; and he at once called Mr. Hull and sent him copies of the report and a copy to the President.

On the following day, November 26, 1941, the diary continues:

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and to tell them that he had no other proposition at all. (R. 4051-4052.)

<sup>33</sup> The Secretary of War has cleared some ambiguity in this record, and an ambiguity in the White Papers by defining with precision the War Council. There were really three bodies that were loosely referred to from time to time by this title. The true War Council was that established under the National Defense Act of 1920, solely within the War Department. The second body was that created by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, when they entered into their positions, by which they gathered together at regular intervals with the Secretary of State, and sometimes with General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The third group was that which joined the President at fairly regular intervals, consisting of the President, the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and from time to time General Marshall and Admiral Stark, and occasionally General Arnold. (R. 4041-4042-4043-4044, 4047-4048, 5-6.)



There is some proof that, before General Marshall left Washington for North Carolina on maneuvers on the afternoon of [118] the 26th, he had drafted in the rough a proposed message to General Short apprising him of the situation as it was developed. General Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, testifies that he believes he discussed such a draft with General Marshall. (R. 4244-4246.)

General Marshall was away on the 27th and returned on the 28th, at which time he saw the complete draft of the message of the 27th together with the report from General Gerow of the events during the 27th which we are now about to relate. (R. 36-37.)

Before the closing of the story of the 26th, Mr. Stimson defines it as:

The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it. (R. 4051-4052-4053.)

What the Secretary of State appears to have done was to have his conference with the Japanese Ambassadors and to hand to them the "Ten Points". As Ambassador Grew testifies, the Japanese considered these "Ten Points" to be an ultimatum. (R. 4221.) Whether or not the Secretary of State considers now that this is not an ultimatum (see his letter of September 28, 1943), nevertheless, the Japanese did so consider it and acted upon it as such by notifying the task force, as the evidence shows was waiting at Takan Bay, to start the movement against Hawaii, and it did move out on the 27th-28th of November. As well put by Ambassador Grew:

Naturally, they (the Japanese) had all their plans made for years beforehand, in the case of war with America. They were very foresighted in those respects, and they had their plans drawn up probably right down to the last detail; but as for the moment at which the button was touched, I don't myself know exactly how long it would have taken their carriers to get from where they were to the point at which [119] they attacked Pearl Harbor; but it has always been my belief that it was *about the time of the receipt of Mr. Hull's memorandum of November 26 that the button was touched.* (R. 4215)

On the morning of the 27th of November 1941, Mr. Stimson's diary reads:

The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy."

Then the Secretary of War states:

I then called up the President and talked with him about it.

He (Stimson) then approved the orders presented to him by General Arnold to move two large planes over the Mandated Islands to take pictures. (R. 4053.)

The Secretary related that General Marshall "is down at the maneuvers today," and "Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow." At this point he says:

A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed. (R. 4054.)

This is the memorandum asking the President not to precipitate an ultimatum with the Japanese and to give the Army and Navy more

time within which to prepare; but it was too late, as the die had been cast by the Secretary of State in handing the "Ten Points" counter-proposals to the Japanese on the previous day, which was, as the Secretary of State remarked, "washing his hands of the matter".

[120] When Ambassador Grew so testified he apparently did not know of the very complete evidence in this record of the movement of the Japanese task force starting on the 27th-28th from Takan Bay to the attack. Mr. Hull's statement on this subject is of interest:

I communicated on November 26 to the Japanese spokesmen—who were urgently calling for a reply to their proposals of November 20—what became the last of this Government's counter-proposals. . . . It will thus be seen that the document under reference did not constitute in any sense an ultimatum." (Letter from Secretary of State to the Army Pearl Harbor Board, September 28, 1944.)

3. *The Drafting of the Message #472 of the 27th.*—We now turn to the drafting of the message of the 27th as related by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and other witnesses. The first meeting was between Mr. Stimson, General Bryden and General Gerow. (R. 4239-4240.) A second meeting between Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark and General Gerow was held later in the day. (R. 4240.) As the diary of Mr. Stimson says:

But the main question at this meeting was over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert; and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert, namely, that he should be on the *qui vive* for any attack, and telling him how the situation was. (R. 4055.)

To continue with the diary:

So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him (Mr. Stimson here verbally testified—"We were sending the messages to four people, not only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska". So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully, finally got it into shape, and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was. (R. 4056.)

[121] The Secretary of War then stated:

The thing that I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two governments, and this part I got from Hull, as I said, by telephone, to be sure I was right. (R. 4056.)

The two sentences which the Secretary of War apparently wrote in the message of the 27th were these:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.<sup>24</sup>

The Secretary continues his testimony:

That was what I was interested in getting out at the time, because that had been a decision which I had heard from the President, as I have just read, and I had gotten the exact details of the situation between the State Department and the envoys from Mr. Hull; and, as I pointed out here, the purpose in my mind, as I quote my talk with the President, was to send a final alert, namely,

<sup>24</sup> However, General Gerow (R. 4247) testified that he believed that the sentence "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment" was inserted by him or Colonel Bundy.



that the man should be on the *qui vive* for any attack, and telling him how the situation was here. (R. 4056.)

The task that the Secretary of War was engaged upon was normally that of the Chief of Staff. As Mr. Stimson said:

That was why I was in this matter. Marshall was away. I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what I of course normally do; to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance with the facts. (R. 4057.)

The message to Hawaii now under consideration of the 27th has endorsed upon it, "Shown to the Secretary of War". (R. 4057.)

[122] The Secretary testified:

I went over very carefully the whole message. . . . And I saw it after it was finally drawn, as shown by the memorandum there. (R. 4058.)

With reference to the other meeting that took place on the 27th in the drafting of this message, #472, General Gerow's testimony is that at the meeting with the Secretary of War the first two sentences, reported by the Secretary of War as being drafted by him, were sentences which were softened by instructions or information furnished by the Secretary of State in a conversation over the telephone with the Secretary of War the morning of the 27th. (R. 4247.) General Gerow testifies that the sentences so softened originally read

Negotiations with Japan have been terminated. (R. 4270.)

The sentence,

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment

was put in by General Gerow or Colonel Bundy. (R. 4247.)

The sentence,

If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act,

was thus phrased because as Gerow said he testified before the Roberts Commission:

We pointed out in the message the possible danger of attack and directed reconnaissance and other necessary measures without fully carrying into effect the provisions of this plan, which would have required hostile action against Japan, and the President had definitely stated that he wanted Japan to commit the first overt act. (R. 4251-4252.)

The next sentence:

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense

was inserted by General Gerow or by Colonel Bundy. The [123] purpose of this language was to insure freedom of action to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. (R. 4252.)

General Gerow said that there had been no discussion of the ambiguity of the message or its apparent conflicting instructions as a "Do-or-Don't" message. (R. 4252.)

He said that nothing in the message told General Short about the relations between the American Government and the Japanese Empire. (R. 4256.) The sole information passed on to General Short by the War Department from October 20th to November 27th about what the soldier calls "enemy information" was in this particular mes-

sage. (R. 4263.) The only previous message that Short had had of the international situation from the War Department was on October 20, which read: <sup>35 36</sup>

[124] Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent. (R. 4264.)

The sentence:

This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense

was put in by the War Plans Division. (R. 4271.)

With reference to the phrase,

You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary,

apparently at that time no investigation was made by the War Department to ascertain just what means General Short had of conducting the reconnaissance; but aside from this fault, the fact is that General Short did have some planes plus radar to conduct a degree of reconnaissance. This the record shows he did not fully and gainfully employ these means for this purpose. General Short was recalled at substantially the end of all the testimony and questioned on this point. Short's position on this message was that the direction to him to conduct reconnaissance was a futile directive and that it indicated to him that the man who wrote the message was entirely unfamiliar with the fact,

that the Navy was responsible for long distance reconnaissance.

He said this was

in spite of the fact that the Chief of Staff had approved that plan that provided for that, whoever wrote the message was not familiar with it, or it had slipped his mind that it was the Navy and not the Army that was responsible. (R. 4436-4437.)

He said when questioned as to why he did not call attention to this matter in his reply to the War Department:

I think if the War Department had intended to abrogate that agreement, they would have told me so.

[125] He said he based everything on the responsibility of the Navy for long distance reconnaissance, because it had been approved by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. (R. 4438.)

He could not explain why he failed to use his own reconnaissance aircraft even though the agreement was not actually in effect at that time or the War Department had overlooked the agreement because he says, as elsewhere admitted, that the Army and Navy agreement was not to go into effect until hostilities, or other equivalent, had occurred. His reconnaissance planes were still under his control and could have been used by him to carry out this direct order in this message.

<sup>35</sup> However, General Gerow testified (R. 4258) that there was a Navy Department message of November 24th which contained information of the Japanese situation and indicated possible Japanese aggressive action and which directed the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet to inform General Short of its contents.

<sup>36</sup> Information gleaned by the Board indicates that G-2, War Department, on November 3, 1941, sent a letter to G-2, Hawaiian Department, in which was set forth the prophecy of war between Japan and the United States in December 1941 or February 1942, as made by a prominent Japanese.



For instance, the following colloquy occurred:

62. General GRUNERT. You might clear up two additional points. First, we will take up the point that you have brought out, there, that the War Department had evidently overlooked the agreement that your command had with the Navy, as to distant reconnaissance. Did you call the War Department's attention to the fact, when you were ordered to make reconnaissance, about that agreement?

General SHORT. I did not, but I reported to them exactly what I was doing.

63. General GRUNERT. Then you considered your report the answer to that?

General SHORT. They called on me for a report. If they had not called on me for a report, I think the situation would have been quite different; but they definitely told me to "report action taken," which I did; and I heard nothing further from them.

64. General GRUNERT. We have had testimony before the Board, from a member of the Navy, calling the Board's attention to the fact that this Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not operative until an emergency arose, and apparently the emergency, or the imminency of [126] such an emergency, was not agreed to, locally, to make the provisions operative. With that understanding, was it the Navy's business to conduct long-distance reconnaissance, prior to such an emergency?

General SHORT. If the emergency existed, it was their business; if it did not exist, there was no necessity.

65. General GRUNERT. Then, when do you judge the emergency came about?

General SHORT. It very definitely came about, at 7:55 on the morning of the 7th. (R. 4438-4439.)

This is sufficient in itself to clearly demonstrate that Short was not taking the action which he could and should have taken of either more fully carrying out the order, or of specifically and definitely reporting the complete circumstances of his inability to do so. He did not call the attention of the War Department to what was an apparent misunderstanding on its part. He was relying upon the Navy reconnaissance without any reasonable energetic inquiry to ascertain the correctness of his assumption that the Navy was conducting long distance reconnaissance. He has no adequate explanation for not using the radar 24 hours a day (which was in full operation Sunday prior to December 7) after getting the message of the 27th, and which was used continuously after December 7. (R. 4441-4444.) For some time after December 7th the situation as to the dearth of spare parts was the same as before December 7th.

The Secretary of War did not know the authorship of the part,

Report measures taken \* \* \* Limit dissemination \* \* \* to minimum essential officers. (R. 4071.)

He said he knew it was there and he understood it.

There were two conferences with the Secretary of War, one [127] at 9:30 the morning of the 27th, and one later in the day. At the first conference, the Secretary of War, General Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff, and General Gerow were there. At that time General Gerow received instructions with reference to the preparation of the message. He then consulted Admiral Stark. (R. 4239-4240.) The second conference took place later with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and Mr. Stimson. (R. 4240.) General Bryden has testified that although he was Deputy Chief of Staff, and Acting Chief of Staff in General Marshall's absence, he does not remember the message nor the conference thereon. (R. 900.) While the Chief of Staff reviewed the message of the 27th on the 28th, it is unfortunate that during this critical period he was off on maneuvers in North Carolina and missed

the drafting of the message which was the composite work of a number of people, which may account for its confusing and conflicting tenor. Possibly had he been present, the Marshall-Stark memorandum might have reached the President in time to have influenced the momentous decisions of November 26th.

It is equally obvious that the November 27th message was the only message that attempted to translate the long and tempestuous course of events terminating in the counter-proposals on the 26th of November to Japan.

No other picture of the situation was given to Short, except in this message. It is apparent that the message of November 27 was entirely inadequate to properly and adequately translate to Short's mind the background of events that had been taking place. While this does not excuse Short, it does necessitate an assessment for the responsibility on others.

[128] The three principal Major Generals who were commanders under Short have testified that they received substantially nothing by way of information as to the international situation except what they read in the newspapers. The fact that the newspapers were urgent and belligerent in their tone was discounted by them, because they were not receiving any confirmatory information from the War Department through Short. Information that was of tremendous value both as to content and substance, which the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and other high officers of the War Department had, was not transmitted to Short. The only summary of this information was the brief and conflicting tone of the message of November 27, which was but a faint echo of what had actually occurred.

It is significant that the Japanese upon the termination of negotiations by the counter-proposals of the 26th, considered by them as an ultimatum, were thereby in full possession of all the information, which our ultra-secrecy policy did not permit of full transmission to field commanders. The Japanese knew everything. The War and Navy Departments transmitted to Short and Kimmel only so much of what they knew as they judged necessary.<sup>37</sup>

It is also significant that the Secretary of War had to go and call Mr. Hull to get the information on what amounted to the practical cessation of negotiations, which was the most vital thing that had occurred in 1941. If it had not been for [129] Mr. Stimson's initiative in calling the Secretary of State, it is uncertain as to when he would have been advised of this most important event. As it turned out, the delay of from ten to twelve hours in getting the information was not material since the Japanese delayed striking until December 7th.

The effect of the counter-proposals of November 26th on the resulting responsibilities of the Army and Navy is indicated in Mr. Stimson's quotation of Mr. Hull's comment to him, as follows:

Now it is up to the Army and Navy to take care of the matter. I have washed my hands of the Japanese.

<sup>37</sup> Both General Marshall and Admiral Stark expressed themselves as of the opinion that the warnings transmitted to Short and Kimmel were sufficient to properly alert their respective commands.



4. *Analysis of the November 27, 1941, Message.*—The message of November 27, 1941, from the Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, consists of the following component parts:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practicable purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government may come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

Comment: This statement on Japanese information is inadequate. It did not convey to Short the full import of the information concerning the American-Japanese relations which was in the hands of the War Department. It was misleading in that it stated that there was a bare possibility of the resumption of negotiations, which carried with it the implication that such resumption would influence the Japanese-American relations, i. e., that war might not come. The War Department was convinced then that war would come.

The statement that "Japanese future action unpredictable" [130] was in conflict with the Navy message which the War Department had directed be shown to Short, to the effect that the attack would be in the Kra Peninsula and elsewhere in the Far East. It did not convey to Short the fixed opinion of the War Department General Staff as to the probable plan of Japanese operations.

A warning that "hostile action possible at any moment" indicated the necessity of taking adequate measures to meet that situation. This is particularly true in view of the Navy message of 16 October, 1941, which said that there was a possibility that Japan might attack. There was also received from the Navy on November 27 a message containing these words,

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days.

The next statement in the Chief of Staff's message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

Comment: This instruction embodied our well known national policy against initiating war. The responsibility for beginning the war must be Japan's. It gives Short the right of defense, notwithstanding the restriction, but creates an atmosphere of caution which he must exercise in preparing for such defense.

The third portion of the message is this:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm [131] the civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.

Comment: This was an order. Short could take such measures, including reconnaissance, as he deemed necessary. What was available to Short for reconnaissance and defensive action and the measures taken by him are fully discussed elsewhere.

Here again we find the limitation that he must act cautiously. However, the weight of evidence indicates that a higher form of alert than that taken would not have alarmed the public.

Short did report within an hour the measures taken. (R. 286.)

Short's answer to General Marshall's radio said:

Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. Reuard four seven two twenty seventh.

This in itself was sufficient to show that such steps were inadequate, but as he did not say he was taking any other steps, the War Department erroneously assumed that its responsible commander was alert to sabotage and to liaison with the Navy and was taking the necessary responsible other steps mentioned in the radio because he had been warned in this radio of the 27th by General Marshall.

Having asked for a report of what he was doing, the War Department placed itself in the position of sharing the responsibility if it did not direct Short to take such measures as they considered adequate to meet this serious threat. This is particularly true in view of the fact that much material information relating to Japanese-American relations was in the War Department, which had not been made available to Short.

[132] The next and last portion of the message:

should hostilities occur, you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Number 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Comment: (a) This was a clear recognition, and advice to Short, that his basic war plan and all joint Army and Navy plans based upon it was to be used and was a clear indication to him to adopt adequate preparatory measures to insure the execution of Rainbow Number 5.

(b) As to the directive to

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers—

The War Department was security-conscious. The construction which Short appears to have placed upon this language may have unduly limited the information which reached responsible subordinate commanders. This part of the message left broad discretion in Short as to the dissemination of the information contained in the message, and had the personnel operating the Air Warning Service on the morning of December 7th known of the absolute imminence of war they doubtless would have interpreted the information obtained from the radar station much differently.

It is of a piece with the other provisions of the instructions—not to alarm the public, not to disclose intent, and to avoid commission of the first overt act.

*Comment on the message as a whole.*—General Short, as the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was charged with the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and as such had a fundamental duty to properly employ all available means at his disposal for that purpose in the face of any threat, with or without notification of impending hostilities.

[133] Notwithstanding receipt of conflicting and qualifying information, which undoubtedly had its effect on Short's mental conception of the situation, the responsibility rested on him to take meas-



ures to meet the worst situation with which he might be confronted, and such action on his part, as Commander on the spot, was mandatory despite the fact that he was not kept fully advised by the War Department of the critical situation and of the positive, immediate imminence of war.

The same day G-2 of the War Department wired to G-2 Hawaiian Department, which clearly indicated that *both* sabotage and hostilities might begin and be concurrent. This message said:

Advise only the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Actions of sabotage and espionage probable. Also probable that *hostilities* may begin.

This G-2 message nullifies all Short's explanation that his mind was put on sabotage because of the War Department's emphasis on this subject. The message shows that hostilities were just as possible as sabotage. His decision to adopt Alert Number 1 came on the 27th, before receipt of any message having reference to sabotage. He had two threats: he only took measures as to one. The third message, upon which he particularly relies as to sabotage, which came on November 28 from the War Department (G-2), came *after* he had made his decision to go to Alert Number 1. This last message again mentions the critical situation as to sabotage activities. It does not in any way change previous messages. Short should have known, as a trained soldier, that a G-2 message is informative and is of [134] lesser authority than a commanding message from the Chief of Staff.

When General Short was asked if he had known that negotiations with Japan had practically ended when he received the message of November 27th, he said:

I think it would have made me more conscious that war was practically unavoidable . . . If I knew it was immediately imminent . . . but if I had known it was immediately imminent, then I should think I would have gone into Alert Number 3 . . . It would have looked to me definite that the war was almost upon us. (R. 450.)

General RUSSELL. General Short, did you know that on the 26th of November the State Department handed to the Japanese representatives a memorandum which G-2 of the War Department at least considered as an ultimatum to the Japanese government?

General SHORT. I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came out.

General RUSSELL. Did you know on the 27th of November, when you received that message that the Secretary of State had in a meeting on the 25th of November told the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and probably the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Admiral Stark, that the State Department had gone as far as it could in its negotiations with the Japanese and that the security of the nation was then in the hands of the armed forces?

General SHORT. I did not.

General RUSSELL. Did you know that in January of 1941 Ambassador Grew made a report to the State Department or to the Secretary of State in which he stated that there were rumors in Japan that in event of trouble with America the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. At that time I was not in command; but I have known of that later, I think probably a year or so later. I do not think I knew anything about it at that time. (R. 451.)

This concludes the status of affairs to the 27th. There still remained the period from the 27th to the 6th of December, inclusive, during which time messages and even letters could have been sent outlining and completely delineating the entire [135] situation to Short.

Even a courier could have reached Honolulu in 36 hours from Washington. The War Department, although it had additional information of a most positive character, left Short with this fragment of information regarding the U. S.-Japanese negotiations contained in the two sentences inserted in the message of the 27th by the Secretary of War, and took no action either to investigate Short's reply to the message of November 27 to determine the steps being taken for defense, or to assure that adequate defensive measures were being taken.

5. *Messages 28th November To 6th December, Inclusive.*—On November 28th the War Department sent message No. 482 to Short, reading as follows:<sup>38</sup>

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department (See paragraph 3 MID SC thirty dash forty-five) stop. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

[136] Short sent a reply to wire 482 of November 28th on the same day which outlined at length the sabotage precautions he was taking. The War Department copy of this wire, which is addressed to the A. G. O., shows that a copy was sent to the Secretary of the General Staff, but no other indorsements are on it showing it was read or considered by anyone else. This wire reads:

Re your secret radio for eight two twenty eighth, full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Dept paren paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this Hqrs by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by Section sixty seven of the organic act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the Commanders of Military and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this Hqrs to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures in the territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations. In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Dept. to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any highway within the city and county of Honolulu, whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters. SHORT.

It is to be noted that the official file does not show a copy of radio #482, sent to Short by the War Department on [137] November 28th.

<sup>38</sup> A similar message, No. 484, was sent on the same day to the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by General Arnold.



On December 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the following wire to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet:

On 3d December we have, "Op Nav informs"—this is a paraphrase, you understand, sir. \* \* \*—"informs C in C Asiatic, CinePac, Combat 14-16 that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents." (Admiral Bloch, Vol. 13, Page 1513, APHB.)<sup>20</sup>

The story as to whether Short ever saw or received this message is as follows: Admiral Kimmel visited Short December 2 and December 3, 1941. (R. 1513.) Short says: "I never saw that message" (R. 424), referring to the 3 December message. He also denied seeing the message from the Navy of December 4th and 6th hereinafter quoted. (R. 424-425.) However, Short was advised by the F. B. I. that it had tapped the telephone line of the Japanese Consuls' cook and had found the Consul was burning his papers. (R. 3204.) All other lines were tapped by the Navy. (R. 3204.) Phillips testified Short was "informed of it," but nothing was done about it. (R. 1243.) Short denies such G-2 information, saying: "I am sure he didn't inform me." (R. 525.) Colonel Fielder says the matter was discussed by Colonel Phillips at a staff conference, but nothing was done about it. Colonel Bicknell, G-2, Hawaiian Department, confirmed Fielder. (R. 1413-1414.)

[138] This record does not provide either a true copy or a paraphrase copy of the message of December 4, 1941, or December 6, 1941. The information we have is no better than that contained in the Roberts Report, which reads as follows:

the second of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only); and the third of December 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment. (Roberts Report, page 8.)

These messages were received because Admiral Bloch testified that he remembered them. (R. 1513-1514.)

Irrespective of any testimony on the subject the record shows that on December 3, 1941, Short and Kimmel had a conference about a cablegram relative to the relief of marines on Wake and Midway. (R. 302, 394.)

There is a serious question raised why the War Department did not give instructions to Short direct which would have put him on his guard as to the tenseness of the situation.

On December 6 there was reported to the Chief of Staff, Phillips, the message about the Japanese burning their papers, and he reported it at a staff meeting on December 6. (R. 1414.)

6. *December 7, 1941 Message.*—This brings us to the final message from Washington. It was filed by the Chief of Staff at 12:18 p. m. Washington time, December 7th, which was 6:48 a. m. Honolulu time.

Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum. [139] Also they are under orders to destroy their code

<sup>20</sup> This message also paraphrased by General Grunert, Vol. 4, Page 424. This same message also paraphrased in Roberts Testimony, Vol. 5, Page 583, and Vol. 17, Page 8-85.

machine immediately stop. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop. Inform naval authorities of this communication.

The story of the sending of this message, which, if it could have been sent so as to have reached Short a few hours prior to the attack might at least have greatly lessened the results of the attack, will be set forth at length. It was sent by commercial radio, the R. C. A. This is a commercial line. Early in the morning in Honolulu the Hawaiian Department radio had had great difficulty in keeping in communication with the War Department radio. It is significant that the Hawaiian Department only had a small 10 k. g. set. It was not a powerful set, like that of the Navy or the R. C. A. The Message Center of the War Department, which is charged with the expeditious handling of messages, decided to send this vital message by commercial R. C. A. instead of War Department radio, because it could not get through on its own net. Why this message was not sent by the Navy radio, by F. B. I. radio, or by telephone, and why these means of possibly more rapid communication were not investigated, is not satisfactorily explained. The explanation that "secrecy" was paramount does not appear to apply to these means.

Shivers of the F. B. I. testified:

We had our own radio station . . . I would say within—depending on the length of the message; a 20-word message could be probably gotten to Washington by—could have gotten to the receiving station in Washington within a period of twenty minutes . . . our channels were not jammed . . . We used a frequency that was assigned to us by the F. C. C. . . . All of the stuff that went out from here to—that went out over that radio, was coded. (R. 3221.)

[140] General GRUNERT. Then any message that Washington wanted to get to you during that morning or just prior to the attack on that morning you think could have gotten to you within the leeway of an hour?

Mr. SHIVERS. The message could have been sent out within an hour, yes. Yes, sir. (R. 3221.)

It is to be noted in this connection that not only was the F. B. I. radio working between Washington and Honolulu on December 6-7, but that testimony shows numerous telephone conversations were conducted just after the attack, over the telephone between Washington and Honolulu.

The story of the sending of this message in the War Department is as follows:

[141] This message arrived in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m., Honolulu time, December 7th. The attack struck 22 minutes later. The message was not actually delivered to the signal office of the Hawaiian Department until 11:45 a. m., the attack having taken place at 7:55 a. m. The message was decoded and delivered to The Adjutant General at 2:58 p. m., 7 hours and 3 minutes after the attack.

The status of communications between Washington and Hawaii on the morning of December 7th and for 24 hours previous to that time was as follows: The Hawaiian Department had a scrambler telephone connection direct with Washington by which you could ordinarily get a message through from Washington to Hawaii in ten or fifteen minutes. After the attack on December 7, Colonel Fielder (G-2) himself talked to Washington twice on this phone and received a call from Washington on the same phone: it took no more than an hour as a maximum to get the call through despite the heavy traffic



to Hawaii by reason of the attack. (R. 2999.) Furthermore, a war message could have demanded priority.

It is important to observe that only one means of communication was selected by Washington. That decision violated all rules requiring the use of multiple means of communication in an emergency. In addition to the War Department telephone there also existed the F. B. I. radio, which was assigned a special frequency between Washington and Hawaii and over which it only took twenty minutes to send a coded message from Hawaii to Washington or vice versa. Shivers of F. B. I. so testified. (R. 3222.) Short testified:

General Marshall stated that the reason he did not telephone was that it took some time, that he had called the Philippines before he called Hawaii, and there was a [142] possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department. In other words, I think there was a feeling still at that time that secrecy was more important than the time element in getting the information to us as rapidly as possible. Whatever the reason was, we got that information seven hours after the attack. (R. 310.)

Apparently, the War Department at that time did not envisage an immediate attack, rather they thought more of a breaking of diplomatic relations, and if the idea of an attack at 1:00 p. m. E. S. T. did enter their minds they thought of it as probably taking place in the Far East and not in Hawaii. Hence secrecy was still of paramount interest to them. We find no justification for a failure to send this message by multiple secret means either through the Navy radio or F. B. I. radio or the scrambler telephone or all three.

The result was the message did not get through in time due to the failure of the War Department to use the telephone as the Chief of Staff used it to the Philippines (Short R. 310) or take steps to insure that the message got through by multiple channels (by code over naval or F. B. I. radio to Hawaii), if the War Department radio was not working. He left Short without this additional most important information. Short testified as follows:

If they had used the scrambled phone and gotten it through in ten or fifteen minutes we would probably have gotten more of the import and a clearer idea of danger from that message and we would have had time to warm up the planes and get them in the air to meet any attack. (R. 310.)

Colonel French, in charge of Traffic Operations Branch, Chief Signal Office, in the War Department testified that on December 7, 1941, Colonel Bratton brought the message to the code room in the handwriting of the Chief of Staff which "I had typed for clarity" in a few minutes. Colonel Bratton read and authenticated it. The message was given to the code clerk and transmission facilities checked. It was decided to send [143] the message by commercial means, choosing Western Union, as the fastest. He stated that he personally took the message from the code room to the teletype operator and advised Colonel Bratton it would take 30 to 45 minutes to transmit message to destination. It left at 12:01 (Eastern Standard Time, 6:31 a. m. Honolulu time). The transmission to Western Union was finished 12:17 p. m. Eastern Standard Time, or 7:33 a. m. Honolulu time. It took 45 minutes in transmission. The message was actually delivered at 11:45 a. m. Honolulu time. The messenger was diverted from his course during the bombing. (R. 189-202.)

Colonel French had no knowledge of the type of communication the F. B. I. used to Hawaii; he never used the scrambler telephone and sometimes he used the Navy to send messages, but did not inquire on the morning of December 7, although the Navy has a more powerful radio. (R. 203-204.)

7. *Failure of Navy to Advise Short of Enemy Submarine in Pearl Harbor on morning December 7, 1941.*—The second failure was by the Navy Department, upon whom Short so trustingly relied. A two-man submarine entered Pearl Harbor area at 6:30 a. m. Between 6:33 and 6:45 a. m. it was sunk by the Navy. This was reported at 7:12 a. m. by naval base officers to the Chief of Staff but the Navy made no such report to Short. (R. 310-311; See Roberts Report p. 15.) As Short said:

That would, under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of [144] it and just failed to notify me; that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the information to me had not—at any rate, I did not get the information until after the attack. (R. 311.)

8. *Failure of Aircraft Warning Service to Advise of Approaching Planes, December 7, 1941.*—The third event that might have saved the day was the following:

The aircraft warning service had established mobile aircraft warning stations on the Island of Oahu, as elsewhere related in detail, and had set up an Information Center to utilize the aircraft warning information, plot the course of any incoming planes and to advise the responsible authorities. The organization was set up and operating and was being utilized from 4 a. m. to 7 o'clock on the morning of December 7th as a training method and had been so used for some time past. The Navy was supposed to have detailed officers in the Information Center to be trained as liaison officers, but had not yet gotten around to it. In the Information Center that morning was a Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Air Corps, whose tour of duty thereat was until 8 o'clock. It was Tyler's second tour of duty at the Center and he was there for training and observation, but there were no others on duty after 7 o'clock except the enlisted telephone operator. He was the sole officer there between 7 and 8 o'clock that morning, the rest of the personnel that had made the Center operative from 4:00 to 7:00 a. m. had departed.

At one of the remote aircraft warning stations there were two privates who had been on duty from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. One of them was Private Lockard, who was skilled in operating the radar aircraft detector, and a Private George E. Elliott, who was [145] the plotting man to plot the information picked up on the radar. This plotter was anxious to learn how to operate the radar, and Private Lockard agreed to show him after the station was supposed to close at 7 o'clock and while they were waiting for the truck to take them to breakfast. He kept the radar open for further operation to instruct his partner, Private Elliott. While Lockard was adjusting the machine to begin the instruction of Private Elliott, he observed on the



radar screen an unusual formation he had never seen in the machine. He thought there was something wrong with it, as the indicator showed such a large number of planes coming in that he was sure that there was nothing like it in the air and there must be a machine error. He continued to check, however, and finally concluded that the machine was operating correctly and that there was a considerable number of planes 132 miles away from the island approaching from a direction 3 degrees east of north. The time was 7:02 a. m., December 7, 1941.

In this record Private Elliott, now Sergeant Elliott, testified that he plotted these planes and suggested to Lockard that they call up the Information Center. After some debate between them, Lockard did call the Information Center and reported to the switchboard operator. The switchboard operator, an enlisted man who testified, was unable to do anything about it, so he put Lieutenant Tyler on the phone. Tyler's answer proved to be a disastrous one. He said, in substance, "Forget it." Tyler's position is indefensible in his action, for he says that he was merely there for training and had no knowledge upon which to base any action; yet he assumed to give directions instead of seeking someone competent to make a decision.

If that be a fact, and it seems to be true, then he should [146] not have assumed to tell these two men, Private Lockard and Private Elliott, to "forget it", because he did not have the knowledge upon which to premise any judgment. (R. 1102.) He should, in accordance with customary practice, have then used initiative to take this matter up with somebody who did know about it, in view of the fact that he said he was there merely for training and had no competent knowledge upon which to either tell the men to forget it or to take action upon it. By this assumption of authority, he took responsibility and the consequences of his action should be imposed upon him.

If Tyler had communicated this information, the losses might have been very greatly lessened. As General Short testified:

If he had alerted the Interceptor Command there would have been time, if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would not have been time to get them in the air . . . It would have made a great difference in the loss . . . It would have been a question of split seconds instead of minutes in getting into action. (R. 312-313.)

The attack actually took place at 7:55 a. m.

When the information that showed up on the oscilloscope was communicated, apparently Lieutenant Tyler had in his mind that a flight of B-17s was coming from the mainland and he thought that they might represent what was seen on the screen of the radar machine. As a matter of fact, that probably had something to do with it, as they did come in about this period and were attacked by the Japanese, some of them being destroyed.

9. *Navy Failure to Advise Short of Suspected Naval Concentration in the Jaluits.*—About November 25, 1941, the Navy through its intelligence sources in the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor and in Washington had reports showing the presence in Jaluit in the [147] Marshall Islands of the Japanese fleet composed of aircraft carriers, submarines, and probably other vessels. Information of this fleet ceased about December 1, 1941. As Jaluit was 1,500 miles closer to Oahu than the mainland of Japan, the presence of such a strong

force capable of attacking Hawaii was an important element of naval information. This information was delivered to G-2 of the War Department as testified to by General Miles. No information of this threat to Hawaii was given to General Short by either the War or Navy Departments in Washington nor the Navy in Hawaii. Short and his senior commanders testified that such information would have materially altered their point of view and their actions.

Such information should have been delivered by the War Department or the Navy for what it was worth to permit Short to evaluate it; this was not done.

The fact that the actual force which attacked Hawaii has now been identified does not change the necessity for the foregoing action.

10. *The Navy Account of the Japanese Task Force That Attacked Pearl Harbor; Sources of Information to Japanese.*—The following account is based upon the testimony of Captain Layton, who has been Fleet Combat Intelligence Officer, and was at the time of December 7th and shortly before Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

He said that the task force which had been identified by the Navy through numerous captured documents, orders, maps, and from interviewing prisoners who were in a position to know personally the orders and preparations for the attack, had the following history, according to the Navy view of the correct [148] story:<sup>40</sup>

Japan started training its task force in either July or August, 1941, for the attack on Pearl Harbor. They were evidently trained with great care and precision as disclosed by the maps which were found in the planes which were shot down in the attack on Pearl Harbor and in the two-man submarines. These papers and orders show meticulous care in planning and timing, which would take very considerable practice. The initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at Tankan Bay was about November 22nd, and they awaited word to act before the force moved out on the 27th-28th of November, 1941.<sup>41</sup>

The elements of the fleet for this task force consisted of six carriers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and a destroyer division. This is one of the most powerful task forces ever assembled and after the date of [149] the attack upon Pearl Harbor, it took part in a number of similar successful and very disastrous attacks in the Pacific southwest. The elements of this task force left individually from the Japanese mainland and assembled at Tonkan Bay in an uninhabited spot where they would be unobserved. The assembly was completed and the task force departed on November 27th-28th, Eastern Longitude Time, which was apparently after the

<sup>40</sup> The Japanese striking force assembled in home waters during November and departed from the Bungou Channel area in Japan about 22 November, proceeding to Tankan Bay (sometimes called Hittokapu Bay). This assembly had started between the 7th and 22nd of November. Tankan Bay is located at Etorofu Island in North Japan. It does not appear on the ordinary maps or charts, but is shown in a map of the Japanese Empire in a Japanese encyclopedia under the title "Hittokapu Bay." The task force arrived in this bay approximately November 25th. The entire force departed on the 27th-28th of November (see footnote 2), taking a northerly route south of the Aleutians directly to the east (to avoid being sighted by shipping) and then headed for a position to the north of Oahu, arriving there on the early morning of the 8th of December (Japanese time) or the 7th of December (Hawaiian time). The date of departure of November 27th-28th, according to the numerous documents and prisoners interviewed who had intimate knowledge of this matter and who independently picked the same date, is confirmed beyond doubt according to Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton. This force consisted of six aircraft carriers, two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and some destroyers as well as submarines.

<sup>41</sup> Japanese time and date must be taken into consideration because our December 7th at Honolulu is Japanese December 8th. The time difference between Tokyo and Hawaii is 4½ hours, the time difference between Washington and Tokyo is 10 hours.



date that the counter-proposals (considered by the Japanese as an ultimatum) were delivered by the President of the United States to Japan through Secretary Hull on November 26, 1941. It is significant that the attack of the Japanese task force aircraft upon the Army and Navy planes parked together wing-to-wing as protection against sabotage (Alert #1) must have been as a result of knowledge of that fact, in view of their carefully rehearsed and scheduled attack formations in which they ran down the aprons, setting the planes on fire with incendiary ammunition: it is equally significant that it was well known in the island that Alert #1 was put into effect November 27th and therefore can be assumed to have been communicated to Japan, and that advantage of such information was apparently taken by reason of the nature of the attack and the way it was conducted.

It is also significant, a map having been found upon the pilot of a shot-down Japanese attacking plane, and another map having been found upon one of the crew in a two-man submarine, that there had been entered on these maps, which were old Geodetic Survey maps of the Pearl Harbor area, the location of the hangars that had been built on Hickam Field and of those that were yet to be built. Five of these hangars had been built. Earlier 1936 maps issued by the Hawaiian Department [150] or by the Air Force, showing Hickam Field, showed five of these hangars in full lines and three in dotted lines as being hangars yet to be built. The Japanese are well known as precise copyists. It is apparent that when they made the maps found on the aviator and the submarine crew members they had knowledge later than 1936 of construction either that had been constructed or was to be constructed, because they entered on such maps the additional three hangars in full lines.

The task force proceeded in radio silence due east to a point substantially due north of Oahu and thence proceeded southward under forced draft to a point between 300 and 250 miles from Oahu, from which the flight took off. The two-man submarines were carried on top of the mother submarines and released adjacent to the harbor.

Captain Layton further testified that the orders that were captured and those that they had knowledge of did exist, as reported by captured prisoners, show that the attacking forces were to destroy without a trace any third power's vessels including Japanese and Russian within 600 miles of the destination of the task force; to capture and maintain in radio silence any such vessels including Japanese and Russian within 600 miles of the destination of the task force, but if such vessels had sent any radio communications to destroy them. (R. 3043) This is a good evidence of Japanese character, being unwilling to trust their own people and to sink them without mercy because they happened to be operating by accident in this vacant sea where no vessels normally operate.

This task force was very powerful in the air, having a total of approximately 424 planes; (R. 3048) of this number about 300 actually attacked Pearl Harbor. (R. 3053.) The pilots [151] were of the highest quality and training that have ever been encountered in this war with the Japanese, with the exception of the Battle of Midway where four of these same carriers were engaged and were sunk. (R. 3046.) The maximum total number of airplanes on carriers that the United States could muster on December 7th, on the carriers "Lexington" and "Enterprise", was approximately 180 planes. (R. 3049.)

Captain Layton testified that our Navy in Pearl Harbor would have been unable to have brought the Japanese task force under gunfire because our battleships were too slow and the remainder of our force would probably have suffered severe damage if not defeat on the high seas by reason of the great superiority in the air before our superior gunfire could have been brought to bear. The only possible hope of overcoming such a Japanese force would be in weather that prevented flight of their planes so that the United States force would have superiority of gunfire, irrespective of Japanese superiority of air power.

He stated that no word of this task force was received in any way, from any source, by the Navy. The attack was wholly unexpected, and if it had been expected the probability of the United States' winning in any engagement of this task force was not a bright one. He stated that this task force represented a substantial per cent of the entire Japanese Navy. It provided alone on the Jap carriers 424 aircraft against a possible 180 which we might have mustered if we had had our own two carriers available to operate against them. (R. 3048-3049.)

The information upon which the story of the attack is based has been revealed so far as coming from several sources. [152] First, the Otto Kuehn trial revealed his complete disclosure of the fleet dispositions and locations in Pearl Harbor in the period December 1 to December 6, and a code delivered with the information, so that communication of the information to Japanese offshore submarines adjacent to Oahu could be used. The same information was delivered by the Japanese Consul direct to the homeland.

Otto Kuehn and his co-conspirators, Japanese of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu, had conspired to send information as to the units of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and their exact positions in the harbor. This information the Japanese Consul communicated principally by commercial lines to Japan. Additionally Kuehn provided a code indicating what units were in the harbor and what were out and means of signaling consisting of symbols on the sails of his sailboat, radio signals over a short-wave transmitter, lights in his house, and fires in his yard, all in order to signal to Japanese submarines offshore. The period during which the signals were to be given was December 1 to 6. If such information has been available to our armed forces it would have clearly indicated the attack. The messages taken from the Japanese Consulate on the subject show clearly what was done and the intention of the Japanese. If authority had existed to tap these lines, this information would have been available to both the Army and Navy. Kuehn was tried by a military commission after signed confessions of his actions and sentenced to death. This was later commuted to imprisonment for fifty years. It is significant that Kuehn was a German agent and had for a long time been living on funds forwarded to him from Japan and had conducted his espionage with impunity until after Pearl Harbor, right [153] under the nose of the Army, the F. B. I., and naval Intelligence.

As Shivers, head of the F. B. I. in the islands, said:

If we had been able to get the messages that were sent to Japan by the Japanese Consul, we would have known, or we could have reasonably assumed, that the attack would come, somewhere, on December 7; because, if you recall, this system of signals that was devised by Otto Kuehn for the Japanese Consul general simply included the period from December 1 to December 6. (R. 3218.)



Shivers testified that the reason why the information being sent over the commercial lines to Japan, other than telephone, was not secured was that while he had the approval of the Attorney General to tap the telephone wires and to intercept telephone conversations, yet they could not get the information out of the cable offices. He testified:

Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask him one question. What other means of communication did the Japanese Consul have with the homeland other than a telephone connection?

Mr. SHIVERS. He had commercial communication system.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you have any opportunity of tapping the commercial lines or of securing any information off the commercial lines?

Mr. SHIVERS. Off of the lines themselves?

Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. So that he did have a free, undisturbed communication over those lines?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir. (R. 3223.)

It was later discovered, when the torn messages of the Japanese Consul were reconstructed after they had been taken on December 7th, that many vital messages were being sent by the Japanese Consul, who was keeping Japan advised of the entire military and naval situation and every move we made in Hawaii.

Another example of this Japanese activity is the telephone [154] message on December 5th from the house of Dr. Mori by a woman newspaper reporter, ostensibly to her newspaper in Japan, an apparently meaningless and therefore highly suspicious message. It was this message that was tapped from the telephone by the F. B. I., translated, and delivered to Military Intelligence and submitted by it to General Short at six o'clock on December 6th. (R. 1417-1419, 2993.) As Short was unable to decipher the meaning, he did nothing about it and went on to a party. (R. 1420.) The attack followed in the morning.

In this same connection, the story of the spying activities of the German, von Osten, is in point. (R. 2442-2443, 3003.) The telephone lines of the Japanese Consulate were tapped by the Navy with the exception of one telephone line to the cook's quarters, which was overlooked, and this was tapped by the F. B. I. (R. 3204.)

The last and one of the most significant actions of the Japanese was the apparent actual entry of their submarines into Pearl Harbor a few days prior to December 7th, their circulation in the harbor, by which they secured and presumably transmitted complete information as to our fleet movements and dispositions.

The story of the bold Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor prior to the attack on December 7th is even more astounding as to the complete freedom with which Japan operated in getting intelligence out of Hawaii. Shivers of the F. B. I. produced maps 1 and 2, which were copies of maps captured from the Japanese two-man submarines that came into Pearl Harbor on December 7th. The F. B. I., in endeavoring to reconstruct the [155] intelligence operations of any agent who may have been operating in Hawaii prior to the attack, secured these maps from Naval Intelligence. (R. 3210.) Maps 1 and 2 have a legend translating all of the Japanese characters and writing appearing on the maps. Shivers said:

An examination of the map indicated to me rather definitely that there had been Japanese submarines in Pearl Harbor immediately before the attack. (R. 3210.)

Now, on this map is various information relating to the installations at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and areas adjacent to both places. (R. 3211.)

There appeared on the map a code in Japanese which was translated by the F. B. I. and shows that it was intended for use by the submarine commanders in communicating with the Japanese task force enroute to Hawaii. It contains such messages as "indication strong that enemy fleet will put out to sea," or "enemy fleet put out to sea from or through;" in other words, describing the presence, size, composition, and movement of the fleet. (R. 3212.)

As this map shows the complete timed movement in and out of the harbor of the submarine and this information had been prepared partly written in Japanese, it is obvious that the Japanese must have been in the harbor a few days before the attack and evidently were moving into and out of the harbor at will. The data on the chart shows the submarine was so well advised that it went in at about 0410 when the submarine net was open to permit the garbage scow to leave the harbor, and stayed in the harbor until about 0600 and then left by the same route. The map shows the location of our battleships and other naval vessels observed by the submarine. (R. 3212-3213.) As the ships actually in the harbor on December 7th were somewhat different from those shown on the map, it is conclusive proof [156] that this submarine was in the harbor and probably advising the fleet of Japan as to our dispositions prior to December 7th. (R. 3210-3213.)

The real action that should have been feared from the Japanese was not open sabotage, but espionage. It is obvious that the reason why the Japanese aliens did not commit sabotage was that they did not want to stimulate American activity to stop their espionage and intern them. That was the last thing they intended to do; and Short appears to have completely misapprehended the situation, the psychology and intentions of the enemy, by putting into effect his sabotage alert.

Undoubtedly the information of the alert, the placing of planes wing-to-wing, etc., as well as the disposition of the fleet was reported by Kuehn through the Japanese Consul, were all known to the Japanese task force proceeding toward Hawaii. That will explain why they were able to conduct such precise bombing and machine-gunning. The bomb pattern on Hickam Field and the machine-gunning of that field, as well as other fields, show that the attack was concentrated on the hangars, marked on the Japanese maps, and upon the ramps where the planes were parked wing to wing. There was no attack of any consequence upon the landing strips.

From the foregoing it appears that there were a large number of events taking place bearing on the attack; and that a clue to such events and the Japanese actions was in part available to Short and in part not available to him. Both the War Department and the Navy failed to inform him of many vital matters, and our governmental restrictions as to intercepting the communications of the Japanese Consul prevented him from getting still additional information.

[157] If General Short had any doubt on the subject of his authority, he had ample opportunity from November 27th to December 6th to inquire of higher authority and make his position and his actions certain of support and approval. This he did not do.



11. *Information Not Given Short.*—In judging the actions of General Short and whether he carried out his responsibilities, there must be taken into account information that he was not told either by the War Department or by the Navy. Briefly summarized, the fundamental pieces of information were the following:

1. The presence of the task force in the Marshall Islands at Jaluit from November 27th to November 30th and the disappearance of that force. Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department saw fit to advise Short of this important piece of information.

2. The fact that the Chief of Staff with the Chief of Naval Operations had jointly asked (on November 27th) the President not to force the issue with the Japanese at this time. (R. 9.)

3. The delivery on the 26th of November to the Japanese Ambassadors by the Secretary of State of the counter-proposals; and the immediate reaction of the Japanese rejecting in effect these counter-proposals which they considered an ultimatum and indicating that it was the end of negotiations.

4. Short not kept advised of the communications from Grew reporting the progressive deterioration of the relationship with the Japanese.

[158] 5. No reaction from the War Department to Short as to whether his report of November 27th as to "measures taken", i. e., a sabotage alert and liaison with the Navy, were satisfactory or inadequate in view of the information possessed by the War Department.

6. The following information not furnished also existed in the War Department:

Information from informers, agents and other sources as to the activities of our potential enemy and its intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete knowledge of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know their potential moves against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions and proposals.

This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.

The messages actually sent to Hawaii by the Army and Navy gave only a small fraction of this information. It would have been possible to have sent safely, information ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives for an all-out alert.

Under the circumstances, where information has a vital [159] bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and cannot be disclosed to them, it would appear incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directives to such commanders.

Short got neither form of assistance after November 28th from the War Department, his immediate supervising agency. It is believed that the disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been lessened to the extent that its defenses were available and used on December 7 if properly alerted in time. The failure to alert these defenses in time by directive from the War Department, based upon all information available to it, is one for which it is responsible. The War Department had an abundance of vital information that indicated an immediate break with Japan. All it had to do was either get it to Short or give him a directive based upon it. Short was not fully sensitive to the real seriousness of the situation, although the War Department thought he was. It is believed that knowledge of the information available in the War Department would have made him so.

General discussion of the information herein referred to follows:

The records show almost daily information on the plans of the Japanese Government. In addition to that cited above and in conjunction therewith the War Department was in possession of information late in November and early in December from which it made deductions that Japan would shortly commence an aggressive war in the South Pacific; that every effort would be made to reach an agreement with the United States Government which would result in eliminating the American people as a contestant in the war to come; and that failing to reach the agreement the [160] Japanese Government would attack both Britain and the United States. This information enabled the War Department to fix the probable time of war with Japan with a degree of certainty.

In the first days of December this information grew more critical and indicative of the approaching war. Officers in relatively minor positions who were charged with the responsibility of receiving and evaluating such information were so deeply impressed with its significance and the growing tenseness of our relations with Japan, which pointed only to war and war almost immediately, that such officers approached the Chief of the War Plans Division (General Gerow) and the Secretary of the General Staff (Colonel Smith) for the express purpose of having sent to the department commanders a true picture of the war atmosphere which, at that time, pervaded the War Department and which was uppermost in the thinking of these officers in close contact with it. The efforts of these subordinate officers to have such information sent to the field were unsuccessful. They were told that field commanders had been sufficiently informed. The Secretary of the General Staff declined to discuss the matter when told of the decisions of the War Plans Division.

Two officers then on duty in the War Department are mentioned for their interest and aggressiveness in attempting to have something done. They are Colonel R. S. Bratton and Colonel Otis K. Stadler.

The following handling of information reaching the War Department in the evening of December 6 and early Sunday morning December 7 is cited as illustrative of the apparent lack of appreciation by those in high places in the War Department of the seriousness of this information which was so [161] clearly outlining the trends that were hastening us into war with Japan.

At approximately 10:00 o'clock p. m. on December 6, 1941, and more than 15 hours before the attack at Pearl Harbor, G-2 delivered



to the office of the War Plans Division and to the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army information which indicated very emphatically that war with Japan was a certainty and that the beginning of such war was in the immediate future. The officers to whom this information was delivered were told of its importance and impressed with the necessity of getting it into the hands of those who could act, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of the War Plans Division.

On the following morning December 7 at about 8:30 a. m. other information reached the office of G-2, vital in its nature and indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan. Colonel Bratton, Chief, Far Eastern Section, G-2, attempted to reach the Chief of Staff of the Army in order that he might be informed of the receipt of this message. He discovered that the General was horseback riding. Finally and at approximately 11:25 a. m. the Chief of Staff reached his office and received this information. General Miles, then G-2 of the War Department, appeared at about the same time. A conference was held between these two officers and General Gerow of the War Plans Division who himself had come to the Office of the Chief of Staff. Those hours when Bratton was attempting to reach someone who could take action in matters of this importance and the passing without effective action having been taken prevented this critical information from reaching General Short in time to be of value to him.

[162] About noon a message was hastily dispatched to overseas department commanders including Short in the Hawaiian Department. This message which has been discussed elsewhere in this report, came into Short's possession after the attack had been completed.

#### D. STATUS OF THE PRINCIPAL HAWAIIAN DEFENSES IN 1941 AND THEIR STATE OF READINESS ON DECEMBER 6, 1941, OR THE REASON FOR THEIR LACK OF READINESS

1. *Aircraft Warning Service and Interceptor Command.*—The Aircraft Warning Service on the morning of December 7, 1941, was in operative condition for all practical purposes. It had an information center and five mobile stations. It was sufficiently operative to successfully pick up the Japanese force 132 miles from Oahu. This was done by Private Lockard and Private Elliott, respectively radar operator and plotter, and reported by these privates on their own initiative to the information center, where the Sergeant in charge of the switchboard received the information and relayed it to Lieutenant Tyler, who was a pursuit officer of the Air Corps on temporary duty for training. The stations had been used from 0400 to 0700 hours each morning for the training personnel, and the personnel was reasonably trained by that time, with the exception of certain liaison officers who were still getting their training, like Lieutenant Tyler. If the radar system and information center had been fully manned, as it could have been and as it was immediately upon the disaster at Pearl Harbor and thereafter without further physical additions, it could have been successfully operated on December 7th.

The Air Warning Service had been operating on tactical exercises and maneuvers prior to December 7th for some weeks.

[163] On December 7, 1941 this service could have been a great asset to the defense of the islands had the Command and Staff under-

stood its value and capabilities and had taken more interest in implementing the temporary setup instead of awaiting completion of the permanent installations.

The only mechanical difficulty that was being experienced was in connection with the stand-by motor generator sets, which were to be used to supplement commercial power in case the latter failed. There had been some minor difficulty with the pumps on the motor generator set for the internal combustion engines, but that was not of serious character.

The story of the delay in installing both the temporary, mobile sets and the permanent sets is as follows:

Army personnel had been receiving radar instructions on Navy surface ships and had gone to sea with the ships and had had the benefit of such practical training. Unfortunately the Navy had not detailed its liaison officers to the Information Center, and in that it failed. There also had not been brought about, due to the failure on the part of General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, a complete integration into a single system of Army and Navy defense including radar and particularly the Army, Navy and Marine fighters which were to pass to the jurisdiction of the Army to form a composite interceptor command, so that the three elements of the system would be working—the aircraft warning service, the interceptor command, and the anti-aircraft artillery.

The only reason that the aircraft warning service was not on a full operating basis on the morning of December 7th was due to the type of alert put into effect but otherwise it should have been in full effect. It was a fully operating [164] service and did so operate shortly after the attack.

Major Bergquist and Major Tindal had been sent to the Interceptor School at Mitchell Field in the early summer of 1941. At that time the AWS was new to the U. S. Army and its organization and development had just started in the United States. For the system to be operative required a considerable amount of highly technical electrical and radar equipment, the supply and manufacture of which was critical.

The whole AWS project was new, novel, and somewhat revolutionary in practice. It took time to get the equipment through War Department priorities, and it took time to teach and train operating personnel, and to indoctrinate the whole Army as well as the public to its operation and value. This process had been going on since May and June, 1941.

Testimony before the Board has indicated that neither the Army, Navy, nor civilian population of the United States or Hawaii anticipated the necessity for immediate use of this service. There was, however, a small group directly in charge of the AWS development in Hawaii, including Major Bergquist, Major Tindal, Major Tetley, and Major Powell, all of the Army, and Lieutenant Taylor of the Navy, who were pushing the AWS project to the fullest extent that their level of authority would permit. As a result of their efforts it is believed that this service in the normal course of events would have been established and in operation in another two or three weeks, which in view of the lack of war-mindedness of the services would have been to the great credit of this group.



Since the No. 1 Alert was the decision due to the logic and judgment of the Department Commander, it is very doubtful had the AWS been 100 per cent completed that it would have been [165] on a full-out operating basis on the 7th of December. General Short has stated in the Roberts report testimony, Volume 14, page 1642, that had he had the matériel and fully equipped radar stations he probably would have operated them just as he did.

Nevertheless, had General Short's judgment led him to have decided to go to Alert 2 or 3 on November 27th, or at any time prior to December 7th, the AWS could have functioned and the fighter airplanes could have been ready for active defense within a period of minutes. From the damage that was accomplished by the few fighters that did get into the air from the Haliewa Airdrome it can be assumed that the seventy or eighty fighters that could have been in the air under a normally active alert system would have made the Jap attack a much more costly venture. This paragraph, however, is hypothesis.

2. *Status of the Aircraft Warning Service on December 7th.*—The aircraft warning service consisting of the Information Center and five mobile radar stations was in operation on the morning of December 7th and had been for several weeks prior to that date. The fact that the Information Center was not in its permanent location and the radar stations were not permanently built had no bearing upon the operation and effectiveness of the aircraft warning system.

It was set up and the men were being trained for, I would say, possibly a month prior to the attack on December 7th.

As testified by General Martin (R. 1825).

The difficulty of putting the AWS into full operation as a practical matter was the insistence of General Short that he retain control for training purposes whereas the best training would have been to put the system into practical operation. [166] Of this General Martin said:

The Department commander would not turn those (the operating stations) over to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces until he (Short) had completed the training under his Department Signal Officer. He refused to turn them over unless he considered they were properly trained. So they were still training under those conditions and had not been turned over to the Air Force the morning of the attack on December 7th. (R. 1824.)

Here again is another example of the whole organization of the Army in Hawaii being held in a training status instead of acquiring its training in or near combat positions, where it would have been ready for any eventuality. As General Martin said:

They were capable of operating . . . the equipment used primarily in the training of personnel to take over the operation of the control area. (R. 1824.)

General Martin is confirmed in this by Commander Taylor, loaned by the Navy for the purpose of getting this service into operation. Commander Taylor confirmed the fact that:

On December 7th the plotters were reasonably well trained to watch and able to do checking without any controller on the plane. The only source of controllers we could find was to see the Squadron Commander of the Pursuit Squadrons at Wheeler Field . . . We had no liaison people to man any of the positions . . . On December 7 all the communication lines were in; the radar stations; the Derax equipment was working satisfactorily enough to give air warning and possibly to make interceptions. The air-to-ground radio equipment

was not satisfactory for interception work, but it was possible that enough advance information could be given to pilots so that they could come back without being intercepted. (R. 1082.)

However, the radio equipment that would have enabled control through interception a reasonable distance offshore had been given to the Ferry Command. This situation is treated elsewhere, but it should be pointed out, to avoid confusion, that on and before December 7th the aircraft warning center was able to pick up incoming planes and to give notification of that fact. It was not fully able to perform its other function, [167] which was supplementary to the Information Center, that is, for full cooperation in conjunction with an Interceptor Command to intercept the incoming planes in the full sense of that arrangement.

So far advanced was the organization and apparatus that it would have been fully complete within ten days to two weeks at the time of the attack. As Commander Taylor said:

The only thing that was not carried through after this meeting (a conference to wind up the details of organization) to bring the thing into operation at the end of two weeks was the manpower to operate it. (R. 1083.)

Taylor, in turn, is confirmed in this by one of the most energetic officers who was working with Taylor in pressing this aircraft warning system to conclusion, Colonel Bergquist, then a Major. He endeavored to have 24-hour service by November 24th and stated that the mobile units could have stood it. There was some minor trouble with the stand-by power gas engines, but this was of little importance and the system could have run 24 hours a day. He had been running a school since October known as the "Air Defense School" in which he was training Army and Marine officers and as many pursuit officers of the Air Corps as he could get. The delay was from the Signal Corps. As Colonel Bergquist said:

I was continually harping to the Signal Corps people to get the stations up and get them operating. (R. 1201.)

Despite the efforts of General Martin with Department Headquarters, very few results were secured in making the *Signal Corps let go their technical operation and allow the practical people who were going to operate it go to work*. This is described by Colonel Bergquist, who said:

One of the big arguments was: we wanted to take over the radar stations and get them set up and operating. The [168] Signal Corps said no, that was their job; they wanted to get them up and get them operating and then turn them over to us for our operational control. The Department headquarters decided in favor of the Signal Corps. (R. 1196.)

This delayed the ultimate completion of the system by a month. (R. 1196.)

He stated that:

My opinion on that is that they (the enlisted men) were fairly well trained at that stage of the game. (R. 1197.)

This state of training is further described by him as follows:

Well, I think we had had the sets operating in practice a sufficient length of time so that the radar scope operators that we had were fairly well trained. We had plotters and information center personnel of the Signal Corps fairly well trained. I was in the process of training what I called pursuit officers, which is one of the positions on the board—on the control platform, that is—by running



a roster of the fighter pilots in the Interceptor Command in order to do two things: to both train them to function as pursuit officers on the control board and to acquaint them with the workings of the board in order to better carry out instructions that they received from the board on flying missions. The only controllers that we had, we considered, that could operate, that were trained sufficiently, were myself, Major Tindal—I mean Colonel Tindal; he was a Major at that time—and I did have with me at that time Commander William E. G. Taylor of the Navy. The other positions on the control platform, we did have an antiaircraft liaison officer, and had conducted problems with them so that they were in a fair state of training. We had not been able to get the Navy liaison officers assigned, so there was no one trained in that. The same applies to the bomber command liaison, the liaison officers with the Hawaiian Department headquarters. (R. 1191-1192.)

At this time the system had a maximum range of approximately 130 miles. (R. 1190.)

On November 24th there was a conference of interested Army and Navy officers on this subject, and the consensus of opinion of these experts among the younger officers who were actually getting this Information Center into operation was expressed by Commander Taylor:

[169] It was felt that the Information Center could be made to function adequately within the next two weeks. (The conference was on November 24, 1941.) We found after that, after this, to qualify it, that that would be except for the air-to-ground radio communications. We learned that we could not keep contact with the fighter aircraft more than five miles offshore with the communication equipment we had at that time. (R. 1077.)

This confirms the testimony of others that the only thing lacking was the IFF equipment on the planes to enable identification of the planes in the air by ground personnel. Considerable equipment had been withdrawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian Air Force for this purpose for the use of the Ferry Command. (R. 1079.)

As to the operatability of the aircraft warning service on the morning of December 7th, Commander Taylor testifying said:

If we had had the Information Center completely manned there would have been some method of identification. Anybody could have told what that (the Japanese) flight was. (R. 1085.)

The Navy had not yet participated in the operation, although Commander Taylor said they had been requested to do so about a week before Pearl Harbor. (R. 1086.)

This brings us to the question of why General Short or his staff did not take more vigorous action in putting this most important part of the defenses into operation, particularly in view of the fact that both the long-distance reconnaissance by the Navy and the inshore reconnaissance by the Army were, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. Commander Taylor was asked, when he found these delays, whether he had ever seen General Short, to which Taylor replied in the negative by saying:

I saw his chief of staff. I saw his operations officer. We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff. (R. 1089.)

[170] We saw every chief of staff, but we found that somebody else was always responsible. (R. 1088.)

Colonel Powell, Hawaiian Department Signal Officer, said repeated efforts to get the Navy to cooperate by supplying naval officers to complete the working of the service were fruitless. They were not interested. (R. 3906.)

It is significant that when Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, was asked if Short had tried to expedite these matters he professed ignorance (R. 1143), but it was Phillips, as Chief of Staff to Short, who Taylor and others said was principally responsible for acting on Short's behalf in this matter. (R. 1088.)

Colonel Powell testified that the construction of permanent installations did not hold up the placing of the Information Center and the radar stations into operation because there was adequate equipment for this purpose that was actually installed in temporary buildings for the Information Center and that radar mobile stations were placed around the Island.

As a consequence the Information Center and the radar stations were in operation some time prior to December 7th. The only reason they were not operated continuously 24 hours a day was the desire to conserve tubes, as they were short of tubes and other spare parts.

Two permanent radars, No. 271, were received on June 3, and a third radar, No. 271-A, was also received on June 3. On August 1 six mobile radar stations were received and shortly thereafter put into operation. They were complete and self-contained and only needed to be placed at some appropriate elevation.

Colonel Powell testified that the entire service was operative [171-172] about the 1st of November, 1941. The installations for the permanent radar and Information Center were held up by the Engineer construction and were not held up by any lack of information or drawings or equipment of the Signal Corps.

Colonel Powell testified that the location of the centers was made by a board from Washington. This board ordered the abandonment of Kaala at 4,000 feet on the theory that while the range would be extended to 150 miles from Hawaii yet there would be no detection of planes within the 20-mile radius close to shore. This does not sound logical because the great necessity was the locating of planes at a maximum distance from Hawaii. The other stations lower down were fully capable of picking up the close, inshore approach of aircraft.

Colonel Powell added the significant statement that the Navy took little interest in the radar system and

We were never able to get any liaison officer over from the Navy to take part in the exercises or carry on the work. (R. 3906.)

This is confirmed by the fact that Navy liaison officers never were supplied for the Information Center although it had been in operation for some weeks prior to December 7 and the Army had supplied a number of officers to be trained. (R. 3906.)

General Short testified again as to the reason why he was interested in keeping the aircraft warning service in training. He said:

We had gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we got them we started using them right away; and when this message of the 27th came along, I prescribed that the aircraft warning service would function those hours. In addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained then from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4.

[173] Now, it turned out that we were putting a little bit too great a strain on this materiel, and later in the afternoon period we had three stations working from 11 to 1, and three working from 1 to 4, so that there was a little more chance for maintenance work and keeping them in shape. But that was the situation, and the Interceptor Command was working with them. We were



trying to educate the Interceptor Command and the Aircraft Warning Service, and using this training period as an opportunity to give them work at what we considered the most dangerous time of the day. The Navy had a liaison officer functioning with this outfit. (R. 298.)

Two explanations have been advanced as to the reason why the aircraft warning service was not put into operation fully. The first was that the signal equipment was not ready until very late; the testimony of Colonel Powell, in charge of this matter for the Signal Corps, plus what actually occurred as to its actually going into operation for nearly a month before the permanent construction was erected, is ample to overrule this objection. (R. 3896-3898.)

The second explanation was that there were serious delays in construction. But such delays in permanent construction did not delay the aircraft warning service because it was using temporary housing for its Information Center, and its mobile radar stations were operative without any permanent housing. (R. 3885.)

As to the Interceptor Command and the Information Center of the aircraft warning service, General Burgin, Commanding General of the antiaircraft artillery, said:

It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the Interceptor Command would take over. (R. 2604.)

He explained how the Interceptor Command had been working during previous trials and exercises. While the Interceptor Command was not fully functioning due to the lack of IFF instruments on the planes, yet there was ample AWS means for [174] defense and interception that it could have used to a material degree on the morning of December 7, 1941. The Interceptor Command was just being set up, but the nucleus of its operation was there, and it would have been an effective instrument had it been used when the attack came. This was not done.

3. *Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses.*—General Burgin commanded the Coast Artillery Command consisting of seacoast artillery plus all antiaircraft artillery in the Hawaiian Department. He commanded the 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade composed of the 64th Regiment, 251st Regiment, and the 98th Regiment.

He testified that the Interceptor Command was being organized on a temporary basis saying:

We had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to interceptor Command \* \* \* For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to December 7 \* \* \* On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The fleet was in the harbor.

And again he said, as to the Interceptor Command:

It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the interceptor command would take over. All that is, so far as turning it over to the Interceptor command, is that the Interceptor command tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire. (R. 2602-2604.)

This brought him to his opinion expressed in the record that if the Interceptor Command had worked during the drills and exercises on the morning of December 7, then it could have worked for the attack. He said in his opinion it would not [175] have made any difference anyway,

because we didn't have ammunition with our mobile antiaircraft. If they had been out in the field without any ammunition, they would have been worse off than they actually were. (R. 2604.)

He said of his antiaircraft batteries:

They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. (R. 2604.)

A reference to the next section will show that it was General Short who supported the Ordnance Department in refusing to issue this ammunition to troops when they went out for exercises in the field.

Additionally, General Burgin found that he could not even put his guns into final positions because of the conditions now described.

General Burgin pointed out one of the great handicaps to development of field artillery positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions. He described the situation as follows:

General RUSSELL. Is it true, therefore, General, that prior to December 7, 1941, so far as you can recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries in the positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities?

General BURGIN. That is correct; they had not all been in the actual position they were to go in.

General FRANK. Was that because of this opposition of the people who owned the land?

General BURGIN. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for practice. (R. 2628.)

He also pointed out that if General Short had gone to Alert No. 3 there would have been great opposition from important and influential civilians on the island and particularly [176] those who compose what is known as the Big Five.

As to this he said:

General RUSSELL. Is there in your mind some thought that there would have been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian population here on the island toward the results of Alert Number 3?

General BURGIN. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world.

General RUSSELL. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert Number 3—and I am asking this question in the interest of clarity—if General Short had ordered Alert Number 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for immediate combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it would have provoked opposition on the part of some of the responsible and influential civilian population here on the island?

General BURGIN. I feel positive it would.

General GRUNERT. Even though he might have explained that to the influential citizens, there would still have been opposition?

General BURGIN. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that time.

General GRUNERT. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think might have voiced their objection?

General BURGIN. Oh, my!

General GRUNERT. Is Dillingham one of them?

General BURGIN. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker.

General FRANK. Which Walker?

General BURGIN. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General Wells. (R. 2629.)



He said amongst those people were the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, and those having the land and crop interests in sugar, pineapples, etc.

In this connection it should be noted that there is proof in this record that one of the things that may have influenced Short in selecting Alert Number 1 and not stirring up the Japanese population was the opposition that developed then and [177] later from the large commercial interests on the Island using Japanese labor, that they did not want it disturbed and that they would be shut down in their business if a substantial portion of it was either deported or interned. (R. 2654.)

As General Burgin testified, if the tables had been reversed and Americans had been situated in Japan like the Japanese were in Hawaii they would have been locked up before the war started and not afterwards. (R. 2649.)

4. *Ammunition Issue: Short's and the Ordnance Department's Responsibility.*—The Ordnance Department in the Hawaiian Department in its misdirected effort to safeguard and maintain ammunition in a serviceable condition objected to a full issue thereof to troops except in an emergency. Such issues in an emergency entailed delays which delayed troops in getting into position and action. (R. 2607.)

General Burgin, who commanded the antiaircraft artillery, stated that he and General Murray, who commanded one of the infantry divisions, personally went to the staff and to General Short, who turned them down and refused to allow the issue of the ammunition for the artillery and the infantry. Later there was some relaxation of the issue of infantry ammunition. Colonel Weddington testified that on the morning of December 7th he had insufficient ammunition, that there was none for his rifles and ground machine guns, and that the only extra supply of ammunition was belted ammunition for his aircraft machine guns. (R. 3026-2027.)

The artillery ammunition situation is summed up by General Burgin as follows:

[178] They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They were not in field positions. (R. 2604-2605.)

He described the efforts of General Murray and himself to get the Ordnance Department to release this ammunition and how he was overruled by General Short's staff and General Short himself, in the following language:

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, we did. I would like to answer that a little more elaborately. You may recollect yourself the great difficulty in prying loose ammunition from our storehouses and from the ordnance during peacetime. It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially

true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazines. We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever struck.

General FRANK. Was that putting off made directly by the Commanding General or by a staff department?

General BURGIN. Both; staff departments first, then the Commanding General in person.

General FRANK. Supported them?

[179] General BURGIN. In his own office, to General Murray and to me.

General FRANK. Well, what were the staff departments who opposed it?

General BURGIN. The Gs: G-4s, the Ordnance.

General FRANK. And their reasons were?

General BURGIN. Same old reason, that they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition, let it get out and get dirty, have to take it back in later on and renovate it; and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise. (R. 2607-2608.)

Apparently one of the reasons in General Short's mind was sabotage, if the ammunition was out with the guns. As General Burgin testified:

As long as the ammunition could be left locked up in the magazines, it was pretty safely guarded and could not be tampered with to any great extent. (R. 2608.)

He testified that without ammunition for his guns it would take from a few minutes to six hours before he could get his guns into position and firing. He was never permitted to take live ammunition on any of his practices and as 50% of the mobile guns were on private land he had been unable to even place half of his guns in position, and they were unable to take ammunition with them. (R. 2608-9-10.)

Therefore on the morning of December 7th he was caught in this position with only ammunition adjacent his fixed gun batteries, but half of his guns were without ammunition.

As General Burgin summed it up,

It was just impossible to pry the ammunition loose from the Ordnance, the G-4s, or from General Short himself. (R. 2612.)

General Maxwell Murray testified as to his difficulties in getting ammunition for both his field artillery and his [180] infantry, as follows:

General GRUNERT. . . . First, I would like to talk to you about artillery ammunition, and ask you this question: Why was not sufficient ammunition at hand for the artillery, on December 7?

General MURRAY. There was sufficient artillery ammunition on hand, but it had not been issued to troops.

General GRUNERT. I mean 'at hand,' not 'on hand.'

General MURRAY. I was not authorized to draw the artillery ammunition from the magazines. I requested authority from General Short to draw artillery ammunition and stack it; I suggested either in the gun parks or the division review field, in small stacks. The division review field, as you know, is a large area immediately adjacent to the old artillery park, and had been planned as the dispersal area for the artillery. (R. 3075-3076.)

General GRUNERT. Now, we get back to the ammunition. You say there was no ammunition immediately available to you for quick action; is that right?

General MURRAY. So far as I can recall, we did not have a round of ammunition in the gun parks.

General GRUNERT. And, in case you were turned out, to go on an alert which required ammunition, you would then have to draw it from somewhere?



General MURRAY. We had to draw it.

General GRUNERT. Where did it come from?

General MURRAY. We drew it directly; the majority of it was drawn at Schofield Barracks, although the artillery units of the Eighth Field Artillery, which came directly to the positions in Honolulu and Hickam Field, immediately adjacent to it, were to draw ammunition at the Aliamannu Crater, which was down here near Pearl Harbor. (R. 3080.)

General Murray had made arrangements to have separate entrances to get the ammunition out of the storage houses, but even with that effective arrangement, plus piling ammunition in the warehouses according to unit, it would take an hour at least to get the ammunition so the guns could [181] go to the beaches to defend the island.

As General Murray said:

I was not satisfied, myself, with the status of our ammunition for either the infantry or the artillery. (R. 3081.)

He had a limited amount of machine gun ammunition and rifle ammunition. He had a large number of machine guns in each rifle company, extra guns, and

It was obviously impossible—most of our ammunition was not belted—it was obviously impossible to get out the ammunition and belt it without serious delay. (R. 3081.)

He had only two belt loading machines for each heavy weapon company, and it had taken three days to load up the belted ammunition on a previous trial. (R. 3081.) After applying to General Short he had been authorized to draw and belt machine-gun ammunition, draw the necessary rifle ammunition, and store it in the parks. He was not allowed to have mortar ammunition or high-explosive grenades inside the barracks; that ordnance had to be left in the Ordnance Depot, as was the artillery ammunition. He testified (R. 3081) that it was General Short who was personally supporting his ordnance officer and G-4 in following the peacetime practice of holding ammunition in depots where it would take hours to get it out in the event of a raid.

He testified that his movement of ammunition into the barracks was in violation of the standing orders of the post, but he had made that movement of ammunition on the express authorization of General Short. (R. 3091.)

It is to be recalled that when the War Department ordered General Herron, in 1940, into an alert in which he stayed for six weeks, he was able to draw his ammunition immediately and [182] take it with him into the field.

The testimony of General Burgin as to his inability to get ammunition for use with his antiaircraft guns is borne out by the testimony of Colonel Weddington of the Air Corps that when he was in command of the Bellows Field base his efforts to get ammunition for his machine guns and rifles were met by a response from the Ordnance Department, on each request he made, that the ammunition was not available and was not authorized and that this was by General Short's order.

Lack of ammunition preparations was shown in the testimony of Colonel Weddington, who was in command of Bellows Field prior to and on December 7th. (R. 3026-3027.) He testified that it was the custom for the ships (aircraft) that were at gunnery practice to be parked on the ramp on Saturday afternoon, close to one another. The guns were taken off the planes for cleaning, the planes were out of gas

and were not to be refueled until Sunday, and the gas was brought over by truck from Honolulu and did not arrive until sometime later in the day. He also indicated that many of the pilots were away over the weekend.

It was in this condition that the attack was launched upon them and they were unable to defend themselves. He said they had 30,000 rounds of belted ammunition but no rifle ammunition for their guards and no machine-gun ammunition. When the attack came they were also without any 30-caliber machine-gun bullets. His repeated efforts to get ammunition from the Ordnance Department met with the statement that it was not available and not authorized, and its failure to be issued was on General Short's order.

[183] 5. *Status of Aircraft Defenses.*—The difficulties with supply of both aircraft and parts to maintain aircraft, due to the conditions depicted in Chapter 2, Background, are no better illustrated than in the case of aircraft. The failure previous to 1941 to provide extended aircraft programs and the necessity for revising designs to meet modern combat conditions, as revealed by the European War, joined together to put the War Department in a difficult situation with respect to a sufficiency of aircraft.

On the deficiency of equipment in Hawaii, General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, testified he had written General Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force, personal letters as well as sent official communications with reference to his obsolete aircraft, the lack of spare parts for the modern craft that he had, and the necessity for placing his aircraft in combat condition with adequate weapons, et cetera. R. 1858-A, 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1874 to 1889, inclusive.)

While correspondence shows a failure on the part of the Army Air Forces to supply the correct equipment, adequate equipment, spare parts, and enough of it to be effective, yet Hawaii was better off than other commands. As General Marshall expressed it:

As to Hawaii, that had the largest troop concentration we possessed, it had the maximum of matériel that we possessed, and we were accumulating the first fighter planes, of the type that we possessed at that time, in the Hawaiian garrison.

As to Panama: if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and matériel was 100, Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible.

[184] As elsewhere stated, on December 7, 1941, General Martin had under his command 123 modern pursuit and bombardment planes, 15 observation planes, 2 transports, 5 observation amphibians, and 8 basic trainers. He had non-modern medium bombers to the number of 39, 9 light bombers, and 62 non-modern pursuit ships.

General Martin testified:

When I took over from General Frank in the Hawaiian Islands we had, you might say, no combat equipment. We had some P-26s, an old obsolete type of fighter which we then called a pursuit airplane. We had some old observation planes, some B-18 bombers which could never protect themselves in any combat at all. They could be used for reconnaissance, but you would lose them as fast as you sent them out, if they went into combat. They were always recognized as not being a combat ship. In the spring of 1941 we received possibly 50 P-36s. They were obsolescent at the time they came over. A little later—as I remember it, about May—we received some P-40 fighters. These ships were brought in on carriers and flown off to the station after they arrived in Hawaii. About May we received 21 B-17s that were ferried over by air. 9 of these, about the 5th



or 6th of September, were transferred to the Philippines by air. The 12 remaining were ordered to proceed to the Philippines; and upon our request that they be delayed, that we could continue the training of combat crews for that type of ship, as the two bombardment groups at Hickam Field would be equipped with that type of airplane, they would go on the tail of some 60-odd airplanes that were being transferred from the mainland to the Philippines. . . . The types of ships which could have been used in combat, which is the P-40, B-17, and ten A-20s, were always possibly 50 percent out of commission due to spare parts. In the beginning of our production program all monies, as possible, were placed into the producing of additional engines, and the spare parts requirements were neglected at the time. Therefore the new airplanes coming out were deficient to meet the requirements of spare parts. We had sent cablegrams and letters on the subject of spare parts through proper channels to our supply agencies, and they were not in a position to help us. I knew that, but I did want them to be sure to realize how important it was to improve the spare-part situation as rapidly as possible. If we had an accident in one of our ships we used what they call cannibalism to rob it of certain spare parts to repair other ships. . . . Therefore the training program had to be rather extensive for the fighters. We were receiving men just out of the schools, who had not had advance training at the time: that is, a limited advance training but not on any of the modern equipment. So they were put through a demonstration of their ability to handle the old, obsolescent P-26, then through the P-36 and on to the P-40, and considerable progress was being made in training these men to take over the P-40 equipment. . . . The bombers, as soon as we got B-17s, in I think it was sometime in May, we had a few of our pilots that had flown the B-17s. They started training others, and as I remember there were one or two officers remained with the first flight of bombers that came over, and helped train other additional crews. So they had to train the pilots to operate the ship, the co-pilots, and all other members of the crew. We had no knowledge of repairing its engines or any of its equipment. . . . In other words, they had consumed some of their own fat, so to speak, to meet the enlargement of the technically school facility. We were getting but a few technical trained men. . . . There were possibly 400 men in these schools, as I remember. (R. 1858-A to 1861.)

It is to be remembered that the record shows that the Japanese carriers had over 400 modern aircraft which they brought against the Island, so that the superiority was overwhelming.

Although General Short gave a high priority to airfield construction, there were many delays due in part to slowness in getting funds and to the inefficiency of contractors under the supervision of the District Engineer.

Some elements of the Air Force in Hawaii had been used during 1941 primarily as a training force for officers and men who were being sent into the Philippines and into the outlying islands. The personnel of these elements, therefore, were largely untrained or partially trained personnel, as the more competent were constantly being forwarded into what was then advance theaters where the danger was deemed to be greater. Therefore, much of the Air Force was in a training status primarily. This has been pictured elsewhere in this report through the testimony of General Short, General Martin, [186] Colonel Mollison, and others.

The great effort in the latter part of 1941 was to get B-17s, of which 180 had been allotted to Hawaii. As there were only 109 B-17s in the entire Army (R. 154) it was obviously impossible to comply with this request. General Marshall testified that he had sent General Arnold to the West Coast to see what he could do to get these B-17s to the Philippines via Hawaii, and that they had been held up by contrary winds and production delays for more than three or four weeks. (R. 167-168.) General Arnold testified as follows:

General FRANK. Had anything held up B-17 production that in any way had an effort on this situation?

General ARNOLD. No; we did not have the facilities to get the numbers that we wanted. If you will remember, at that time in our endeavor to get B-17s we had 90 in January, and by June the 90 was up to 109, and by November it had only gone up to 148. That was the total number of B-17s produced by the Boeing Company. We just did not have the productive capacity to get the numbers required. (R. 180.)

Due to this condition the planes had been flown out with their guns, but without their ammunition, to save weight, a factor that was interpreted by Short as indicating that no attack was expected on Hawaii. (R. 305.)

However, the impression in Washington, as testified to by General Arnold, was that the Hawaiian Air Force was in good shape despite its heavy training mission. He testified:

We were always of the belief that the Hawaiian Air Force was probably better trained than any of our air forces. That is the impression we had here in Washington as a result of our inspections and due to the fact that they were always carrying out some form of mission simulating what they would do in active combat. (R. 179.)

[187] In order to develop this further, the following question was put and answer gained:

General FRANK. What I was about to approach was this point, which your present answer seems to disclaim, namely, that because of the fact that they were charged with training a lot of crews to fly B-17s from California to Honolulu and then conduct a lot of transition training in Honolulu, and do certain training work in preparation for transferring squadrons to the Philippines, that perhaps they got themselves into a training state of mind rather than a war state of mind.

General ARNOLD. I wrote to General Martin, as I said, from time to time, and the establishment of a transition school in Hawaii was not done until we were assured that they would get more effective results by carrying this transition on in Hawaii than if it were done in the United States. In other words, we had no air force, as such, anywhere at that time. No matter where you had that training, it was going to disrupt something. Where could we put that training so it would interfere least with the creation of the small air force that we did have? And it looked to us as if they could carry on this transition in Hawaii and interfere less with the training than anywhere else because we would have the airplanes then available, in case of an emergency, where they would be most needed. (R. 179-180.)

It will, therefore, be seen that the Hawaiian Air Force was handicapped by conducting a training program not only for itself but also for other theaters of action; its ships were mainly obsolete, its modern ships were few, and there was a marked deficiency of spare parts, and its airfield construction was lagging. Such was the status on December 7, 1941, of the Army Air Force installations.

[188] E. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON SUNDAY MORNING.  
DECEMBER 7, 1941

1. *Army Aircraft*.—On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the status of the island defenses was at the minimum.

As General Burgin testified:

A peculiar thing attaches to that. For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy.

Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simu-



lated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to December 7.

General FRANK. On Sunday?

General BURGIN. On Sunday but, by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The fleet was in the harbor. (R. 2603.)

On that morning, due to Alert #1, all planes, with some minor exceptions, were grouped together wing to wing. There were 80 pursuit planes in commission and 69 out of commission in various states of repair. There were 39 bombers in commission and 33 out of commission. Of the bombers in commission the only ones available for a real mission were 6 flying fortresses and 10 A-20s. The old B-18s were of minor value. There were a few fighter aircraft that morning that were at a remote field, apparently unknown to the Japanese, where a squadron was practicing short landings. It was out of this group that there came the brilliant performance of Major (then Lieutenant) Welch, who courageously got his ship off the ground, together with his wing man. Major Welch and his wing man shot down a number of Japanese [189] aircraft.

The Navy had no PBVs in the air that morning, although they usually had four to six for doing reconnaissance. Perhaps this is explained by General Burgin's testimony that while every Sunday morning the antiaircraft artillery had an exercise with the Navy when the Navy sent its carrier-based planes from ship to shore, and this continued up to the Sunday before December 7th, the Navy planes did not get into the air on this particular December 7th. (R. 2603.) The fleet was also in the harbor that Sunday, the only vessels of material character that were out being the carriers ENTERPRISE and LEXINGTON. The ENTERPRISE, with the addition of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, was about 200 miles west of Oahu. Task Force No. 12 was approximately 425 miles southeast of Midway, with the carrier LEXINGTON (R. 444-445); therefore there was not a single carrier in Pearl Harbor that morning. (R. 540.)

2. *Naval Long-Distance Reconnaissance.*—The situation as to the long-distance reconnaissance supposed to have been conducted by the Navy is admirably and frankly explained by Admiral DeLany, who was assistant chief of staff for operations on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, during this period: Admiral DeLany testified that there was absolutely no protection or screen thrown out by the Navy on the morning of December 7th, and no attempt to obtain information about the launching of an attack upon Oahu. He further testified, "There were neither planes, pilots, nor other facilities available to conduct and maintain such a [190] continuous reconnaissance" as would be necessary in order to maintain a 360-degree reconnaissance around the island. They realized the danger but there was nothing that could be done about it. (R. 1728.)

Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander of the Navy Base Defense Air Force, Commander, Patrol Wing 2, and Commander, Task Force 9, said that on the morning of December 7th he had a total of 81 PBVs in Patrol Wings 1 and 2, which included those at Midway, leaving a total of 69 on Oahu, with 9 out of commission. The reconnaissance work that was being conducted normally each morning at sunrise was merely to search the fleet operating areas for submarines so that the

fleet could operate on exercises without molestation. He usually sent out three to six planes "to guard against submarine attack." He testified that the only patrolling being done as a defense against a surprise attack was in the vicinity of Midway. (R. 1600.) He testified as follows:

General FRANK. You had no instructions from anybody to conduct any search against a force to protect you from a surprise attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. We had had on specific occasions, when there was some apparent reason for doing so. That instance had occurred for one or two different sectors over the periods during the year. (R. 1601.)

Admiral Kimmel summarized the situation when he testified as follows:

General RUSSELL. You have testified, and it has been supported by a line of evidence here, that there was not available to the Army and Navy any means for distant reconnaissance to ascertain the location of a Japanese task force.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. (R. 1805.)

[191] General GRUNERT. Were there any planes on distant reconnaissance on that morning?

Admiral BELLINGER. There were no planes on distant reconnaissance in the true sense of the term "distant reconnaissance." (R. 1629-1630.)

This failure to do distant reconnaissance cannot be excused for lack of planes under Navy control because the Navy had 50 PBVs available. The only excuse for not using them was, as stated by Admiral Kimmel:

We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had received no orders to mobilize. (R. 1811.)

Admiral Bellinger testified that the relationship between the Navy and the Army for the use of Army planes from the fighter group of the Army was not in a functioning status. (R. 1622.) He had 33 scout bombers, 7 fighters, and 9 scouts available on the morning of December 7th, but they were not being used. (R. 1623.) As witnesses testified, they were accustomed to seeing PBVs go out each morning, but on Sunday morning, December 7th, they did not go out. (See General Rudolph's and Colonel Brooks' testimony, R. 993-994, 1232-1234.)

3. *Aircraft Warning System.*—The radar aircraft warning system had the information center completed and organized with five mobile radar stations which were operating. They had been in operation from four to seven o'clock each morning for training purposes but had not gone into regular operation. It was because of their being in operation that Lockard and Elliott picked up the Japanese attack force 132 miles from Oahu, and this organization functioned continually after the attack, so it can be assumed it was in operating condition. (R. 439-440-441.) (See Lockard in other testimony.)

[192] As General Short said:

I think that the men were not experts, but I think they were getting trained to the point where they could do pretty well,

as of December 7, 1941. (R. 508.) They had three heavy radar sets complete and six mobile sets complete. (R. 509.) The mobile sets were operating. (R. 510.)

General FRANK. . . . the AWS system was operated with mobile sets up to a distance of about 130 miles. Is not that correct?

General SHORT. That is correct. (R. 512.)



The Interceptor Command "was actually operating," according to General Short. He said, "it was actually operating daily." (R. 525.) An order had not gone out to Burgin and Martin, but it was working.

4. *Antiaircraft Defenses*.—As to the antiaircraft, much of it had never gone into position so far as mobile guns were concerned, and none of the mobile guns was in position on the morning of December 7th. Ammunition had not been issued because the Ordnance Department objected to having it out convenient to the guns because it might get dirty. As General Burgin said,

they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition. . . . and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise. (R. 2608.)

As it took about six hours to get the ammunition fully out, distributed, and broken open, the delay was a very difficult one. (R. 2608.)

As General Burgin again testified:

It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at [193] heart is goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazines. We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever struck. (R. 2607.)

The two divisions were in their quarters so that it took them a number of hours to move out after the attack. One of the principal difficulties was the necessity of drawing their ammunition, as elsewhere discussed.

The status of the antiaircraft was this: The mobile guns had to secure their ammunition from Aliamanu Crater, between two and three miles from Fort Shafter. The fixed guns had their ammunition in boxes adjacent to the guns. He had 60 mobile guns and 26 fixed guns and the usual complement of 50-caliber and 30-caliber. He testified as follows:

They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. (R. 2604.)

On the morning of December 7th he had not gone into operation with the Navy as one previous Sundays. (R. 2603.) This was due to the fleet being in the harbor on that Sunday, and for some reason the Navy was not conducting its usual Sunday exercises with him. (R. 2603.)

5. *Summary*.—Therefore, the situation on December 7th can be summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBYs were not out; the antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with the fleet air arm; the naval carriers [194] with their planes were at a distance from Oahu on that Sunday; the aircraft were on the ground, were parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one another; the fleet was in the harbor with the exception of Task Forces 9 and 12, which included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE. Ammunition for the Army was, with the exception of that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance

storehouses, and the two combat divisions as well as the antiaircraft artillery were in their permanent quarters and not in battle positions. Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of the anti-sabotage alert No. 1. This made of them easy targets for an air attack. In short, everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack and the Japanese took full advantage of it.

[195]

## F. THE ATTACK ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

1. *Japanese Intelligence.*—The details of the attack have been already adequately described. To have a competent understanding of the attack and the perfection with which it was executed, we should remember that the Japanese had had exceptional opportunities for securing the very latest information from a wide variety of sources in the islands as to the exact dispositions of the fleet and of our military forces. The maps that were found upon Japanese aircraft that were shot down or on Japanese aviators or upon Japanese submarine crew men indicated a vast amount of meticulously accurate, up-to-date information. The fact that one or more submarines were in Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th and had circulated in the harbor and then gone out again showed a knowledge of what was going on in Pearl Harbor that was substantially complete.

It is interesting to contrast this activity of the Japanese Navy in gaining detailed information of our Fleet with the failure of our Navy to glean any information concerning the task force that attacked Pearl Harbor from the time that it left Japanese home waters, about November 22, 1941, and left Takan Bay about November 28, 1941, until the attack took place.

For instance, the map found on a Japanese aviator brought down at Fort Kamehameha on December 7th, Exhibit No. 22; Exhibits 23, 24, 25, and 26; and Exhibit No. 48, illustrate with what meticulous detail the entire operation was worked out, based upon adequate and complete intelligence by the Japanese. It is difficult to understand this attack and its [196] perfection without first studying these maps. The Japanese came to the attack with full information of our dispositions and defenses; we met the attack with absolutely no information about the Japanese attacking force. The details of the securing of this information are set forth elsewhere in this report. The Japanese realized that this was the foundation of their war and that perfection of execution would have a profound effect politically upon their allies and upon the countries of the Far East in which they intended to operate.

2. *Nature and Composition of the Attacking Force.*—The strength of the attacking force has already been stated in this report, based upon the extended testimony of Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton. It was one of the most powerful naval attacking forces ever assembled up to that time, because of the large complement of carriers. Its aviators were of the highest quality of Japanese encountered during this war. After they were finally disposed of during the later days of the present Pacific war, the testimony is to the effect that no equal or superior Japanese aviators have been met.

Japan evidently brought to bear upon this attack the best brains, the best equipment, and the finest intelligence, with the most expert planning, which it had.



The first indication of the attack on the Island of Oahu was the detection by the U. S. S. *ANTARES* of a suspicious object in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6:30 a. m. This was found to be a small two-man submarine, which was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of the U. S. S. *WARD* and a naval patrol plane between 6:33 and 6:45 a. m. on December 7th. The *WARD* sent a report of this action to the Naval Base [197] watch officer at 7:12 a. m., who immediately notified his chief of staff. A ready destroyer was dispatched to investigate, but no alert warning was issued based upon the report. This was one of the most important of a succession of mistakes made during this fateful morning. The Navy admits that it did not advise General Short as it should have done.

A second small two-man submarine was sunk inside the harbor between 8:35 and 8:43 a. m., and a third one was grounded in the Kaneohe Bay and was captured. There was a total altogether of five such submarines equipped with two-man crews, one of which was captured. The remaining nine crew members were killed, as confirmed by a Japanese citation later given to these ten men raising them in rank. (R. 3038.) These two-man submarines were launched from mother submarines a short distance from the Island of Oahu.

While Pearl Harbor was provided with an antitorpedo net to prevent the entrance of submarines and this net was kept closed during the hours of darkness, being opened only when necessary for a vessel to pass through the net, it was kept open continuously during daylight hours, upon the assumption that the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel, and other vessels in the neighborhood, would detect any submarines. On the morning of December 7th, the net was opened at 4:58 a. m. for the entrance of two minesweepers and was left open until 8:40 a. m. when it was closed by order as a result of the attack. The net was not damaged and it was fully functioning. Apparently the submarine got into the harbor at 7 a. m. It will be recalled that prior to December 7th one or more Japanese submarines had already been in this harbor, passing [198] through the net when it was opened at 4 a. m. to permit the garbage scow to go through.

The attacking planes from the six carriers of the attacking force numbered approximately 424. (R. 3048.)

Of this number about 250 to 300 took part in the attack. They consisted of fighting, bombing and torpedo planes that simultaneously and successively attacked Pearl Harbor and the adjacent air bases and airfields on Oahu, starting at about 7:55 a. m. The attack was over by 11 a. m. On these fields the aircraft were carefully lined up, wing to wing, tip to tip, in the most perfect target position for both bombing and machine-gun strafing. This is true both of the Army and of the Navy. The PBYs of the Navy were substantially all destroyed, and a large number of the Army aircraft met a similar fate. The landing strips were substantially without damage, possibly indicating some subsequent intention on the part of the Japanese to employ those landing strips.

Immediately upon the attack being known to General Short he ordered Alert No. 3. This was executed with more than expected promptness.

As already related, this force of attacking Japanese planes was detected about 132 miles north of Oahu. The Japanese force came

over the island as follows: One force came from the north directly across the island, over Schoefield Barracks, Wheeler Field, to Pearl Harbor, attacking Wheeler Field and Pearl Harbor. Another force came in from the east attacking Kaneohe Field, Bellows Field, and Pearl Harbor, and a third force came in from the south attacking Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor. The torpedo planes devoted their [199] attention to the ships in the harbor. A study of the bomb pattern of such places as Hickam Field shows that the attack was concentrated upon the aprons where the planes were parked and upon the hangars as well as upon the machine shops. All objectives were entered and carefully identified by legends placed upon the U. S. Geodetic Survey maps used by the Japanese.

It is significant as to maps secured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that there is an abbreviation of a code which takes care of every major contingency before, during and as a result of the attack. Nothing was left to chance. It is particularly noted that the information of construction was shown by the fact that as to Hickam Field the legend indicated,

All concrete structures—or in the process of construction.

[200] G. TIME ELEMENT IN THE EXPECTED ATTACK; THE EFFECT OF USING HAWAII AS A TRAINING GROUND IN ADDITION TO ITS BEING A COMBAT OUTPOST

1. *Attack a Surprise.*—The Chief of Staff and all other witnesses, including Kimmel and Short, have without exception stated that the attack was a surprise. General Marshall testified that the Hawaiian commanders indicated their views that an air attack was their very serious concern. (R. 52.) Yet he also testified:

We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack. (R. 9.)

An analysis of the probabilities of success from the Japanese point of view shows that the Japanese took an extraordinary chance, if the facts as to their strength as we now know them are reasonably accurate. In race track parlance, it was a "long-shot" and an extraordinary risk because the consequences of failure to the Japanese might have been greater than those to the United States in the event of success. It was a bold and considered venture.

Japan knew with reasonable accuracy the movements and location of our fleet. It knew weekend conditions in Hawaii with the fleet in the harbor as well as we did. It apparently knew of our assumption that Japan would not dare attack the United States and that if it did, it would be in the remote islands of the Pacific, including the Philippines. It accurately gauged our belief that Japan had its eyes turned on Indo-China and the Dutch Indies and was proceeding southwardly with its conquest.

Based upon this shrewd estimate of our national psychology and our estimate of their intentions, Japan proceeded to the [201] execution of the unexpected, the gain from which it estimated would be of incalculable value. In the daring attack Japan was compensated by the gain to her of immobilizing and substantially destroying the



Pacific Fleet, which was a major threat to Japan's left flank in its southward move. The value of such a result was tremendous.

It gave both safety and freedom of action to Japan; and the ability to concentrate both on the Pacific Islands of the United States and the Philippines. By that time Japan believed it would be so entrenched that dislodgment would be substantially impossible.

Japan used in this attack from four to six carriers out of the total of eight available to its fleet. The failure of this mission, by the destruction of such carriers, would have been really fatal to its fleet, at least for long months to come. The daring, therefore, of this attack was out of all proportion to its value because had it not been successful and had its carriers been destroyed it would have been disastrous to the Japanese Navy.

But in making this estimate of Japan's risky action and its considered chances, we were doing so from the occidental point of view. We were completely ignoring the oriental attitude, the Japanese cheap price of life, and her willingness to conduct a suicide attempt without any foundation of occidental reasoning in order to gain an extraordinary advantage. Hull and Grew had warned of this psychology and her penchant for unexpected, reckless, and suicidal moves.

This national urge to take a desperate chance of a military nature has since then become well-known. It was our failure to take into consideration this extraordinary chance [202] taking characteristic, due to the violent and uncivilized reasoning of the Japanese mind, that would approve the making of such a long military and naval chance for the satisfaction of the first blow, and a disastrous one, that was so satisfactory to the oriental mind, which misled us.

2. *Time Element—The Important Factor in All Estimates.*—This analysis is recited for the reason that apparently no one from the Chief of Staff down considered *at the time the attack was made* that any such attempt would be made.

This *time* element is important in understanding the state of mind of the responsible authorities of the United States. The military estimates of the situation from the War Department, the Navy Department, and in Hawaii, clearly show a reasoned and correctly stated analytical estimate of the situation. The missing link in our search for the reason why steps were not taken to carry out the logic of the military and psychological estimate of the situation seems to be in this belief that there was ample time to prepare Hawaii. It was generally thought that Japan would not attempt this attack, if at all, until some time later after it had made its attacks upon the Philippines and intermediate islands. In that, the United States' calculations went far astray for lack of understanding of the long-chance type of the military and naval minds of oriental Japan.

As a consequence a policy was followed that was disastrous to the defense of Hawaii. They gambled upon having time for preparation that did not exist.

3. *Expected Time to Continue Training.*—That assumption of time for preparation resulted in using a portion of the Hawaiian Army Air Force and the Navy as a training force for the training [203] of green personnel followed by the removal of experienced personnel thereof, as they were trained, to other theaters. The Board, al-

though it realizes the great need of organized air forces to serve as training units and that the Hawaiian Air Force was one of the few available, nevertheless it considers it a mistake to so utilize this outpost which should have been on a purely combat basis and not subject to the weakening process of a periodic turnover.

Let us look at the consequence of this. The Navy was either training ashore or constantly training at sea through its three task forces. Those operations in the areas were not, as Short thought, for the purpose of combat reconnaissance or defense duty, but they were training maneuvers for the constant training of new personnel to be used elsewhere.

The training problem, which had been frequently discussed with the War Department and was well known by it, had assumed a position of importance in Hawaii. This evidently strongly influenced Short's decision to adopt Alert No. 1.

He testified:

In addition to that, it was a question of training. Alerts Nos. 2 and 3 would require so many men on duty. Alert No. 3 would take every man, practically, so it would eliminate any training. Alert No. 2 would practically put every man of the harbor defense, the antiaircraft, and the air on duties that would prohibit training. The situation in the air with regard to training was quite serious. We had been given the mission of ferrying B-17s to the Philippines. We had already sent, I think, two groups, one of 9 and one of 12. We had also sent some crews to San Francisco for the purpose of bringing them back to the Philippine Islands. We had only 6 flying fortresses in commission to train all of these crews. If you remember, at that time a flying fortress was relatively new and you could not just pick up a pilot here and there say he could fly a flying fortress. He had to be stepped up. We had a bunch of the old obsolete B-18 bombers that were death traps if you put anybody in them to fight, but it was one step in teaching a pilot how to handle larger ships. They were put on those. They were put on A-20s [204] for a little time, and finally got to the B-17s. With the limited number of ships we had it took time to train these crews; not just the pilots. In addition to that we had to train the bombardiers and the gunners so they could protect themselves from the Japanese going over the Mandated Islands.

General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should do nothing that would interfere with the training or the ferrying group. The responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to get the ships there and get them there without loss; and we could not do it if we started them out with untrained crews.

That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1 rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3. (R. 285-286.)

We felt that we required all possible time for training in the Air Corps, because we had to prepare these teams for ferrying to the Philippines. Just as soon as we got a trained unit we lost it by transferring it to the Philippines. (R. 390.)

And again he testified before the Roberts Commission:

Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more serious about training rather than expecting something to happen at the time. (Roberts Record 1622.) (See page 531 of the Grunert Record.)

General Martin, Chief of the Hawaiian Air Force, testified even more vigorously that the selection of Alert No. 1 was largely influenced by their desire to keep on training.

General FRANK. Was there any advantage to conducting Air Corps training in any one of the three alerts? . . .

General MARTIN. There most certainly was, because we were hard pressed to get the men properly trained to meet our requirements in the new organization.

General FRANK. Could you do more technical training for the Air Force in No. 3 Alert, No. 2 Alert, or No. 1 Alert, or was there no difference?



General MARTIN. Of course there was a difference. There would be more under Alert No. 1. (R. 1864-1865.)

Admiral Kimmel said:

The principal one that arises at once is the question of personnel, the necessity for training personnel, from the fact that certainly the Navy was training personnel and shipping them back to the States, that we were constantly getting new personnel. That intensive training program was essential if we were not to have a fleet that was utterly impotent. I have been informed, and I believe firmly, that [205] the Army had just as many troubles as we had, if not more. They brought pilots out there that needed training, and they were depleting their trained airmen of all ratings, and in the weeks immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the primary effort for their Hawaiian Air Force, I think it is fair to say, was in ferrying planes to the Asiatic station, and they very greatly depleted their stuff. (R. 1764-1765.)

It is therefore apparent that both services were placing great emphasis on training, possibly to the detriment of preparedness to meet an attack.

4. *Short's Trust in Navy to Give Him Timely Notice. Time Element Again.*—General Short accomplished what he set out to do, to establish a cordial and friendly relationship with the Navy. His instructions from the Chief of Staff to do this were not for the purpose of social intercourse, but for more effectively accomplishing the objective of a sound and complete detail working agreement with the Navy to get results. He successfully accomplished fully only the cordial relationship with his opposite numbers in the Navy, i. e., the top rank of the Navy; he did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his own full information, the complete execution of his own job and the performance of his mission. The claim of a satisfactory relationship for practical purposes is not substantiated. General Short testified:

The one thing that that letter (General Marshall's first letter of February 7th, 1941) emphasized to me, I think, more than anything else, was the necessity for the closest cooperation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter impressed me more than anything else. (R. 355.)

Apparently Short was afraid that if he went much beyond social contacts and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he had a right to know in order to do his job, he would give offense to the Navy and lose the good will of the [206] Navy which he was charged with securing. That is evidenced by his following statement:

I would say frankly that I imagine that as a Senior Admiral, Kimmel would have resented it if I had tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out, and as I say, our relations were such that he gave me without any hesitancy any piece of information that he thought was of interest. (R. 363.)

He testified that he relied for reconnaissance upon the task forces of the Navy, which employed carriers to search the ocean 300 miles to each side, giving each task force 600 miles of reconnaissance area, and with three forces that would have meant covering 1,800 miles. (R. 284, 384.) Admiral Pye, commander of one of the three task forces of the Pacific Fleet, testified that:

The schedule as arranged was that one task force was at sea practically all the time, that is, one of the three task forces, leaving a period normally of about eight days and about fourteen days in port. (R. 1036.)

Kimmel testified the task forces were in training and not out for reconnaissance. (R. 1773, 1794-1795; Cf. Pye 1037, Burgin 2673.)

He said that this was well known and undoubtedly Short knew about it. (R. 1771-1773; Cf. Short 359.) The Short and Kimmel testimony is in conflict on this point.

Again, Short said he was dependent on the Navy, and particularly the 14th Naval District, or the War Department for securing information as to the movement of Japanese ships. (R. 291.) He said that the combination of the continuous flow of information that the Navy Department had as to the location of Jap ships and the Navy task forces doing long-distance reconnaissance with their carrier-borne planes, led him to the position that

it was a natural thing that I should accept the opinion of the Navy on that particular subject. It seemed to be the best informed opinion that there was in the vicinity [207] (R. 300-301.)

It was for that reason that he accepted the Captain McMorris statement, when visiting with Admiral Kimmel and his staff, that there would be no Japanese attack in early December. (R. 299-301.)

He said he was further strengthened in his opinion, during the period of the 27th of November to the 6th of December, that the Navy either knew

where the Japanese carriers were, or had enough information that they were not uneasy, and with the task forces that I knew they had out, that they felt they could handle the situation. (R. 303.)

Short evidently believed that he was getting full information from the Navy that was available to them. There does not seem to have occurred anything that led him to think he was not being told all the pertinent official naval information there was available. He relied upon complete official interchange which was not in practice.

An examination of the facts showed that the naval forces were insufficient for long-distance patrol, and General Short frankly confesses this situation (R. 375); General Short further points out that the Army had insufficient planes for reconnaissance. (R. 377-378.) Although General Short "looked on task forces as the best means of reconnaissance" (R. 384), he did not know nor try to find out their routes. (R. 359-360, 475.) Short could easily have learned that the task forces conducted only incidental reconnaissance (R. 1773, 1794-1795) and that the Navy was devoting itself to the submarine menace in the areas in which they had their exercises. (R. 1040, 1757, 3041.) Short knew that his inshore patrol was of limited value (R. 473); that Admiral Bloch did not have the planes to carry out the agreement (R. 375); and that all that Admiral Bellinger had was a limited number of PBY reconnaissance planes (R. 456, 1598, 1810); that Bloch had none (R. 1493, 1526. [208] 1532, 1751) and the carrier-borne planes were normally used for antisubmarine reconnaissance. (R. 1039-1040.)

General Short's knowledge of the situation at the time of these events in 1941 is shown in the testimony of General Martin, who said:

I feel that our decision was influenced to a certain extent by the fact that the Navy was patrolling with task forces in waters of which we had no knowledge. Now, as to what areas they were covering, we did not know, but it did affect a decision as to the paramount danger coming from within rather than from without. (R. 1856.)

General Martin said emphatically the fact that the Navy had task forces out influenced his decision, saying:



. . . I had a feeling that the Navy was not properly equipped to conduct a reconnaissance that would be completely satisfactory to me; . . . (R. 1873.)

This was despite the fact, as he said:

. . . we were not completely satisfied with the way this reconnaissance was being done, because there wasn't enough in the air, and your reconnaissance from the air would extend over a larger territory in the limited amount of time, and that was the thing I was complaining to Admiral Bellinger about. (R. 1857.)

As an indication that Short was not getting the information is his own admission:

General FRANK. Another thing; Do you now feel that the Navy withheld from you certain information that they had available that would have been invaluable to you?

General SHORT. I don't believe that they purposely withheld anything from me that they thought really concerned me.

General FRANK. Don't you think that that information about the naval task force with carriers and submarines and battleships down in Jaluit would have vitally affected you?

General SHORT. Yes, possibly.

General GRUNERT. Did the Navy understand your mission and your responsibility sufficient to be able to be a good judge of what should be passed to you or what shouldn't be passed to you?

General SHORT. Oh, I think they did, definitely. (R. 409-410).

[209] He did not learn of the early visit on the morning of December 7th of the Japanese submarine. He did not learn of it until the 8th, when Admiral Kimmel himself told him about it. (R. 364-365.) By his implicit trust in the Navy he let them not only get the information but to evaluate it. In connection with the information about the Japanese submarine sunk by the Navy early December 7th, he said this as to the Navy action:

They did not connect it (the submarine which was sunk by the Navy) with the general raid, they thought it was separate. (R. 365.)

But the point is that Short should have been given this information and have made his own evaluation. As he now testifies, if he had known of this submarine information it

might have worked out to our very great advantage if they (the Navy) had been handled differently. (R. 310.)

In this connection he said,

It was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me; that he (Bloch) could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong. . . . (R. 311.)

Again, he was not advised of the Japanese task force in the Marshalls, between the 25th and the 30th of November. (R. 361.) He said he was not advised of the naval dispatch of December 3rd, 1941, and never saw that message. That was the message that showed that the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts were destroying certain codes and ciphers, and burning certain documents. He said that he did not receive the naval messages of December 3rd, December 4th, and December 6th from [210] the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, regarding the destruction of confidential documents.

He said:

General GRUNERT. You had none of the information that was disclosed in those three messages?

General SHORT. No, sir. (R. 425.)

He expressed his relationship with the Navy in this wise:

I felt that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, either one, would have definitely given me anything they thought had any bearing on my job; that if they were sure it was an absolutely inside naval proposition that did not concern me in any way they might not have given it (the information) to me. (R. 358.)

This situation was summed up as follows:

General FRANK. The question as to whether or not you got the information was placed upon a trust that you had that they would have given it to you?

General SHORT. Absolutely.

\* \* \* \* \*

General FRANK. Do you feel that you were secure in that?

General SHORT. I do not know what other basis you could work on. I had no right to demand that they give me all information they had. (R. 358.)

As to naval task forces on which he so thoroughly relied for reconnaissance, he did not have any regular means of knowing where they were or what they were doing,

except as we (Admirals Kimmel, Bloch and Bellinger) happened to talk about in a personal kind of way. (R. 359.)

This brings us to the further observation that Short in dealing with the Navy was trying to do the job himself (R. 1248-1249), which resulted in that he neither got the information completely, accurately, nor consistently, instead of delegating it to his trained staff officers dealing with equally trained [211] staff officers of the Navy so a professional, systematic job could be done. He relied on confidence and natural trust rather than certainty of information; and on personal visits and informal conferences instead of the definiteness of an established organization smoothly operating to an effective end.

## II. WHAT WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK?

1. *Reason For Analysis of Action Taken After 7 December 1941.*—The question of insufficient means with which to adequately defend Oahu has been raised. General Short's energy was admirable and well directed towards improving the defense of Oahu. As a consequence, we have examined the situation as to what he did before the attack and what he did after the attack with what he had. The first part of the examination has already been related in the previous portions of the report. We now propose to examine two questions: How effectively was Short able to use this very same material, personnel, and available facilities after the attack; and what did Washington do after the attack in giving help to Hawaii that might have been done before?

2. *Hawaii and Washington Action.*—Upon learning of the attack General Short immediately ordered the Number 3 Alert. (R. 1118). The 24th Division was in all battle positions by 1600 hours 7 December 1941. The 25th Division was in all battle positions by 1700 hours 7 December 1941. The Division Artillery drew its ammunition and secured its issue of a unit of fire to take to beaches within one to two hours. It is significant that the war garrison was increased by



Washington from 59,000 to 71,500 after December 7 to defend Kaneohe Bay, "back door to the island," and that increases in air strength and in engineers for [212] aviation purposes were granted. (R. 325.) Harbor troops had ammunition "immediately at hand." The antiaircraft had theirs sometime later. The first of the sixteen surgical teams reported to the hospital at 0900. At noon there was started evacuation of women and children from Hickam and Wheeler Fields and harbor defense positions. The Ordnance Depot went into two underground rooms. Slit trenches were then dug. (R. 316-317.)

The Department Engineer, under the Department Commander, was put by Washington in complete control of building of field fortifications. The troops started on field fortifications. The slit trenches were not completed on 8 December. (R. 321.) The outlying islands were further garrisoned. (R. 332.) Orders were issued in connection with the defense against chemical air attack, air raid instructions were issued, klaxon horns were distributed for the aircraft warning service and old gas masks were exchanged for new. (R. 529-531.) The Interceptor Command, inactive before December 7 and still in the training stage (R. 1825), was activated 17 December. (R. 4136-4137.) After December 7

the Navy took us over body and soul . . . we did exactly as they ordered us to. We were a part of their Naval Air Force, so to speak,

said General Rudolph. (R. 1223.) Washington gave unity of command. Directives came from the War and Navy Departments to establish a joint operating center for a joint staff of Army and Navy. This was done in tunnels in the Aliamanu Crater and put into use in February 1942. (R. 1534.)

Daily reconnaissance was made after December 7, using Army B-17s and Navy PBYs and "anything they had," even the B-18s. Navy planes were sent from the mainland by Washington after December 7; many B-17s came out almost immediately. Additional PBYs were received and those damaged on December 7 were repaired. [213] If the planes that were available by Washington after December 7 had been available before December 7, distance reconnaissance could have been made, according to the testimony of Admiral Bloch. (R. 1532-1534.) However, the necessity for the ferrying of bombers to the Philippines ceased since they, too, were under attack.

The Interceptor Command was activated immediately after December 7. (R. 2604.)

The status of the antiaircraft artillery and coast artillery was as follows. After December 7 the ammunition was issued for use with the guns in the field. (R. 2605.) The skeleton crews were replaced with full crews on the fixed coastal guns. (R. 2611.) Only 40 per cent of the allowance of automatic weapons existed before December 7, which was rectified after that date. (R. 2613.) The whole command was put on a five-minute alert and old Alerts Number 1, 2, and 3 became obsolete, the men in camp after December 7 remaining right at their guns. (R. 2639.) The radar and Interceptor Command installations, formerly under the control of the Signal Corps, were taken away from the Signal Corps immediately after December 7 and placed under the Interceptor Command. (R. 2644.)

The aircraft warning system was started full time on December 7 as it could have been weeks before, had the order been given. (R. 4133.) After December 7 the aircraft warning system personnel continued to operate efficiently. They did so in conjunction with the 24-hour duty of the Interceptor Command. As Colonel Bergquist said, in contrasting his efforts to get the aircraft warning service and the Interceptor Command [214] cooperating before December 7, after December 7

I just had to snap my fingers and I got what I wanted. (R. 1205-1206.)

The AWS work moved much faster after December 7. (R. 1218.) After December 7 the controversy between the Air Corps and the Signal Corps, which contributed to the delay in the activation of the Interceptor Command, disappeared. (R. 1216-1217.)

After December 7 the fighter planes were kept ready to take off instantly (R. 3911) and the antiaircraft warning service was put on a 24-hour basis, as it could have been before, said Colonel Powell, Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Department Corps. (R. 3913.) The aircraft warning sets were in continuous operation after December 7 with three groups operating four hours each. (R. 1029.)

Tillman, an Engineer Corps civilian employee, testified that he as a trouble shooter took charge of construction pertaining to the aircraft warning service after Colonel Wyman was relieved because progress was unsatisfactory. (R. 2135.) He found he was able to complete certain construction projects at aircraft warning stations by scouting around for parts. Prior to December 7 the crews on those projects were not working because they said they had nothing to work with. (R. 2149-2151.)

The most remarkable change between December 6 and December 7 was the change in construction activities under the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman.

A new field was begun at Kahuku on December 7. Bunkers were built at Hickam Field; the field at Haliewa was expanded; construction of a new field at Kipapa was started; a temporary field was put on the Schofield golf course. The troops started on field fortifications. (R. 321.) Authority was requested to [215] build ten airfields. Bombers were put on the outlying islands.

We were able to go ahead and do a lot without funds.

Barracks were built with WPA money. (R. 325.) A pool of lumber was authorized for the Quartermaster. (R. 328.)

All the material and contractors with their machinery were taken over and put to work. Priorities were established on jobs to get more work accomplished, according to Benson, President of the Hawaiian Contracting Company. (R. 3737.) A job at Wheeler Field had not been completed for a long time, due to the delay of plans from the Engineers. (R. 2542.) Barking Sands airport and Kokee radar station jobs had been delayed for many weeks with the material on the ground awaiting someone to act. The Hawaiian Constructors had not put it up. After December 7 the witness Bartlett went to the site, erected the tower in five days and had the station operating.

On December 7 the runways under construction at Bellows Field were incomplete. On the Wednesday after December 7 the work



began on a 24-hour-a-day basis. The second runway was completed in seven days, that is, by the following Thursday, said Colonel Weddington, base commander at Bellows Field. (R. 3020.) After December 7 antiaircraft emplacements were constructed at Bellows Field. When the attack struck, the planes were concentrated practically wing to wing, but after the attack they were dispersed on the field, 50 to 75 feet apart. (R. 3014.)

The Corps of Engineers also evidenced an appreciation of the situation by raising the contracting authority of the District Engineer from \$50,000 before December 7 to \$5,000,000 after December 7. The Corps of Engineers' red tape of sending [216] all contracts and changes to Washington to the Chief of Engineers was then eliminated by Washington; testimony of Colonel Wyman. (R. 3435, 3874.) The Robert E. McKee Company, which had been discarded by Wyman when he went to the Islands in the middle of 1940, was invited by him after December 7 to join the Hawaiian Constructors. (R. 2405-2407.)

Slit trenches had not been built until the day of Pearl Harbor (R. 1916), but they were built extensively, together with air raid shelters, after December 7. (R. 838.)

After December 7 Admiral Pye testified the Navy kept its forces out of the harbor fairly continuously except for the time necessary in port to overhaul materiel and receive supplies. (R. 1045.)

We, therefore, find that after December 7 an active and vigorous employment of facilities, materiel and personnel was made, and full support and supplies were furnished by Washington some of which might have been done before December 7. The support from the mainland was vastly different after December 7 than before, and the record so reflects this condition. For instance, before December 7 G-2 did not submit to General Short any strategical estimates but after December 7 they submitted such a statement weekly. After December 7 the suspected aliens were rounded up and interned, the Japanese consul and his 200 agents were put out of business and all necessary steps were taken to monitor both telephone and radio communication, all of which might have been done without stirring up the civilian population or the Japanese prior to December 7, 1941.<sup>42</sup>

[217]

#### I. SUMMARY

The foregoing concludes the story of Pearl Harbor with the exception of the matter of the construction of the Hawaiian defenses and the particular part of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., with respect to those defenses. Col. Wyman's part in the Pearl Harbor disaster is treated in Chapter V.

<sup>42</sup> List of things done and action taken on or after 7 December 1941 by persons in the Hawaiian Islands: Bloch, volume 13, pages 1532-34; Klatt, v. 13, p. 1465-66; Pye, v. 9, p. 1045; Phillips, v. 10, p. 1118; Murray, v. 27, p. 3080; Martin, v. 17, p. 1825, 1850, 1911; Lockard, v. 9, p. 1029; Bartlett, v. 22, p. 2510-11; Midkiff, v. 25, p. 2805-07-14-40-41; Bergquist, v. 10, p. 1205-06-16-17-18; Rudolph, v. 10, p. 1223; Weddington, v. 27, p. 3020-13-14; Howard, v. 17, p. 1916; Pratt, v. 18, p. 1986; Locey, v. 25, p. 2790; King, v. 23, p. 2542-37-38; Felder, v. 26, p. 2981; McKee, v. 21, p. 2405-07; Burgin, v. 24, p. 2603-04-07-09-11-13-14-15-39-44; Reybold, v. 6, p. 580; Davidson, v. 36, p. 4133-36-38-42; Powell, v. 32, p. 3904-11-13; Wyman, v. 29, p. 3435-36, v. 32, p. 3874 (affidavit—v. 29, p. 3433-34; Perliter, v. 30, p. 3712; Benson, v. 30, p. 3737; Farthing, v. 7, p. 838; Tillman, v. 19, p. 2135-49-51; Short, v. 4, p. 314-15-16-17-19-20-21-22-25-28-30-31-32-37, v. 5, p. 500, 529-30-31-34-36.

In order to not disturb the continuity of the complete Pearl Harbor story both at Hawaii and in Washington, the next succeeding Chapter No. IV is devoted primarily to the responsibilities for the Pearl Harbor disaster of those in Washington who had some part in the matter. In this way Chapters III and IV, when read together, will give a balanced and complete picture of the principal events and actions taken which contribute to the result of the attack on December 7, 1941.

#### [218] CHAPTER IV. RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON

##### 1. *General*

##### 2. *War Council*

Three groups of conferees.

##### 3. *Secretary of State*

Responsibility for dealing with the Japanese; no authority to commit the United States to War; indecision of the Secretary of State November 25-26; advice to the Secretary of War of the action by the Secretary of State; action by the Secretary of War on the 27th.

##### 4. *War Department*

Policy of War Department to avoid conflict; policy as evidenced in the War Department messages to prevent overt acts; no information to Short of the Secretary of State's counter proposals; confusion resulting from the Navy messages of October 16 and 24; confusion from the messages of the 27th and 28th; how the Long message was delivered and what was done about it; failure to act promptly to notify Hawaii.

##### 5. *Conflict Between the Army and Navy Messages*

The Army-Navy messages were conflicting; the Navy messages predominated with warnings of a conflict; Army messages predominant to avoid overt acts.

##### 6. *Military Intelligence Division*

Field of investigation; necessity for a larger scope in the future; intelligence a national problem.

##### 7. *War Plans Division*

Responsibility for Overseas Departments; responsibility to see the War Plans implemented; no action on Alert No. 1; Gerow's failings; inadequate supervision.

##### 8. *Navy Department*

Failure to carry out agreement with the Army for long-distance reconnaissance; failure to advise of enemy submarine sinking; failure to give Short information of Jaluit task force.

##### 9. *Chief of Staff*

Responsibility for organization and operation of War Department; failure to delegate authority; responsibility to keep General Short advised of international situation; delay in sending message on December 6 and 7; no action on Short's report of measures taken; and lack of knowledge of conditions of readiness in Hawaii November 8 to December 7, 1941.

##### 10. *Summary*

[219] 1. *General*.—The preceding chapter has dealt primarily with Hawaii and the actions of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian Department. It has to some degree and to a lesser extent, by reason of the chronological sequence, dealt with what was done in Washington both with respect to the internal activities in Washington and what Washington sent to Short. This chapter, therefore, will be devoted primarily to the activities in Washington and only secondarily in Hawaii.

2. *War Council*.—The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, has discussed the activities of the group in the War Department known as



the War Council. He also described the group consisting of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Navy, Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, who were also called colloquially the "War Council". The third group was that which included the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, usually the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and occasionally Commanding General, Air Force, General Arnold.

All three of these bodies were informal and constituted simply a group of men exchanging ideas and attempting to determine policies without regularity of record of what they did, as far as this Board has been able to determine. It was a sort of clearing house for information, a gathering place for discussion of policies, so that each of the independent actors in the scene would know what was going on and would have information to guide him in making his own decisions that were more or less independent, but at the same time also somewhat dependent on the action of other members of the group.

[220] 3. *Secretary of State.*—The responsibility apparently assumed by the Secretary of State (and we have no other proof that anyone else assumed the responsibility finally and definitely) was to determine when the United States would reach the impasse with Japan. It was the Secretary of State who was in charge of the negotiations with the Japanese; it was the Secretary of State who had long and numerous conferences with the Japanese. He was the contact man and the responsible negotiator.

He was doubtless aware of the fact that no action taken by him should be tantamount to a declaration of war. That responsibility rests with Congress. It is important to observe that the President of the United States had been very careful, according to the testimony of the Secretary of War, to be sure that the United States did nothing that could be considered an overt act or an act of war against the Japanese.

For, as Mr. Stimson testified in the phrasing of the message of November 27, he was particularly concerned with so phrasing it so as to carry out the President's directive which was in accordance with our constitutional method of doing business. Mr. Stimson said:

I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what I of course normally would do; to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance with the facts. (R. 4057.)

Mr. Stimson was referring to the status of the negotiations of the previous day on November 26, when the Ten Points were handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese, and to the fact that the President, as of the 27th of November, 1941, was still desirous that no overt act be committed by [221] the United States.

With this clear understanding, let us see how these serious responsibilities were discharged. In making this statement we are deeply sympathetic with the state of mind, the irritation, the exasperation, the chicanery, trickery and deception of the Japanese ambassadors with whom the Secretary of State had so long and manfully struggled. What he did was human, but the results are the things with which we are concerned.

Undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been frequently advised through the meetings of the War Council of the inadequate status of the defenses of the United States. Our Army and Navy were not ready for war, and undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been fully advised of that fact. So serious was this situation that General Marshall and Admiral Stark drafted a joint memorandum under date of November 27 on this subject.

This memorandum was addressed directly to the President, according to the testimony of General Marshall. It contained two things: first, a statement that the most essential thing then from the United States viewpoint was to gain time and to avoid precipitating military action so long as this could be done consistent with the National Policy because of the fact that the Army and Navy were not ready for war; and second, attention was called to the desirability of counter military action against Japan in event she engaged in specific acts of aggression (described in the memorandum). The memorandum then recommended among other things that

steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the [222] issuance of warnings to the Japanese against taking such aggressive action. (R. 9-10-11.)

The situation was delicate.

Now let us turn back to Mr. Stimson's testimony. The War Council met with Mr. Hull on the 25th of November 1941. The *tentative* U. S. proposals to the Japanese were so drastic and harsh that Mr. Stimson testifies that when he read it his diary shows this was his contemporaneous impression of it:

Hull showed me the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, secured it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic.

Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of his long experience with the Japanese, with whom he dealt extensively when he was Secretary of State to this government, was concerned at the situation, for his diary continues:

We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall.

Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was to be precipitated by the action of the Secretary of State, Hull, necessitated his informing the Chief of Staff immediately of the threatened difficulty.

Next, the Secretary of War attended a meeting at the White House. His diary describes it:

Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem.

Apparently, at that time no decision was reached and the [233] entire matter was left for further consideration.

On the following day, November 26, 1941, the Stimson diary continues:

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the



25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and tell them that he had no other proposal at all.

Apparently on the 26th in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his mind not to go through with the proposals shown the day before to the Secretary of War containing the plan for the "Three Months' Truce".

Evidently the action "to kick the whole thing over" was accomplished by presenting to the Japanese the counter proposal of the "Ten Points" which they took as an ultimatum.

It was the document that touched the button that started the war, as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed it.

Again Mr. Stimson's diary relates:

The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it. (R. 4051-2-3.)

Apparently the Secretary of War was not advised by the Secretary of State that he had handed this so-called ultimatum to the Japanese. The diary of the Secretary of War and his actions indicate that to be a fact.

Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th of November 1941:

The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy."

[224] His diary continues:

I then called up the President and talked with him about it.

He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in his absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of General Marshall, which became radio #472. Also, as he says,

A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of need for further time was discussed. (R. 4054.)

The advice from the Army and Navy to delay matters and get more time for defense preparations and not precipitate the issue evidently did not reach the President or the Secretary of State in time to be considered before the memorandum of the 26th was delivered to the Japanese. It seems well established that the sending of this "Ten Point" memorandum by the Secretary of State was used by the Japanese as the signal for starting the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attacking force departed from Takan Bay on the 27-28 November for its attack on Hawaii. It also appears that the delivery of the 14-point reply of the Japanese to this memorandum was contemporaneous with the attack.

4. *War Department.*—The intentions of the War Department not to precipitate war, as far as the War Department was concerned, are clear and unmistakable. The messages sent to the Hawaiian Department show this to be a fact. The Navy apparently had the same idea because many of their messages likewise so indicate the situation

and the Hawaiian Department was given the benefit of those messages.

[225] To be concrete: the Navy message of October 16 concluded with the sentence,

In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose previous intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan.—

the message of November 24, from the Navy Department to Hawaii said in conclusion:

Inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation nor precipitate Japanese action.—

the message of November 27, #472 from the Chief of Staff to General Short says,

The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act . . . these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.—

the message from G-2 on the same day warns against an incident with the Japanese population by saying,

Axis sabotage and espionage probable.

All this had an effect upon Short because his reply to the message of the 27th was

Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.

In order to prevent an untoward action by Short the message of the 27th as originally drafted started with the opening words, "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated" (R. 4270) were changed by the Secretary of War after consultation with the Secretary of State to the softer caution contained in the Stimson-drafted sentences:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable. Hostile action possible at any moment.

Then followed the caution not to commit the first overt act.

[226] In continuing on beyond November 27th, was the message from G-2 on November 28, #484, sent by General Arnold which was devoted to sabotage and defensive measures. On the same day the War Department sent message #482 to Short with similar tone and tenor. Short replied to #482 on the 28th with a very long message all dealing with sabotage and espionage. This ends the communications with Short by the Army until the final message of December 7, which arrived too late.

Short was never informed of the Secretary of State's action in delivering the "Ten Points" counter proposals. He testified he first saw or heard of that document after the White Papers were published. General Short said,

I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came out.

The message of November 27th did not convey to Short what it was meant to convey by the people who drafted it. While confusing, it contained information and instructions the significance of which should have been appreciated by Short and his staff.



The two Navy messages of October 16 and 24, both of which cautioned against precipitation of an incident, could have added to Short's confusion in interpreting the message.

The impression that the avoidance of war was paramount was heightened by the messages immediately following the one of the 27th. In the first place, Short had no reaction from the War Department to his reply that he was acting only to prevent sabotage and to keep contact with the Navy. He felt confirmed in this action by the message on the 27th, from G-2, saying,

Actions of sabotage and espionage probable.

[227] Immediately following that the next day were two additional messages dealing with sabotage and espionage.

From that time on, November 28, until the message that was received after the attack, Short received no other word by courier, letter, radio, or otherwise. The only claim that he received any additional information was that he was told of messages of December 3, 4, and 6, about the Japanese destroying their codes and the Navy being instructed to destroy some of its codes. Short denies receiving this information.

These acts of omission and commission on the part of the War Department undoubtedly played their part in the failure to put the Hawaiian Department in a proper state of defense.

The record shows that from informers and other sources the War Department had complete and detailed information of Japanese intentions. Information of the evident Japanese intention to go to war in the very near future was well known to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations. It was not a question of fact; it was only a question of time. The next few days would see the end of peace and the beginning of war.

If it be assumed that for any reason the information could not have been given to the Hawaiian Department, then it was a responsibility of the War Department to give orders to Short what to do, and to tell him to go on an all-out alert instead of a sabotage alert.

As elsewhere related in detail, when vital information of December 6th reached G-2 of the War Department, not later than nine o'clock the evening of December 6, it was placed in [228] the locked pouch and delivered to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen Smith, with a warning from Colonel Bratton, Chief of Far Eastern Section of G-2, that it contained a vitally important message. In fact the message implied war and soon. Whatever was the reason of Colonel Bedell Smith for not conveying this message to General Marshall on the night of December 6th, it was an unfortunate one. And further, with the top War Department officials fully aware of the critical nature of this situation, standing operating procedure should have required delivery of this vital information to General Marshall at once. He, himself, was responsible for the organization and operation of his own immediate office.

This information could have been sent to Short on the afternoon (Honolulu time) of December 6. Additionally, this same information was given to General Gerow's Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, and there is no evidence of action taken by that Division.

The responsibility of War Department is clearly defined and plain. Action by it would have been sufficient further to have alerted the Hawaiian Department. It was in possession of the information which was the last clear chance to use the means available to meet an attack. It had the background of the full development of the Japanese preparation for war and its probable date.

Again, the equally important and vital information of December 7th, the day of the attack, was in the possession of the War Department at 0900 on the morning of December 7. Colonel Bratton made an immediate effort to get the Chief of [229] Staff at that hour. It was not until nearly three hours later that any action was taken by the War Department, when time was of the greatest importance.

Under the circumstances of the clear and explicit revelation of Japanese intentions, arrangements should have been made for immediate action to further warn Hawaii and not leave the situation to be acted upon when the Chief of Staff could not immediately be reached. The responsibility is the Chief of Staff's for not providing an arrangement by which another could act in so critical a situation when he could not readily be reached.

Strange as it may appear, the War Department did not know the actual state of readiness of Short's command from November 27th to December 7th, 1941, though this information was contained in Short's report of action taken on November 27th.

5. *Conflict between the Army and Navy Messages.*—The practice of having General Short secure through the Navy in Hawaii copies of the naval messages tended towards confusion. We have taken occasion to compare the messages of the Navy and the messages of the Army delivered to General Short from October 16 to December 7. We find:

a. That they were conflicting.

b. That the Navy messages were predominant with warnings of a conflict and the Army messages predominant with the idea of avoiding a conflict and taking precautions against sabotage and espionage.

Short naturally took his choice between the two types of [230] messages and followed that of the War Department. Examination of the Navy messages of October 16, 24, November 27, December 3, 4, and 6, will show that their tenor was predominantly war. One Army message of November 27 and two of November 28 predominated in antisabotage warnings.

Furthermore, the Navy message of November 27 and the Army message of November 27 from the Chief of Staff were conflicting: the Navy message flatly stated,

This is a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended.

Now, contrast the opening sentences of the Army message which indicates that negotiations may still continue, where it says:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes.\* Only barest possibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue.

The Navy message contained no warning to Hawaii to take precautions against sabotage or overt acts, and no precautions as to the civilian population. To the contrary, the Army message gave explicit



directions on this subject. This was followed on the same day by a G-2 message, which said,

It appears that the conference of the Japanese had ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable.

The Navy war warning was further diluted in its effect upon Short by the Arnold-AG sabotage message on the 28th of November; and the additional G-2 message on sabotage on the 28th. These November 28 sabotage messages undoubtedly influenced Short to continue on his sabotage alert.

Thereafter Short had only silence from Washington. Short was given no further clarification of this conflict amongst the messages.

[231] There is no explanation why Short was not told of the so-called ultimatum. It was known to the Japanese because it was handed to them.

6. *Military Intelligence Division*.—Within the scope of its activities, this division performed well. It gathered much valuable and vital data. Through Colonel Bratton it insisted on the dissemination of this information to Field Commanders.

There was a broad field for investigation, however, which was not touched by it or any intelligence agency of the American Government, either military or civil. In this field were the mandated islands, the home land and the home waters of the Japanese empire, and the areas in which the Japanese Navy and Army were operating.

In these fields, reliance was placed upon sources of information which were inadequate. The Japanese Navy was lost to us for considerable periods in those months prior to the outbreak of war. The task force which made the attack on 7 December 1941, left home ports, assembled at Takan Bay, and notwithstanding that it was a relatively large convoy, sailed for thousands of miles without being discovered. Part of its aircraft was in flight for the targets at Pearl Harbor and on Oahu before we knew of its existence. Its detection was primarily a naval job, but obviously the army was intensely interested. Elsewhere in this report, the mass of detailed information which the Japanese had assembled relating to American activities has been discussed and is not repeated here.

Discussing this subject before the Board, General Miles, G-2 in 1941, testified as follows:

[232] But to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. That was beyond our terms of efficiency. (R. 107.)

The disadvantages accruing from this situation could have been calamitous. The Japanese armed forces knew everything about us. We knew little about them. This was a problem of all our intelligence agencies. This should not come to pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with the part which we are to play in world affairs.

We must know as much about other major world powers as they know about us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent planning by those charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our security. Our intelligence service should be second to none in its efficiency. It must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M. I. D. It is a national problem.

In the past our intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds, lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to correct all of these.

7. *War Plans Division.*—The War Plans Division, the supervising agency for the War Department for Overseas Departments, was charged with directing the preparation of and coordinating the war plans for Hawaii. It had the responsibility and duty to insure the implementing of such plans.

Aside from the letters and telegrams sent throughout 1941 to General Short (and there were no letters from General Marshall to General Short after the first of November 1941,) no action after November 1, 1941, appears to have been taken by way of communications or inspections, or full report of [233] any sort, to reveal whether General Short was doing anything, whether he was doing it correctly, what his problems were, and what help could have been given him.

The War Plans Division took no action when Short put the Alert Number 1 into operation and so reported. It took no steps to stop the use of the Hawaiian Department as a training station and put it on a combat basis, such as an outpost should have been, with threatened war. It took no steps to find out if the Hawaiian defenses were being implemented and built according to schedule and the right priorities. It took no steps to put the control of the building of its defenses on the Department Commander so that he could coordinate the building of defenses with his other defense preparations.

General Gerow's own testimony clearly pictures the lack of organization and management of the War Plans Division of the Overseas Departments, such as the Hawaiian Department. The War Plans Division was responsible for the Overseas Department, said General Gerow. (R. 4334-4335.) The War Plans Division was familiar with the equipment situation in Hawaii, such as lack of parts for radar. (R. 3425.) It was their duty to do all they could to correct the deficiencies but there is no proof that any action was taken. (R. 4325-4326.) The War Plans Division was responsible for drafting the operational messages to the Hawaiian Department. Gerow was responsible for drafting the message of the 27th and managed the drafting and final sending of that message. He admitted that he failed to follow up to see if the message of the 27th was being carried out and that was the War Plans Division's responsibility.

[234] He said:

Admiral STANDLEY. Then who would have been interested in following up that message to see whether those instructions were obeyed or not?

General GEROW. The War Plans Division, sir, should have been——

Admiral STANDLEY. War Plans Division.

General GEROW. Should have been responsible for following it up, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was not done then?

General GEROW. No, sir, it was not.

\* \* \* \* \*  
Admiral STANDLEY. Then those instructions went by the board; nobody followed them up, then?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir; that is, between the 27th and the 7th. (Roberts Report 1857-1858.)

And he again admitted that he made an error in not realizing that the reply of Short, which referred to Message No. 472 by number, referred to that message. He thought it referred to a G-2 message, (Roberts Report 1857-1858.)



He also testified as follows:

General GRUNERT. Without such coordination, there was liable to be confusion and misunderstanding as to the intent of each one of the messages. Was that the War Plans Division? Was it the Chief of Staff?

General GEROW. It was done, usually, General, I believe by a matter of getting concurrences between the various divisions of the General Staff, on something that was going to be sent out. (R. 4336.)

\* \* \* \* \*  
General GEROW. The coordination of concurrences, and then most of these important messages, I believe, went through the Secretary of the General Staff.

General GRUNERT. Then it appears to be the Secretary of the General Staff?

General GEROW. No.

[235] General GRUNERT. It appears you do not know just who does it, do you?

General GEROW. Well, no, sir. (R. 4337.)

He testified that it was not his particular duty in 1941 to coordinate all messages of the War Department that went to our overseas possessions. (R. 4338.)

Therefore the War Plans Division under General Gerow failed as follows:

a. General Gerow failed to take action on Short's reply showing that he was taking precautions against sabotage only. He again failed to take action in that he assumed liaison with the Navy meant Short was taking the correct steps. The documents in the War Plans Division show that the Navy's responsibilities did not start until war was imminent or had taken place and that some formal action by Washington or the Hawaiian Department putting the agreements into effect was necessary.

b. He was responsible for drafting the confusing message of November 27.

c. He took no steps to deliver to Short additional available information. As Gerow testified as to Short's reactions to the message of the 27th:

No one knows what he would have done had he been in that position and not having perhaps all information we had here. (R. 1851.)

d. He did not check on the Hawaiian Department's activities to determine its state of readiness from November 28 through December 7. (R. 4306.)

[236] e. He relied upon the message of November 27 to give Short all the information he needed for full preparation for war, but did not check to find out if that was a fact. (R. 4256.)

f. The joint air estimate of General Martin and Admiral Bellinger under the joint agreement of General Short and Admiral Bloch as approved by Admiral Kimmel, stated that air attack was the prime threat against Hawaii; and when General Gerow was advised in a conference with the Secretary of War and the report to the Secretary of War from the Secretary of State, in addition to the intelligence information with which he was provided as to the status of the international situation, it was incumbent upon him to do two things which he failed to do:

(1) To correct Short's mistake in going to Alert Number 1 instead of to Alerts Number 2 or 3; and

(2) To direct immediately the activation of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Defense Plan to put the Army, in conjunction with

the Navy, on a complete war footing, ready for any eventuality.

8. *Navy Department*.—The Navy Department undertook by a signed agreement to provide long-distance reconnaissance in Hawaii. It assumed this responsibility admittedly without means of carrying it out in Hawaii.

The Navy in Hawaii failed to advise Short of the sinking of enemy submarines in the outer harbor between six and seven [237] a. m. the morning of December 7. The Navy failed to advise Short of the Jaluit task force so that he could evaluate the information for himself.

9. *Chief of Staff*.—The responsibility for the conditions in the military component of the War Department as depicted in this chapter rests with the Chief of Staff.

At about this time, November 25-December 7, 1941, there seemed to have been in the War Department a firm conviction that war was imminent but also there seems to have been the conviction that it would start in the Southwest Pacific and evidently nobody had any belief that Hawaii was immediately in danger. There was the belief both in Hawaii and in Washington that war was on our doorstep but not on Hawaii's doorstep. This resulted in the main consideration being given to General MacArthur and the Philippine Islands and the resulting second consideration during this critical time to Hawaii. The unfortunate thing was that the Japanese "crossed us up" with a daring surprise attack. When the famous November 27 message was being prepared, consideration first was given to send it only to MacArthur and then it was decided to include Panama, Hawaii and the Western Defense Command. This shows the trend.

As a result of the message of November 27 Short ordered only a sabotage alert and so reported to the War Department as of the same day. The import of Short's reply was little noticed in the War Department by either General Marshall or General Gerow. Just as General Short failed to interpret the full seriousness of the November 27 message, likewise the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans Division failed to [238] interpret the limited defense that Short's reply indicated in the face of known impending war.

There was failure of understanding at both ends of the line. The Washington officials had full knowledge of impending events, which full knowledge was not available to Short.

A cardinal principle in good management is the necessity to "follow up" on directions. The War Department had nine days in which to check up on the state of defense in Hawaii, which it did not do.

Repeatedly, since General Short took command in Hawaii in February 1941, General Marshall during this peacetime had written to him at length, advising him on details of operating and here, late in November, with war expected almost daily, he communicated none of those personal messages containing needed inside information.

The evidence indicates that the manner in which authority to act was delegated or not delegated had its influence on this situation. The Chief of Staff had three deputies, Generals Bryden, Arnold, and Moore. None of these three was given the secret information concerning the known Jap intentions. When General Marshall went away on November 27 he had, prior to departure, prepared a first draft of the November 27 message. It was the Secretary of War who initially fol-



lowed through on it on November 27. Then it was given to Gerow to complete. Complete authority to act in General Marshall's absence does not seem to have been given to any one subordinate. Had there been an officer either with authority or with courage to act on the information that was in the War Department on the evening of December 6, and had he sent a message to Short, [239] Hawaii should have been fully alerted.

As has been repeated so many times, there was positive evidence in the War Department that it was only a matter of days before war would ensue and the War Department had notice that Hawaii was on only a sabotage alert, inadequate for full warfare. Had a full war message, unadulterated, been dispatched or had direct orders for a full, all-out alert been sent, Hawaii could have been ready to have met the attack with what it had. What resulted was failure at both ends of the line. Responsibility laid both in Washington and in Hawaii. Hawaiian responsibility has been treated in Chapter III.

To summarize: insofar as the Chief of Staff is related to these events there are specific things which appear in the record with which he was personally concerned. The following are of this nature:

- a. Failure to advise his Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Bryden, Arnold, and Moore, of the critical situation in the Pacific so that they might act intelligently for him in his absence.
- b. Failure to keep General Short fully informed as to the international situation and the probable outbreak of war at any time.
- c. The delay in getting to General Short the important information reaching Washington on the evening of December 6 and the morning of December 7.
- d. Noting without taking action the sabotage message of Short which presumptively was on his desk on the morning of November 28, 1941.
- e. His admitted lack of knowledge of the condition of readiness of the Hawaiian Command during the period [240] of November 8 to December 7, 1941.

The Board is impressed with the absolute necessity of considering the conduct of all responsible officers in the light of the situation as it existed in November and early December, 1941.

It was a case of intelligent men arriving at the best decision possible with all the facts that were before them. This is the basis for successful procedure in either military or civil affairs. In both of these fields occasional mistakes are made notwithstanding that such principles are followed. Such was the case at Pearl Harbor.

This recital is in explanation, not justification. The thinking in the War Department and the Hawaiian Department was faulty in that it emphasized probabilities to the exclusion of capabilities.

10. *Summary.*—In summarizing the "Responsibilities in Washington" it appears that the issue between the United States and Japan was precipitated before the Army and Navy could prepare themselves to follow through on the consequences thereof and that coordination and cooperation between the State, War and Navy Departments lacked effectiveness, at least in this respect.

As to the War Department's responsibilities there was—

- a. A lack of organization for war.

b. A lack of adequate procedure under which to advise the Hawaiian Department and to control its actions.

c. A lack of instructions to the Hawaiian Department based upon full knowledge of its actions [241] and full knowledge of the international situation.

d. Failures on November 26-27, November 28, during the period from November 28 to December 7, and on December 6 and 7, to take adequate and prompt action on vital information then at hand.

These responsibilities in no way mitigate those of General Short as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. However, they do add others to the list of those responsible.

## [242] CHAPTER V. WYMAN AND CONSTRUCTION DELAYS IN HAWAII

### A. PRE-PEARL HARBOR ASSOCIATIONS OF WYMAN AND ROHL: SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION

#### 1. Relationship of Wyman and Rohl in Los Angeles

#### 2. Hawaiian Actions of Wyman and Rohl

Wyman's actions in Hawaii with other contractors; the initiation of the secret defense construction in Hawaii in November, 1940; Wyman's selection of contractors for the task; the difficulty of Rohl's alien status; Wyman's efforts to get the naturalization of Rohl; the yacht VEGA.

#### 3. Rohl's Associations

Rohl's origin and German affiliations; Rohl's association with Werner Plack; Rohl's perjury; Wyman's association with Rohl and Rohl's citizenship considered.

#### 4. Subsequent Relations—Wyman and Rohl

The Rohl-Wyman association and the reason for selection of the Hawaiian Constructors.

#### 5. Delays in Construction

Wyman's inefficient administration and management; typical delays listed.

#### 6. Directive of November 24, 1941

Relationship between contractors and the Corps of Engineers disregarded by Wyman; Rohl's continued relationship with Wyman; Rohl's conduct in the Islands and removal.

#### 7. Responsibility of the Corps of Engineers

Lack of supervision by the District Engineer and the Chief of Engineers; inspections made by the Inspector General on the complaint of civilians in Congress; inspections made by direction of Secretary of War.

### B. OVERT ACTS

#### 1. False Official Statement by Wyman as to His Knowledge of Rohl's Alien Status

#### 2. Refusal to Accept Low Bidder on Hawaiian Contracts—Wyman Preferred His Friends

#### 3. Irregular Purchase of Machinery by Wyman From the Hawaiian Constructors and His Associates

### C. SUMMARY

## [243] A. PRE-PEARL HARBOR ASSOCIATIONS OF WYMAN AND ROHL: SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION

1. Relationship of Wyman and Rohl in Los Angeles.—The investigation represented by the following summary and by the more detailed report attached hereto on Colonel Wyman (Appendix —) is the result of the direction of the Acting Secretary of War, the Hon-



orable Robert P. Patterson, to investigate the conduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. as District Engineer in the Hawaiian Department as his activities had affected Pearl Harbor. We have found it necessary to consider Colonel Wyman's activities and those of his contractor associates prior to his advent in the Hawaiian Islands, because some of them were initiated prior to the departure of Colonel Wyman for the Islands; We found it was necessary to consider the acts for a time after December 7, 1941, as many of them were the fruits of the things done and mistakes made that were initiated before December 7 and the full effect and importance of which would not be appreciated unless the subsequent events after December 7, 1941, were recorded.

In making this summary report we have divided it into two parts: the first part is a running story of Colonel Wyman's activities on the mainland with Hans Wilhelm Rohl and the associated contractors involved in this matter, and the results upon the Pearl Harbor operations by reason of such associations; the second part is an explanation of typical acts of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. which represent many other matters of similar nature which can be found in his conduct. In no sense has this board attempted to draw any complete specifications or charges, but we have confined ourselves to findings of fact.

[244] The record shows that Wyman, as a Captain going to duty as a District Engineer at Los Angeles, was an able and steady officer, devoted to his professional duties and to the government's interest, with a forceful disposition.

While at Los Angeles he fell into the company of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, German alien, who was in a contracting firm that became the successful bidder on a contract to build a breakwater at Los Angeles. This contract was under the administration and jurisdiction of Wyman (R. 3359, 3378).

Rohl's methods of doing business and his personal life were at that time apparently the antithesis of Wyman's. Rohl was a man-about-town in Los Angeles and had become increasingly prominent in the night life and social activities of Los Angeles and Hollywood. His personal habits in connection with extreme drinking and with "party girls" of the community, his extravagant methods of living and his disregard of the domestic and social proprieties of a responsible person increased as the years went by, but they were already well developed at the time of his initial associations with Wyman, who was introduced by him into new and more extravagant methods of living. Rohl evidently introduced Wyman, or at least influenced him to join in extravagant and disgraceful parties as Rohl's house guest in Los Angeles hotels, and in heavy drinking over considerable periods. Trips on Rohl's yacht were expensive and lavish.<sup>43</sup> [245] This association involved pleasure trips on Rohl's yacht, membership in a large number of clubs and a scale of riotous living, drunkenness and both private and public misconduct by Wyman and Rohl together.

<sup>43</sup> Colonel Hunt in his Inspector General's Report found: "These yacht trips, as described by Colonel Wyman, were for the greater part essentially business trips, primarily to inspect the quarries above referred to. Actually, there existed no necessity for conducting the business of inspecting quarrying activities on Catalina Island in this manner, since there were available to the District Engineer adequate Government-owned vessels. These trips must therefore be classed as pleasure trips at Mr. Rohl's expense, official business being an incidental consideration. . . . It is therefore apparent that Colonel Wyman was on close and intimate social relations with Mr. Rohl during the period when, as the

Thus was born an intimate association, characterized by improper conduct, and it continued over a considerable period into and through the Pearl Harbor events. Rohl, at that earlier time, had distinguished himself by his lack of domestic propriety; he was the father of four illegitimate children by what he called a common-law wife, later discarded. (R. 2223, 2441, 4113.) In 1938, Wyman also divorced his wife of 30 years standing and shortly thereafter acquired another wife. This Rohl association continued actively up until Wyman was ordered to Honolulu as the Hawaiian District Engineer.<sup>44</sup> It also [246] continued in Hawaii.<sup>45</sup>

2. *Hawaiian Actions of Wyman and Rohl.*—Wyman reported to Hawaii in July 1940 (R. 3371). In the Islands there were not only a large number of able and competent resident contractors but also one of the leading contracting firms in the United States, which had opened up an office in Honolulu and which had been building millions of dollars worth of construction for the Army and Navy. This was an organization of great wealth, high integrity and unquestioned ability and a successful government contractor for a long period of years. They were just concluding some of their contracts when Wyman arrived (R. 2399-2400).

When the contract began to develop for the defenses of Hawaii in November 1940, apparently the general outline of the project was well known and fully considered by Wyman and the [247] Hawaiian Department. They knew generally what they wanted to do, although the details of the plans probably had not been fully worked out by the time of the actual execution of the contract hereinafter mentioned as having been entered into by the Corps of Engineers with the Hawaiian Constructors. Generally, it was desired to have built as a part of the Hawaiian defenses the following: a war reserve storage system for gasoline, aircraft warning service, and improved

Government's representative, he administered extensive work for which Mr. Rohl was the contractor.

"The yacht trips and house parties given by Mr. Rohl and attended by Colonel Wyman were expensive and lavish. Intoxicating liquors were habitually served, with no limitation except the guest's capacity to imbibe. Colonel Wyman, claiming an ability to hold his liquor, imbibed freely. It is not in evidence, however, that his acceptance of Mr. Rohl's entertainment was in any sense necessary to that desirable degree of acquaintance between the Corps of Engineers and the construction industry which may be considered necessary to their mutual interests. These contacts were essentially, if not entirely, social and personal affairs, which by their frequency and character tended strongly to bring discredit upon the Corps of Engineers and to give rise to just such allegations as the ones now in question."

<sup>44</sup> Colonel Hunt in his Inspector General's report found: "A very careful study of all facts and circumstances brought to light in the course of this investigation leads to the following conclusions:

"During the years 1936-1939, Colonel Wyman, as District Engineer, Los Angeles, maintained a close personal friendship, as distinguished from a business friendship, with Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which was inappropriate on the part of a United States Army officer administering costly works on which the said Mr. Rohl was engaged as contractor. This relationship extended so far beyond the need for ordinary cordial business relation as to give rise to such presumptions of impropriety as formed, in part, the basis of this investigation. In maintaining that relationship, Colonel Wyman was not sufficiently mindful of that unquestionable reputation for integrity and impartiality which it was the duty of a man in his position to cultivate at all times.

"The flattery of Colonel Wyman personally and professionally, which was bestowed upon him by his wealthy associate, Mr. Rohl, evoked in Colonel Wyman so complete a confidence in the former as to lead him to an unwise acceptance of Mr. Rohl's judgment and advice during their subsequent association in Hawaii. He thereby relinquished to some extent that independence of judgment required of an officer in charge of the Government's interest, as indicated in his too ready acceptance of Mr. Rohl's recommendations relating to equipment purchases and appraisals." (R. 749-750.)

<sup>45</sup> Colonel Hunt also reported: "d. Various witnesses testified to having seen Colonel Wyman with Mr. Rohl at various semi-public functions, when both men indulged freely in intoxicating beverages. So far as could be ascertained most of those instances were prior to the attack of 7 December. No witness was found who could testify to drunkenness on Colonel Wyman's part." (R. 2114.)



or new airfields . . . There were in all about 148 major projects.<sup>46</sup> (R. 3432, 3570-3572.)

When it came time to place the contract and negotiate, the Corps of Engineers decided upon a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. Wyman stated that only certain Los Angeles contractors were interested in this work. This is contrary to the evidence. The McKee Company, then doing millions of dollars of work in [248] the Islands, and a number of Island contractors with full equipment and a fine record of performance were anxious and willing to bid on the job. (R. 2416-2418.) Wyman's reason for selecting his friends is without foundation and the net result condemns his choice.

Wyman now proceeded to secure contractors for this task in this manner. By virtue of using a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee type of contract he was able to award the work to contractors comprising his old friends and immediately excluded all others from consideration, both in the Hawaiian Islands and the United States.<sup>47</sup> (R. 3632, 3722.) He turned to his old Los Angeles alien friend Rohl, who was president of the firm of Rohl-Connolly (and half owner), and their associate companies, the Callahan Company and the Gunther & Shirley Company (R. 2240, 2295, 2319). These companies much later, when they found them [249] selves in difficulty in performing the work, took into partnership certain of the local Hawaiian contractors in a subordinate position. (R. 3727, 3750-51.) These several contractors formed what was known as the Hawaiian Constructors. The chairman of the executive committee and the principal executive steering the organization of Hawaiian Constructors at the outset and the signer of the contract was Mr. Paul Grafe (R. 2299-2301, 2345). Grafe was Vice-president of the Callahan Company.

<sup>46</sup> Colonel Hunt in his Inspector General's Report found: "As to whether this relationship influenced Colonel Wyman to find a place for the Rohl-Connolly Company in the Hawaiian Constructors, contractor for work ultimately totaling about \$100,000,000 in Hawaii and the South Pacific, there is no conclusive evidence. Colonel Wyman became District Engineer in Hawaii in June 1940. In November of that year, funds became available for road, railroad, fortifications, and allied work to the estimated cost of about \$1,097,673. Details of this work were not available. Colonel Wyman testified that he proposed to perform the work by hired labor, since a proper basis for contracting the work was lacking. Due to a marked propensity on the part of Colonel Wyman to conduct business orally to the exclusion of written records where possible, other references to which will be made in this report, no positive proof of this claim was developed. It was determined by inquiry among contractors in Honolulu that at about the time mentioned by Colonel Wyman, they had been requested to indicate what equipment they had available for rental. Neither Mr. Phillip C. Chew, Chief Clerk of Colonel Wyman's office nor other members thereof could confirm the statement that Colonel Wyman proposed doing the work by hired labor, nor could anything be found in the files which would confirm it. However, there is no reason to doubt that such was Colonel Wyman's original intention. The idea of performing work by contract appears to have reached Colonel Wyman through the office of the South Pacific Engineer Division and the then Division Engineer at San Francisco, California, Brigadier General (then Colonel) Warren T. Hannum, CE. On 6 November 1940, General Hannum in a letter to the District Engineer, Honolulu, suggested a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract due to the probable difficulties of conducting the work on a fixed price basis while large Navy works in Hawaii were being performed on the fee basis. (Exhibit C.) There followed some telephone conversations between Colonel Wyman and General Hannum, records of which were not kept, and about the middle of December 1940, negotiations were started in the San Francisco office, which ultimately resulted in the signing of Contract "-414-Eng-602. That contract originally contemplated a job totaling \$1,097,673 and a fixed fee of \$52,220, value of work to be performed thereunder approached \$100,000,000 and the fee approximated \$1,000,000."

<sup>47</sup> Rohl-Connolly Company, the W. E. Callahan Company and the Gunther & Shirley Company who became co-adventurers as the Hawaiian Constructors. Colonel Hunt's report reads: "Colonel Wyman testified that he had tried to interest local contractors in taking on the work originally proposed, and that they showed no interest. That statement was not confirmed by inquiry among those contractors, seven of whom were questioned in the matter, all of them denying having been given a chance to take on any part of the work. These contractors were then seeking new work, and the bringing in of an outside contractor without giving them a chance to participate, created a considerable natural resentment on their part."

There was a federal statute that prevented an alien from having any interest in or the management of a secret national defense contract.<sup>48</sup>

This brought about the disclosure to Wyman that Rohl was a German alien, that he was born in Lubeck, Germany, in 1886, that he had entered the United States as an alien, that he had never acquired citizenship, although he had applied for it, but had not consummated the transaction. This story is elsewhere [250] related.<sup>49</sup>

When the contract was about to be placed in Washington, Wyman went to Washington and lived in the same hotel and same hotel room with one of the prospective contractors, Mr. Connolly of the Rohl-Connolly Company and he was later joined by Mr. Grafe of the Callahan Company (R. 2197, 2294-95, 3398-99, 3542). There was no dealing at this time at arms' length by Wyman, the government agent, and his friends. These contractors who appeared to be already predetermined were to get this cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. At that time the contract was estimated to be worth a million dollars but which later was extended to an approximate gross business of a hundred and thirty million dollars.

The alien status of Rohl put the parties in a difficult situation.<sup>50</sup> Rohl was then eliminated as president of the Rohl-Connolly Company by a paper change without change of substance or interest (R. 2160-61). Later action was taken by the Acting Chief of Engineers to write a letter to the Department of Justice, Immigration Bureau, on Wyman's urging General Kingman, requesting that Rohl's application for citizenship be expedited. Then followed efforts with government agencies, stimulated by Wyman, concluded by a hearing before Federal Judge O'Connor in Los Angeles, resulting in Rohl's acquiring citizenship. The complete story of Rohl's alien status and the efforts to get [251] him naturalized appears elsewhere.

<sup>48</sup> The statute reads:

"NATIONAL DEFENSE  
"CHAPTER 440-3D SESSION  
"(PUBLIC—No. 671—76TH CONGRESS)  
"(H. R. 9822)

"AN ACT to expedite national defense, and for other purposes  
"SEC. 11. (a) No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government department concerned has first been obtained, and any person who willfully violates or through negligence permits the violation of the provision of this subsection shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"(b) Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts by willful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such willful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"(c) For the purpose of this section, the term 'person' shall be construed to include an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other business enterprise.

"Approved, June 28, 1940." (R. 4109-4110.)

<sup>49</sup> See p. 262 of this report.

<sup>50</sup> Colonel Hunt reported: "His own testimony and that of other witnesses in this respect indicates that Colonel Wyman maintained a totally unnecessary, and in the circumstances, an undesirable social familiarity with the active head or an organization whose prime business it was to profit from work under his supervision. If there is reasonable doubt that this relationship was with a man whose non-citizenship at the commencement of the contract was known to him, there is no doubt whatever that it was with a man who at the time of this relationship in Hawaii, had been proven to Colonel Wyman to have concealed the fact of his alien status. The least that can be said of that relationship is that it displayed a callousness on Colonel Wyman's part, not only toward the character of his associate, but toward the possible consequence of its public display."



On 22 January 1941 Wyman wrote a vigorous letter to assist this citizenship matter, indicating that Rohl was absolutely essential to the successful operation of the contract by Hawaiian Constructors. (R. 3529-3531, 4187-4188.) With Wyman's help Rohl was naturalized and proceeded to Hawaii, so that he could participate actively in the contract.

Wyman, during his tour in the Hawaiian Islands is shown by this record to have been continuing his acquired habit of drinking.<sup>51</sup> Wyman and Rohl lived in adjoining rooms in the Pleasanton Hotel, which had been taken over by the contractors at government expense (R. 1297-8, 3644-46). They negotiated a charter of Rohl's yacht, the VEGA, which was in the name of Mrs. Rohl. (R. 2203.) It came to the Islands with a cargo of liquor in a government convoy, which was delivered to Rohl. (R. 2266-67, 3403.) The vessel was never used for its intended purpose as a survey ship (R. 1311).

The record shows that there were many delays, confusions, inefficiency in administration, and lack of correct administrative relationship between the contractors and the government agent. The District Engineer failed to secure results in the prompt construction of the defense projects under this contract.<sup>52</sup> Grave administrative inefficiencies had arisen in the District Engineer's office (R. 2118, 3570-3571).

The drinking<sup>53</sup> by Rohl during duty hours in the day as [252] well as night after December 7 was so frequent, excessive, and such a detriment to the business of both the government and the contractors that, upon the request of Wyman's successor, General Lyman, Rohl was requested to leave the Islands and cease further connection with the Hawaiian Constructors (R. 2534-35, 2544). This request was concurred in by Rohl's two associates on the executive committee of which Rohl was chairman (R. 2546).

3. *Rohl's Associations.*—There is testimony in the record of substantial character that the impression that Rohl made a large sum of money on his first large contract, the Los Angeles breakwater, was not well founded, yet his expenditures have been habitually for many years those of a wealthy man (R. 2445, 2449). Rohl made at least one visit to Germany (R. 3996).

There is some evidence in the record to show the following about one, Werner Plack and his associations with Rohl. Plack was an employee of the German Consulate in Los Angeles, working under

<sup>51</sup> R. 748, 777, 1173-1174, 1283-1285, 2114, 2408-1409.

<sup>52</sup> R. 512, 513, 1261-62, 1331, 1334, 1342, 2063, 2366, 2503-05, 2530, 3018, 3431-32, 3439-43, 3699, 3703, 3770-71, 3837-39, 3886, 3901, 3905.

<sup>53</sup> Major Meurlott, in the G-2 Department of the Hawaiian Department and G-2 at the time he testified said:

"Major CLAUSEN. Major Meurlott, I show you a memorandum entitled 'Memorandum for the files' dated July 22, 1942, to the effect that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was such a drunkard that he was even incompetent to be a subversive influence. Did you make this?"

"Major MEURLOTT. Yes, I wrote that." (R. 3925.)

(Copy of memorandum)

"7/22/42.

"Memo for files.

"Decision made to bring this case to a close without the formality of a C1-R1 report. Subject is claimed by Colonel Mollison to be a confirmed drunkard, and, inferentially, to be incompetent as a subversive influence for that reason. Irresponsibility rather than subversion appears to characterize the irregularities in his activities, as brought to the attention of this office.

"Case closed.

"/s/ T. M. MEURLOTT.  
"Capt. M. I."

Doctor Gyssling, the German Consul. (R. 2387, 2429, 2442.) Rohl and Plack appeared publicly together in prominent night spots in Los Angeles and were apparently on intimate and friendly terms, as identified by a number of witnesses, (R. 1167-1168, 2387-2388, 2390). In 1940 Plack left the United [253] States under suspicion of being a German agent. The FBI made an exhaustive examination of his baggage before permitting him to depart with Fritz Weidemann, the Consul General at San Francisco, who left for Germany via Japan, taking Plack with him (R. 2519-2520). Weidemann stayed in the Far East as Chief of the Far Eastern Espionage and Sabotage Unit for Germany, while Werner Plack went on to Berlin and was placed by the German government in a position of high responsibility in the German Foreign Office (R. 2389). Flannery, Columbia Radio news commentator, who was then the Columbia correspondent in Berlin, and author of the book "Assignment to Berlin", testified in this record that he was personally well acquainted with Plack in Germany, having dealt with him repeatedly in the German Foreign Office from the period of early January 1941 to 29 September 1941 because Plack censored Flannery's writings. While dealing with Werner Plack he found that he was high in the Nazi councils in connection with radio and other propaganda to the United States, in which he was regarded by the German government as a specialist. Flannery said he did brilliant work, in that he put on the broadcasts of Wodehouse, who was popular in the United States as a writer, the Broadcast of Count von Luckner, who was likewise popular, and had arranged for other similar personalities to improve the quality of German broadcasts so that Nazi propaganda would be listened to (R. 2521). Evidently the entertainment that Werner Plack offered to friends in the Los Angeles area while posing as a wine salesman, during which period he associated with Rohl, was for propaganda purposes for the Nazis. (R. 2522.)

Rohl flatly denied under oath before this board that he [254] even knew Werner Plack (R. 2252-2253). The following witnesses in this record testified as to his open association with Werner Plack in Los Angeles over a considerable period: Willard Bruce Pine (R. 2387-88, 2390), R. E. Combs (R. 2429, 2442), and Fulton Lewis, Jr. (R. 1167-1168).

The conditions surrounding Rohl, his long record of contact with pro-Nazi and German organization and associations, his repeated violations of the Federal laws as to his entry into this country, his long neglect to become a citizen, his open association with the German agent Plack, were widely known (R. 2430-2434). It was Wyman who was responsible for bringing this man and his organization into Hawaii for work on defense contracts (R. 2430-2434).

Rohl's testimony before this board contained conflicting statements either with thoroughly proven facts and documents or with his own previous testimony. (The records were open for investigation and have been for years (R. 2430). Rohl swore falsely on his income tax statements that he was a United States citizen (R. 2380, 2441). He made a false statement when he was placed on his own ship's manifest at Honolulu as an American citizen born in Iola, Kansas (R. 2380-2441).



Wyman as a commissioned officer of the United States Army openly and indiscreetly associated with Rohl and this association continued over a period of several years.

4. *Subsequent relations—Wyman and Rohl.*—Wyman had gone to the Pacific islands to become District Engineer at Hawaii in July 1940 (R. 3371). A great defense contract program in Hawaii was being initiated. Wyman had only one consideration in placing these contracts: to get his friend Rohl as the con- [255] tractor. To do that he exerted great efforts not only to have the contract placed with the group of affiliated companies of which Rohl's company was one but he also exerted himself to the utmost to permit Rohl in person to participate in the contract openly by getting him his citizenship. His written communications, his telephone calls and the pressure he brought to bear in Washington testify to his urgent desire for the accomplishment of this object. His first excuse was that these were the *only* competent contractors, and secondly that only Rohl was the essential man who could get results, because the representatives of the contractors on the ground, both the Hawaiian contractors and the mainland contractors, were not expediting the work (R. 768, 3481, 3527).

The record shows that Rohl did go to Hawaii, and that his contribution consisted primarily in adding to the disorganization, confusion and delays which were already inherent in utilizing the loose association of miscellaneous contractors from the mainland and the Hawaiian Islands under the co-adventurer's agreement which terminated in the formation of the Hawaiian Contractors (R. 2179-81). This loose confederation of contractors, dominated by Rohl, who became the chairman of the executive committee of the group, was poorly organized and was the attempt to conduct an enormous operation through committee management, which was fallacious in principle and unsatisfactory in action (R. 1182-84, 2527-28, 2544, 3771-72).

Here Rohl resumed his drunken conduct. The record is replete with testimony of his drinking.<sup>54</sup> General Emmons' demand [256] for the relief of Colonel Wyman, and General Lyman's demand for Wyman's relief got results from the Chief of Engineers (R. 1302, 1307-08). It also resulted in the sending of Rohl back to the mainland at the request of Colonel Lyman (R. 2555).

5. *Delays in Construction.*—It is difficult at this late date, within the limited time that this board has had, to make a thorough examination into all of the ramifications of delays in construction due to Wyman's administration as District Engineer. Suffice it to say, the testimony shows<sup>55</sup> that the organization of Colonel Wyman was bad in its administration, that it was mismanaged, that the engineering work was slow, defective and erratic, and the instructions to the contractors were repeatedly changed, resulting in delays at a time when it required the best type of supervisory organization to meet the difficulties of priorities, the machinery and the personnel. Wyman's conduct in discarding responsible contractors, such as the McKee Company, and others, of whom there were several available in the Hawaiian Islands,

<sup>54</sup> R. 767, 1433-34, 2114, 2526, 2544, 2555, 2574, 2575, 3288, 3296, 3299, 3648, 3925.

<sup>55</sup> R. 2092-2129 and reports of Colonel Luther B. Row, Inspector General, Hawaiian Department: R. 2094-99 and reports of Colonel Hunt, Inspector General's Office, Washington, D. C., who made a special investigation: R. 747-752. Also R. 2458, 2465, 2478, 2486-87, 2494, 2502, 2530, 3602, 3625-3626, 3635, 3670, 3671.

and on the mainland, and insisting on limiting the contracts to his friends and intimate associates, can bear but one meaning, namely, that he was not conducting himself as an impartial agent of the United States Government or as a responsible representative and officer of the Corps of Engineers.<sup>56</sup>

Typical delays resulting from this association, aside from the greatly increased expense to the government, were as follows:

[257] (a) Only about 25 out of every 90 employees brought to Hawaii by the Hawaiian Constructors, were good or experienced workers (R. 3670-3671); (b) "a great deal of waste and unnecessary expenditure of time and funds" (R. 2123); (c) frequent changes in supervisory personnel (R. 3590); (d) very slow in getting organized, finally taking four to six weeks to get started after the Under Secretary of War approved the contract negotiated 20 December 1940 (R. 3602); (e) inefficiency, poor organization, and lax planning (R. 3625-3626); (f) the fact that Rohl, their key man, was frequently drunk during working hours and "not particularly inclined to push the work" (R. 3635); (g) a strike by workers against supervision by Japanese employees (R. 2490); (h) bickering and appealing of disputes with the contracting officer, the aloofness of Colonel Wyman from the personnel (R. 2498-2502); (i) failure to use material as soon as it arrived (R. 2511); (j) lack of promptness in handling the payroll (R. 2465); and, (k) poor morale of employees (R. 2530).

6. *Directive of November 24, 1941.*—General Robbins sent a directive on the above date to the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman, laying down one of the most fundamental of all directives for an Engineer office, that is, the relationship between the Corps of Engineers and the contractors. This document was clear and precise that the contractor's responsibility must not be undertaken by the Corps of Engineers.

This directive was honored only in the breach by Colonel Wyman. His organization increasingly assumed, through its inspectors and others, duties of management which were those of the contractor. It even undertook to pay the employees and to [258] feed many of them, which were duties of the contractor (R. 2465-2466, 2551).

In other words, Wyman intervened to the extent of relieving contractors of some of their duties thereby adding to the confusion of his office and to an already difficult situation, which resulted in further delays, changes and gross waste. These things occurred both before and after Pearl Harbor.

The testimony shows that in taking over the paying of employees from the contractor after Pearl Harbor, in continuing this same policy, that weeks would go by without paying the employees, resulting in a poor state of mind and low morale. This condition was aggravated by the fact that the food was bad or insufficient, except where the Army had charge of the messes (R. 2095, 2465-2466, 2529-2530, 2536-2538, 2554).

All of these things lead us to the belief that instead of having a professional Army organization on behalf of the Corps of Engineers that would exert its professional skill in engineering and administration to see that the contractors did their duty promptly, the entire organization of Wyman was disorganized, the relationships with the

<sup>56</sup> R. 762-63, 764, 2403, 2416-2420, 3627-3629, 3722, 3725, 3751, 3754.



contractors were confused and improper, and that a large number of delays occurred (R. 1268, 3425).

This cost-plus-a-fixed-fee arrangement resulted in a profit to the Hawaiian constructors of about \$1,060,000 (R. 3732-33).

Rohl's presence in the Islands, according to the testimony of all the impartial witnesses, was a detriment in several ways: In the first place, he rendered little assistance in getting the job done on behalf of the contractors, and his own associates on the executive committee of the contractors [259] welcomed his being sent back to the mainland by General Lyman (R. 2525-28, 2533, 2564). His periodic drunken condition interfered with his making decisions or fully attending to business. (R. 2544, 2555). Wyman's contention that Rohl could aid the contract finds no substance in fact in this record, but there are many witnesses to the contrary.<sup>57</sup> Rohl's presence on the Island brought Wyman back into his old association. The record also shows that large extra profits were made by the contractors in unloading worthless machinery upon the government.<sup>58</sup> In these transactions we find little evidence of concern by Colonel Wyman for the interests of the United States (R. 778, 1343, 2477, 2576).

7. *The Responsibility of the Corps of Engineers.*—This board feels impelled to direct attention to the lack of supervision and the correction of these conditions which were impeding some of the most important projects for the defense of the United States. There is no showing that General Hannum, the Division Engineer, conducted any investigation or had any organization to do so, to see that Colonel Wyman, while under his jurisdiction, was doing his work and conducting himself honorably and correctly as an Army officer and as a citizen charged with government responsibilities.

We find substantially no supervision, a weak control and a lack of inspection, which would have revealed at an early date the conditions and should have resulted in their remedy. [260] Colonel Wyman was given an unrestricted and free hand without adequate control, inspection or check. These conclusions are supported in the findings of Colonel Hunt in his elaborate report on behalf of the Inspector General's Department. This came about due to the complaints from Civilians directed to Congress and the action of Congressmen in calling this to the attention of the War Department. The Secretary of War in a letter in February or March of 1941 to the Hawaiian Department directed inspections of construction activities. Under the direction of Colonel Row there was a continuous series of investigations made throughout 1941 as to Colonel Wyman's conduct and the actions of the contractors (R. 2100-2101).

It is pertinent to observe that there were several investigations of the activities of Colonel Wyman, including one by Colonel Hunt and two by Colonel Row. Each of these severely criticized him. Letters were written by Colonel Lyman to the Chief of Engineers asking for Wyman's relief from duty and a letter was received by G-2 from the American legation in Canada as a result of a complaint by the Canadians as to Wyman's conduct. Yet in no one instance do we find evidence of disciplinary action in his case on the part of the Chief of Engineers or the War Department.

<sup>57</sup> R. 767, 2476, 2526-2527, 2544, 2574-2575, 3635.

<sup>58</sup> R. 751, 757-759, 2140-2143, 2147, 2153, 2154.

We find as a fact that there were delays in the Hawaiian Department construction as follows:

(a) Delays due to red tape in approval of plans and specifications and choice of location for underground gasoline storage and radar stations (R. 3429-32, 3439-43, 3449-3454, 3459-60);

(b) Delays due to lack of adequate priorities (R. 3426-8, 3439-43, 3459-3460, 3566-67);

(c) Delays due to lack of experienced clerical personnel [261] (R. 3415-17);

(d) Delays due to shortage of materials and transportation facilities (R. 3417);

(e) Delays due to necessary importing of labor from the United States (R. 3500);

(f) Delays due to changes in plans (R. 3515-17);

(g) Delays due to the inaccessibility of General Short, when Colonel Wyman found it necessary to consult him, and had to consult the Chief of Staff and Colonel Lyman (with whom he "clashed") (R. 3515-3516);

(h) Other unavoidable delays, which always occur on any job of such magnitude (R. 3425);

(i) Delays due to poor organization and administration of the office of the District Engineer; and

(j) Delays due to poor supervision by the contractors, headed by Rohl.

General Short states as follows:

(a) The plan for radar stations at high altitudes necessarily resulted in delays, as cable had to be procured to draw material up Mt. Kaala (R. 297-298);

(b) "The priority proposition was very complicated"; priorities could not be readily obtained in Hawaii (R. 328); and

(c) Local suppliers ran out of materials and could not replace their stock (R. 328).

The contractors state as follows:

*Rohl* testified that the delays were due to lack of material and men, beyond the control of the Hawaiian Constructors (R. 2280).

*Robert McKee* testified many delays occurred, due to [262] inefficiency of Hawaiian Constructors (R. 2407-2409).

*Woolley* stated that if contractors had been allowed to operate normally, without interference and directives from Washington, then operation would have been accelerated (R. 3770).

*Beuson* testified that Short switched men and materials on jobs, causing delay (R. 3738).

Therefore all of the witnesses called who had any material knowledge or responsibility in the Hawaiian Department, no matter what their interest, concur that in some cases conditions could have been improved or eliminated by proper inspection and prompt and aggressive action. This action was not taken.

This board has found numerous items of proof and evidence of Colonel Wyman's misconduct. The complete story so far as the record has now been developed will be found in the appendix attached to this report.

However, as illustrative of the situation as revealed by countless witnesses and records before this board, before the House Military



Affairs Committee, and the Tenney Committee, as to the conduct of Colonel Wyman, we select the following overt acts for brief attention:

- I. False official statement by Wyman as to his knowledge of Rohl's alien status.
- II. Refusal to accept low bidder on Hawaiian Contracts. Wyman preferred his friends.
- III. Irregular purchases of machinery by Wyman from the Hawaiian Contractors and associates.

*I. False Official Statement by Wyman as to his Knowledge of Rohl's Alien Status*

Wyman stated in his testimony that in June 1941 he first learned that Rohl was an alien and that he received this information from Grafe (R. 3503-04). This testimony is similar to that which was given to the Inspector General, Colonel John A. Hunt, IG, by Wyman (R. 3503-3505). Wyman testified:

282. General FRANK. When did you first learn that Rohl was an alien?

Colonel WYMAN. I first learned that Rohl was an alien from Mr. Grafe in June, 1941, when Mr. Grafe informed me that Rohl was an alien, and I immediately sat down without delay and wrote a letter to the Chief of Engineers, announcing that I had been informed by Mr. Grafe of the Hawaiian Constructors that Mr. Rohl was an alien, also that Mr. Rohl had applied for citizenship. I do not recollect what else in the letter, I have forgotten, but I sent that through channels. It went to the Division Engineer, thence to the Chief of Engineers. That was in June, I am certain—the date of the letter is whatever the date of that letter is, that is the date that Grafe told me that Rohl was an alien.

283. General FRANK. Did you meet John Martin in Washington while you were negotiating that contract?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I remember a person came there while I was in Grafe's room whose name was John Martin, a lawyer. He talked with—well, the group there, and I remember he stated that he was engaged on the claims of a contractor who, due to changes by orders, what we call change orders, had accumulated a lot of claims on the Pennsylvania turnpike, and he discussed in some detail in my hearing the arguments for and against the claims of the contractor. He was there for a little while and then he departed. That was the only occasion I think I have ever seen Mr. John Martin.

284. General FRANK. You did not know that Martin told Grafe in Washington that Rohl was an alien?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I did not know that. I did not know whether he did or not. I do not know.

285. General FRANK. Don't you think it was rather queer, when there was some question about a defense contract being in the hands of an alien, that they should not have told you about it?

Colonel WYMAN. I do not know. If they told me about I would merely have told the Chief of Engineers right on the spot.

286. General GRUNERT. What was the occasion of Grafe informing you of Rohl's status as an alien; what brought it up?

Colonel WYMAN. You see, there was an act of Congress came out about employing aliens on defense work, and [264] we wrote letters to everybody inquiring whether or not they had any aliens in their employ, and it came up as a result of that inquiry.

287. General GRUNERT. This was the date you wrote the letter?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir, that he informed me that he was an alien.

288. General GRUNERT. Was this the time the War Department put this out?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no. I put the inquiry out some time before that. I don't know. That is a matter of record. The records show the date. You see, at this time Mr. Rohl was in the United States. He never had been in Honolulu as far as I know, he had never taken any part in the contract.

General FRANK. In these telephone conversations where you were discussing work on the Hawaiian Islands with Rohl, the Hawaiian Islands airdromes were defense contracts, were they not?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, but he was a citizen when I talked to him. That was after he became a citizen. You see, he came to Honolulu after he became a

citizen. Then he immediately went back to the United States to get plant and men to go to Canton and Christmas Islands, and he went back to the United States and got plant from his job at Highgate Dam, brought it to Los Angeles, rehabilitated it, put it in good shape. He got men and organized them into gangs, superintendents, and put some aboard the transport LUNDINGTON. It was during that period that I recall talking to him about the plant for the Canton and Christmas Islands.

These statements on this record and to the Inspector General were wrong in two particulars: (a) as to date, and (b) as to origin of the information.

The proof to show that Wyman was untruthful in the two particulars is the following:

Testimony of Colonel Lewis J. Claterbos,<sup>59</sup> Fort Belvoir, Virginia, who served under Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Los Angeles, California, from August 1935 to July 1937, shows Wyman admitted to Claterbos on December 4, 1941, in Honolulu that before the basic contract was signed Wyman casually remarked to Rohl, "You're a citizen, aren't you, Bill?"; and Rohl replied that he was not (R. 4098).

The foregoing testimony is confirmed by a report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation made by Agent Don C. Bird at Richmond, Virginia, on July 3, 1944, who interviewed Claterbos and obtained among other things the foregoing information (R. 4096 Exhibit 70).

Hans Wilhelm Rohl testified before the California State Legislature Joint Fact Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, February 27, 1943, that *before the basic contract was signed* he told the then Major Wyman that he was an alien (Tenney Testimony, 3807). He testified,

On this particular contract, contract 602, being a secret contract, of course, I told him—I had to tell him. (Tenney Transcript, 3808.)

The time that this information was given to Colonel Wyman was fixed as being prior to the award of the contract; in this respect, the Tenney Transcript indicates the following testimony:

Question: When you first obtained the contracts for the construction of military installations did you tell Major Wyman that you were an alien?

Answer: I did on the Hawaiian Constructors. (Tenney Transcript, 3807.)

Mr. Rohl testified that he was familiar with the provisions of the law regarding such contracts. He testified further before we took this contract the War Department was told (Tenney Transcript, 3809).

From a letter in testimony from James A. Dillon, Immigration Inspector, Honolulu, T. H. (see Immigration file) it is shown that Wyman knew of Rohl's alien citizenship and that Rohl knew that Wyman had been interviewed in Honolulu by Mr. Dillon, who advised him at that time, February 1941, of Rohl's alien status (R. 4193). Rohl also knew that Wyman had been interviewed by Mr. Dillon and had been informed of Rohl's alien status as indicated by Rohl's testimony in the file of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (R. 4117).<sup>60</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Colonel Claterbos testified that he was and still is a friend of Wyman's. His testimony can be weighed in that light.

<sup>60</sup> Portion of examination of Mr. Rohl by Inspector Ellis, Immigration and Naturalization Service, May 22, 1941. (R. 4116.)



It should be borne in mind that Wyman testified that he had no written communications with Rohl, but that he had had telephone conversations. Rohl admitted charges of the House Interim Report true as to calls (R. 2234). Hence it is an inescapable conclusion that Wyman informed Rohl by telephone from Honolulu that Mr. Dillon had interviewed Wyman at Honolulu. Furthermore, no conclusion with regard to the letter of January 22, 1941 from Wyman to Rohl can be reached other than that this letter similarly was furnished by Wyman to Rohl with the express and sole purpose of assisting Rohl in obtaining his naturalization.

In this regard the testimony of Wyman was to the effect that he took no action whatsoever when Rohl failed to comply with the order contained in the letter. The letter of 22 January was furnished for the sole purpose of initiating and expediting the getting of Rohl's citizenship as a special case. It was a fraud in that it inferred to the uninformed who read the letter that such was not its purpose, and that the writer did not know that Rohl was an alien, whereas he did know, and the letter was written for the purpose of this "speed-up," while [267] not committing Wyman to public knowledge of Rohl's alien status. (R. 2056-2058, 3972-3974).

Dillon, Honolulu Naturalization Examiner, received a letter from Los Angeles, under date of February 20, 1941, which came to him through the District Director, at Honolulu of the Immigration Service, which reads as follows:

DISTRICT DIRECTOR,

*Honolulu, T. H.:*

One Hans (or John) William Rohl, a native and citizen of Germany, is an applicant for United States citizenship in this District, and through his attorney has presented a photostatic copy of a letter addressed to him by Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, Post Office Box 2240, Honolulu, T. H.

A copy of the photostat referred to is enclosed, from which it appears that Mr. Rohl's presence in Honolulu is desired in connection with secret contract #W-414-eng-602. In connection with our investigation concerning the applicant's qualification for citizenship, and in order that appropriate recommendation may be made to the court with reference to the matter, please ascertain whether Mr. Rohl at any time representing himself to Colonel Wyman, Jr., as a citizen of the United States.

A reply by airmail at your earliest convenience will be very much appreciated.

/s/ WILLIAM A. CARMICHAEL,

*District Director,*

*Los Angeles District. (R. 4187-4188.)*

As a result of this he interviewed Colonel Wyman a few days after February 20, 1941. (R. 4189.) He identified himself to Colonel Wyman by his identification card to the Department of Justice, indicating that he was a Naturalization Examiner from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He showed him the letter of February 20, 1941 and discussed the matter of Rohl's alien status from ten to thirty minutes with him. (R. 4190.) As a result, the letter was referred back, as it shows on its face, to the District Director at Los Angeles in reply to the letter of February 20, 1941. (This is under date of March 1, 1941.) (R. 4192.) In that letter of March 1, it was written as [268] follows, representing his conversation:

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,  
*Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1, 1941.*

Air mail.

665/Rohl

DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

*Honolulu, T. H.:*

Los Angeles File B-23-1876, HANS WILLIAM ROHL, Feb. 20, 1941.

In accordance with the directions contained in the above captioned letter, I called on Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, United States Army, for information regarding subject alien and particularly whether the alien applicant had ever in any manner represented or assumed himself to be a citizen of the United States.

Colonel Wyman in substance stated that he first became acquainted with the alien in California some time ago. That the Rohl-Connolly Company, with which the alien is associated, had done construction work for the Department of the Interior in the Indian country as well as projects on the Colorado River. During the construction of a breakwater in the California area, Colonel Wyman came in contact more or less with Mr. Rohl. During those business relations in California Colonel Wyman, assumed without any basis therefor, that Mr. Rohl was a citizen of the United States. He knew from hearsay that Rohl was born in Germany and that his father had been a professor of engineering in a German university. Colonel Wyman stated the applicant gathered about him in his organization only high-grade men. That the quality of his work was excellent. Contracts were always faithfully carried out. That Mr. Rohl was a man of integrity. His outstanding social diversion was yachting.

As a result of the national defense efforts, the Rohl-Connolly Company, W. E. Callahan Company and another group, organized the Hawaiian Constructors, Ltd., to procure construction contracts in Hawaii. It was in connection with one of these projects that Colonel Wyman wrote his letter of January 22, 1941, to Mr. Rohl. To summarize in a word, Colonel Wyman said the alien never represented himself to be a citizen of the United States and if there was any misunderstanding in that regard it was due to the assumption of such citizenship by the Colonel himself.

(SEAL)

/s/ JAS. P. DILLON,  
*U. S. Naturalization Examiner.*

Respectfully referred to District Director.

[269] Los Angeles District  
(stamp) MAR 1 1941

(Signed) W. G. STENCH,  
*District Director, Honolulu District.*

(Stamped on face of letter) RECEIVED MAR 11 1941. (R. 4193-4194.)

\* \* \* \* \*

General FRANK. Mr. Dillon, are you positive that in your conversation with Colonel Wyman you made him understand positively that Mr. Rohl was an alien?

Mr. DILLON. Very definitely, yes.

General FRANK. There is no question about that in your mind?

Mr. DILLON. None at all.

Colonel TOULMIN. What did Colonel Wyman say, when you told him that? Did he express surprise, or was it something he apparently already knew?

Mr. DILLON. No. From reading my report in the anteroom before I came into the hearing, Colonel Wyman appeared to be under the apprehension that Rohl was a citizen of the United States.

Major CLAUSEN. That is what he told you?

Mr. DILLON. Yes. (R. 4195.)

And witness the letter of Rohl's attorney, Cannon, to the Secretary of Commerce:

Theodore Wyman, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, War Department, in charge of all the above-mentioned defense work in Hawaii, has requested Mr. Rohl and the War Department to have Mr. Rohl give his personal service in



connection with the emergency defense work in Hawaii, and as early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Islands and has stated to Mr. Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain special permission, because of Mr. Rohl's alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret contract. (R. 2229).

Rohl says Wyman knew he was an alien before the contract was signed in December 1940:

126. General FRANK. Just while we are on this subject, I would like to ask some questions about these telephone [270] conversations that you had with Colonel Wyman, he in Honolulu, and you in Los Angeles. Do you mean to say that never, in any of those telephone conversations, did you ever bring up the question with him about your alien status?

Mr. ROHL. I don't believe I did, General. I took it for granted that he was told that, in Washington.

127. Major CLAUSEN. What did you base that on?

Mr. ROHL. Well, that's what I would like to explain.

John Martin was back in Washington on other matters, not on my business, or Rohl-Connolly business, Hawaiian Constructors' business. He was back on some other business.

128. General FRANK. Having to do with your firm?

Mr. ROHL. No, sir—with other contractors; no one involved in Hawaiian Constructors, and by accident he met Paul Grafe and Tom Connolly and told them not to sign the contract, until he talked to them further; so John Martin called me, in Los Angeles, from Washington, and told me the nature of the contract, and I gave him permission—not permission, but told him to tell Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly my alien status; which he did.

129. General FRANK. Who was responsible, in trying to get the group of contractors interested in this Hawaiian project? Was it, or was it not, Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

130. General FRANK. It was Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. He was interested in getting a group of contractors.

131. General FRANK. Including the Rohl-Connolly Company, the Callahan Company, and the Gunther & Shirley Company?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

132. General FRANK. Now, Colonel Wyman, Mr. Connolly, and Mr. Grafe were in Washington together, in a group, discussing this contract, were they not?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

133. General FRANK. And a hitch that came up in consummating the contract was your alien status, is that correct?

Mr. ROHL. General, by that do you mean—now, I have no knowledge of my own whether Mr.—

[271] 134. General FRANK. Well, I will put it in different words. Maybe the words "consummating" bothers you. You and they felt that you could not participate in the contract because it was a defense project and you were an alien?

Mr. ROHL. That's right.

135. General FRANK. That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. ROHL. That's correct.

136. General FRANK. Therefore, there was some question, considerable question, as to whether or not the Rohl-Connolly Company could participate in this project?

Mr. ROHL. No, General.

137. General FRANK. There was, until you get out of it?

Mr. ROHL. There was no question about Rohl-Connolly Co.

138. General FRANK. To whom were these letters being written, and with whom was this conversation by Wyman, in the United States. It was with you, wasn't it?

Mr. ROHL. General, you mean the letter from the Hawaiian Islands?

139. General FRANK. Yes, the letter was to you?

Mr. ROHL. Direct.

140. General FRANK. Rohl, by name?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

141. General FRANK. And the telephone conversations by Wyman were with you, Rohl, by name?

Mr. ROHL. That's right.

142. General FRANK. You were the person that he was interested in getting over there; is that not correct?

Mr. ROHL. That is correct.

143. General FRANK. Yes. You were the person that he wanted on the job, as stated in the letter that was written to expedite your naturalization, that is correct, isn't it?

Mr. ROHL. That is correct.

144. General FRANK. Therefore, you were the man who was concerned, and whose alien status threw a monkey-wrench into the smooth operating of getting this contract through, [272] in Washington, because unless you pulled out, the Rohl-Connelly Company could not participate in the project; that is correct, isn't it?

Mr. ROHL. General, by that do you mean, unless I pulled out—

145. General FRANK. As an official.

Mr. ROHL. As an active manager?

146. General FRANK. Yes. That was correct, wasn't it?

Mr. ROHL. That is correct.

147. General FRANK. Therefore, there was some complication because of your personal status as an alien, wasn't there?

Mr. ROHL. No, General.

148. General FRANK. Well, you just said so.

Mr. ROHL. Well, I never had any intention of going to the Hawaiian Islands and managing that contract.

149. General FRANK. Nevertheless, Colonel Wyman in his conversation and in his letters was rather insistent on having you there, was he not?

Mr. ROHL. That's right.

150. General FRANK. Now, since your alien status was the one thing that interfered with this thing, since your alien status was the one point that had to be cleared up in Washington, since your alien status was the one thing that blocked your going to Honolulu, and since Wyman, on the other side, was so insistent on having you come there, do you mean to say that Wyman was never told about it?

Mr. ROHL. Oh, Wyman was told about it. (R. 2239-2240-2241-2242.)

Thomas B. Shoemaker, Deputy Commissioner, Legal Branch, Philadelphia, testified that he was in the Los Angeles office when the letter of January 22, 1941, was brought in, shortly after that day, to the Los Angeles office of the Immigration Bureau, as the basis for expediting Rohl's citizenship. It is on the basis of that and General Kingman's letter<sup>61</sup> and the [273] activities of four lawyers, the Martin brothers, Cannon, and Galloway, former assistant attorney general of the United States, that Rohl's application for citizenship was expedited.<sup>62</sup> He testified that the report of the inspector on May 24, 1941 in Los Angeles recommending that a warrant for Rohl's arrest be issued and he be deported for illegal entry into the United States was outweighed by the efforts of Colonel Wyman, as a certificate from an Army officer that the alien was needed on a national defense contract would counterbalance the alien's past actions.

He said the result of all these efforts was to expedite Rohl's citizenship, which was granted in September 1941. At that time there was also on the statute books the present statute that an alien enemy would have an entirely different status of naturalization than Rohl

<sup>61</sup> Also letter or wire from Wyman to some Immigration and Naturalization official stating that Rohl was an alien and requesting that his application for citizenship be expedited which communication could not be found in the files of the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau. (R. 2453-2454).

<sup>62</sup> See testimony of Benjamin L. Stilphen, lawyer-expediter for the Chief of Engineers. (R. 1540.)



enjoyed, as we were not yet at war with Germany, and that was one of the real reasons, in addition to Wyman's solicitude for the Hawaiian contract, that Rohl was pressing so hard with four lawyers to get naturalized. The fee for a lawyer acting in this capacity is fixed by statute at \$25. It is obvious that these four lawyers were not in the class of such payment of fees. Shoemaker testified it was unnecessary to have a lawyer for any man to become naturalized if it was justified. (R. 4 790.)<sup>63</sup>

In confirmation of the foregoing is the letter of Rohl's attorney, Cannon, who was handling his trouble with his alien [274] status which had resulted in Rohl being fined \$25,000 for holding in his name as an alien vessel over 75 feet in length. This letter reads:

Theodore Wyman, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, War Department, in charge of all the above-mentioned defense work in Hawaii, has requested Mr. Rohl and the War Department to have Mr. Rohl give his personal service in connection with the emergency defense work in Hawaii, and as early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Island and has stated to Mr. Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain special permission because of Mr. Rohl's alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret contract. (R. 2229.)

Rohl testified that Wyman knew he was an alien before the contract of Hawaiian Constructors was signed in December, 1940. Witness the following:

160. General FRANK. Now, since your alien status was the one thing that interfered with this thing, since your alien status was the one point that had to be cleared up in Washington, since your alien status was the one thing that blocked your going to Honolulu, and since Wyman, on the other side, was so insistent on having you come there, do you mean to say that Wyman was never told about it?

Mr. ROHL. Oh, Wyman was told about it. (R. 2242.)

This is the same testimony that Rohl gave before the Tenney Committee in February 1943 (p. 3807):

"Q. When you first obtained the contracts for the construction of military installation (construction), did you tell Major Wyman that you were an alien?

"A. I did, on the Hawaiian Constructors.

"Q. But you didn't, on any other projects?

"A. We don't have it. There are no restrictions. I mean, on a government contract you are not questioned as to whether you are a citizen or not, but on this particular contract, contract 602, being a secret contract, of course, I told him. I had to tell him." (R. 2243.)

The foregoing testimony is significant in connection with what happened at Washington thereafter when Grafe, Connolly and Wyman were jointly working to get from the Corps of Engineers [275] the contract for Wyman's friends, Rohl-Connolly Company, the Callahan Company, and the Gunther & Shirley Company:

General FRANK. Just while we are on this subject, I would like to ask some questions about these telephone conversations that you had with Colonel Wyman, he in Honolulu, and you in Los Angeles. Do you mean to say that never, in any of those telephone conversations, did you ever bring up the question with him about your alien status?

Mr. ROHL. I don't believe I did, General. I took it for granted that he was told that, in Washington.

Major CLAUSEN. What did you base that on?

Mr. ROHL. Well, that's what I would like to explain.

<sup>63</sup> See also Barber (R. 3972-3974), Combs (R. 2428).

John Martin was back in Washington on other matters, not on my business, or Rohl-Connolly business, Hawaiian Constructors' business. He was back on some other business.

General FRANK. Having to do with your firm?

Mr. ROHL. No, sir—with other contractors; no one involved in Hawaiian Constructors, and by accident he met Paul Grafe and Tom Connolly and told them not to sign the contract, until he talked to them further; so John Martin called me, in Los Angeles, from Washington, and told me the nature of the contract, and I gave him permission—not permission, but told him to tell Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly my alien status; which he did.

General FRANK. Who was responsible, in trying to get the group of contractors interested in this Hawaiian project? Was it, or was it not, Colonel Wyman?

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Mr. ROHL. He was interested in getting a group of contractors.

General FRANK. Including the Rohl-Connolly Company, the Callahan Company, and the Gunther & Shirley Company?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. Now, Colonel Wyman, Mr. Connolly, and Mr. Grafe were in Washington together, in a group, discussing this contract, were they not?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. And a hitch that came up in consum- [276] mating the contract was your alien status, is that correct?

Mr. ROHL. General, by that do you mean—now, I have no knowledge of my own whether Mr.—

General FRANK. Well, I will put it in different words. Maybe the word "consummating" bothers you. You and they felt that you could not participate in the contract because it was a defense project and you were an alien?

Mr. ROHL. That's right. (R. 2239-2240.)

Wyman was in Washington, as his testimony shows, and, as he admits, with Connolly of the Rohl-Connolly Company and Paul Grafe of the Callahan Company. It was on this trip they were occupying the same rooms together at the Hotel Carlton. It was then that the citizenship question came up which stopped the whole thing.

The letter of January 22, 1941,<sup>64</sup> was written by Wyman to Mr. Rohl, Rohl-Connolly Company. This letter created an inference of lack of knowledge of Rohl's alien status by Wyman. Wyman stated before this board that at that time he did not know that Rohl was an alien. That was a false official statement. This letter was obviously written to furnish a basis of getting Rohl to Hawaii and to use any reply to it or action initiated by his letter as a means of pressing the government to expedite Rohl's naturalization.

The testimony of Connolly and Grafe as to their Washington trip and the holdup due to this alien citizenship matter of Rohl is significant. (R. 2162-2170, 2189-2199, 2290-2318.) [277] The fact that Rohl changed his position as president in December 1940 *before* the contract was signed, in the light of Connolly's testimony of the reason therefor, because of Rohl's alien status, again confirms that these co-conspirators well knew that there would be no contract unless Rohl was camouflaged in the background until they could get him admitted to citizenship. (R. 2160-2161, 2167-2168.)

It is further significant that when Rohl was confronted with his testimony in February, 1943 to the same effect that he had previously given before this board he began then to see the impact of his admissions and endeavored to get out by claiming some error in the Tenney records. (R. 2243-2245.)

<sup>64</sup> This letter shows Rohl was addressed as a part of the Rohl-Connolly Company, the letter refers to "secret contracts No. W-414-Eng-602 with the Hawaiian Constructors" and "as you are actively interested in this venture" etc. (R. 3530.)



Again before the Tenney Committee, before whom he admitted having given testimony as before this board (R. 2246-2247) he testified as follows: after having read to him the statute against an alien having anything to do with a secret defense contract he testified before the Tenney Committee,

Absolutely. Now, as a matter of fact, before we took this contract, the War Department was told.

So here again we have proof that he knew perfectly well that Colonel Wyman was fully advised because when questioned he said

Now, whether Mr. Grafe or Mr. Connolly or Mr. Martin told Colonel Wyman, or any one in the Engineer Department that, I don't know. I simply took that for granted. (R. 2247.)

It is obvious that Rohl was not the type of man, on a matter of this vital importance, holding up a contract that ultimately amounted to \$100,000,000, that he would take anything for granted unless he was certain it was so; and one of the things of which he was very certain and to which he repeatedly testi- [278] fied was that Wyman did know he was an alien before Wyman went to Washington to negotiate the contract.

Rohl testified, as a matter of fact, that his alien status was not a secret, saying

There was no reason at all for dodging that point. I mean, it was a fact. I didn't keep it a secret. (R. 2258.)

In attempting to protect his co-conspirators, it will be noted in Rohl's testimony that from time to time, after fully and frankly testifying as to one set of facts and having done so at other times to the same effect, when he was cornered he would try to change his testimony, not once but many times. Under such circumstances the truth probably is that testimony of Rohl's which was the natural and logical testimony that he did tell Wyman when they were negotiating the contract, because he knew, as did Wyman, that that was a fatality they would have to overcome or there would be no Hawaiian Constructors, including the Rohl-Connolly Company.

## *II. Refusal to Accept Low Bidder on Hawaiian Contracts: Wyman Preferring His Friends*

After Colonel Wyman arrived in the Islands following the formation of the Hawaiian Constructors he asked for bids on construction work involving rock excavation, furnishing of rock excavation, furnishing of rock and similar heavy construction. The bids were asked for on two bases, a bid on each individual job and a bid on the total job. The Hawaiian Constructors were one of the bidders and established local contractors with going organizations and equipment and quarries were the other bidders. These local contractors were all organizations of long standing in the Islands, who had constructed some of the largest installations in the Is- [279] lands for both Army and Navy and were fully competent to do the work.

When the bids were opened publicly, a local contracting firm, Clarke-Halawa Rock Company, headed by Mr. Chester R. Clark, was the low bidder. Despite the fact that as a matter of law the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman, was required to place the bid with the low bidder and thereby save the government a sum estimated as \$300,000 by Mr. Clark, the low bidder.

But this action of Colonel Wyman's was not the end of this transaction. The bids stipulated that the work must be completed within 90 days from the acceptance of the bid. Upon the expiration of the 90 days from the date of the bid by Colonel Wyman to Hawaiian Constructors, the latter had not fulfilled the terms of bid and had not proceeded with the contract, thus losing the government three months' time, where time was vital and was so stipulated in the invitation to bid and in the proposals by the contractors. Thereupon Mr. Clark wrote to Colonel Wyman and asked that the award be revoked and the bids reopened and again Colonel Wyman refused to desert his "friends," the Hawaiian Constructors.

In the very beginning Mr. Clark wrote and called upon Colonel Wyman, as had been his custom with other district engineers for whom he had worked satisfactorily. He was told that Colonel Wyman had other plans and did not want anything to do with him. (R. 3627, 3633.) He thus shut off direct dealings with local contractors as a part of his, Wyman's, plan as shown by the facts before this board, to deal exclusively with the Hawaiian Constructors headed by his friend, Rohl, and thus violated all dictates of good business, the best interests of the government, and action that would have expedited [280] the contract through contractors who had going organizations, resident in the Island, with ample equipment, quarries, men on the ground, working and with no need to be imported. (R. 3627-3628.)

It is worth quoting the testimony of Mr. Clark on this subject:

when the bids were opened on the 12th of May, 1941, a group of contractors, local contractors, were the low bidders as individuals, on individual airfields, but the organization headed by Mr. Rohl, Gunther-Shirley and I think by Mr. Grafe, were the ones that had—and also a bid by McKee and Company—were high on the total for all the airfields. Adding up the individual bids we were several hundred thousand dollars low and when I consulted with Colonel Wyman in regard to the saving to the government he informed me that all of the local bids were being thrown out and the contract would be awarded to the Rohl-Connolly organization. We thought that quite unfair at the time and wrote two letters to the Engineers in protest, and both of them were ignored. (R. 3627.)

He testified that the bids were publicly opened. He was present at the opening of the bids in the usual manner. He then testified:

Had we been awarded these contracts, my own organization on the Molokai and the Akioia on the Hawaiian one, and the Hawaiian Constructors on the Maui field, all of us would have those fields completed within the year 1941.

He further said:

That was the idea, to get the fields in usable condition, and the bids specified that they should be within use within a hundred days.

Accordingly, Mr. Clarke said:

I wrote a letter to the United States Engineers on the 100th day, asking them what was being done, and the letter was ignored, because we felt that we had a right to protest, owing to the fact that the jobs were being unduly hampered and not started. (R. 3628.)

He stated that his bids were \$300,000 less than the bids of Hawaiian Constructors. (R. 3629.)

The services of his organization were used later by the Hawaiian Constructors as sub-contractors and suppliers of [281] rock and material from the quarries of Clark's company, the Clarke-Halawa Rock Co. Mr. Clarke's record of construction work he had performed in the Island is impressive. (R. 3630-3632.)



Mr. Clarke testified as to repeated news of and discourtesy and arrogant treatment by Colonel Wyman, in entire contrast to all previous District Engineers. (R. 3633-3634.)

He also testified to the constantly drunken condition of Rohl as soon as he got to the Islands and his lack of any help to the work in the Islands. (R. 3634-3636.)

Clarke's experience was not the only one. Mr. Robert E. McKee, general contractor, was in the Islands at this time and had been for several years, constructing Hickam Field and other large government installations. His organization is one of the largest in the country, having completed enormous contracts with the Federal Government in the United States and abroad. He is one of the leading contractors in the United States and heads a firm of great wealth and high reputation for integrity and compliance with its contracts. The story of how McKee's organization was summarily discarded by Wyman is best told in Mr. McKee's words. It is to be noted that McKee had a going organization fully equipped with able men and equipment ready to do business whereas the Hawaiian Constructors were mainland people who had not operated in the Islands and had to import such second- or third-grade men as they could recruit and they were without complete equipment which all agree, including Colonel Wyman, were two primary factors in delaying the work of the Hawaiian Constructors, i. e., the lack of men and lack of equipment and materials.

[282] Here you have some of the reasons for the great delay in getting the work done on these secret defense contracts under Wyman's direction. He refused to take the existing organizations, fully equipped with men and equipment, and went to great trouble to assemble his friends whom he had dealt with in Los Angeles (The Rohl-Connolly Company, The Callahan Company, and the Gunther-Shirley Company) into a new organization and have them start from scratch to assemble men, who were then very scarce, and equipment, that was even scarcer, and get them into Hawaii and try to get started.

It was not until sometime later that any local contractors were taken into the "party" of Wyman's with his favorite contractors. Let it be remembered that the primary excuse given by Wyman for the Hawaiian Constructors was that he had to get somebody whom he knew would be able and efficient to do the job and who was equipped to do it and that he could not trust anybody else. This board finds that such excuses were not founded in fact.

After he began to find that the Hawaiian Constructors were not producing and the work was extremely slow because of the defective organization of the Hawaiian Constructors, their lack of men who were skilled and competent, their lack of machinery, etc., Hawaiian Constructors then invited in two local contracting concerns, Hawaiian Contracting, Inc., headed by Bensen, and the Woolley Company, headed by Woolley.

### *III. Irregular Purchases Of Machinery By Wyman From The Hawaiian Constructors and Associates*

The next chapter on the "side profits" of Hawaiian Constructors, was the following transaction:

[283] Wyman knew that he was going to be relieved on the 15th of March. On the morning of the 12th of March he directed his

second-in-command, Colonel Robinson, to have their official Corps of Engineers appraiser, a civilian named Parker, appraise the machinery of the Rohl-Connolly Company which had been shipped by the latter from Los Angeles some three months before destined for Christmas Island but not being able to unload there it was returned to the U. S., additional renovation work on it was done, and it then was shipped to Hawaii. Parker was instructed to bring back his appraisal by that night. He was given the price of \$166,000 which the Rohl-Connolly Company wanted for this equipment with a list of the machinery and the price wanted. Parker took with him a representative of the Hawaiian Constructors and by great effort he traveled over the Island on the 12th to visit various parts of the Island where the equipment was located.

He found some of the machinery was in bad condition, that some of its defects had been repaired and then painted over, and some of the repairs were of such character that they were unsatisfactory. (R. 3794.) Parker was an experienced appraiser before he came to the Corps of Engineers and knew Island values.

He completed his appraisal at eight o'clock the night of the 12th and delivered it to Colonel Robinson. His appraisal was \$131,000. (R. 3783, 3808.) The latter expressed his disagreement with the appraisal value and the following day called Parker into a meeting with the Hawaiian Constructors, at which were present Rohl, Woolley, Benson and Middleton. (R. 3784.) Parker was placed at a table with these men by himself while Robinson went off and left him. Rohl and Middleton of Hawaiian [284] Constructors did the talking. (R. 3790.) He was then subjected to great pressure to have him change his appraisal, which he refused to do. The testimony of Parker on this score is significant:

They had papers there of figures showing that they had spent so much money fixing up these trucks and the shovels and so forth, and I said, "Well, I still consider that my appraisal is fair, and even though you fixed it up", I said, "It was a poor job, because there's cracks in the pumps, all the shovels are not running and the trucks are broken down right now, and," I said, "They did a very good job of painting over all these defects." (R. 3785.)

Thereafter Robinson developed, under Wyman's direction in cooperation with Hawaiian Constructors, that rental should have been paid on this equipment; and that, if such rental had been paid, the price would have been what the Rohl-Connolly Company wanted, as the rental plus the appraisal of Parker would have amounted to that sum or slightly more.

The basic contract provided, for the rental of equipment through written transactions duly approved by the Secretary of War. There is no scrap of paper found by us showing this was done. As showing how unfounded such rental was, it is to be observed that the purchase price was one thing and the rental was another and so recognized by the contract. (R. 3810.)

In the purchase of equipment outright, rental should not have been combined with the purchase price of the equipment, because the voucher for the purchase must certify that the bill is "correct and just". In this case the voucher was issued for \$166,000 whereas Robinson admits that the appraised value was 26% less. (R. 3811.) The voucher for \$166,000 was therefore in error as the actual value of the machinery was only \$131,000 according to Robinson's own story. The



balance of the \$166,000 was rental which the contract required be handled in an entirely [285] different way.

This 26% of the total value for rental as approved by Wyman and Robinson was the government possession of the equipment for two or three months. (R. 3814.)

The equipment was second-hand to begin with when they loaded it on the to the government transport "Luddington" at Los Angeles. No appraisal was made of it at that time as could have been easily done. (R. 3610.) It was then finally brought to Hawaii and apparently was used to some extent during this period of two to three months.

As to this matter we find the report of the Inspector General, Colonel Hunt, significant. He said (p. 15, par. "e") :

It appears to be reasonably certain that the equipment in question had been in actual use for various lengths of time during January, February, and part of March at the time of purchase, although use records are not available and apparently were not maintained. There was no record of any rental agreement relating to any of this equipment. It is quite possible that assuming the fairness of Mr. Parker's appraisal on 12 March, the equipment had a substantially higher value when delivered to the site of use or at point of shipment. It does not, however, appear that a depreciation of a approximately \$35,000 in value, or about 26% could have occurred in that period. No suitable basis was available upon which to reconstruct a fair value to apply to the equipment as of the date of delivery. Mr. Rohl's efforts to sway the appraiser's judgment by reference to rentals due, seems an obvious effort to distort the facts in his own favor. All trace of the retained voucher and supporting papers was missing. No memoranda or other papers were found in connection with Colonel Wyman's letter directing the purchase at Mr. Rohl's figures. In the absence of justifying evidence or testimony, the conclusion seems inescapable that Colonel Wyman was unduly swayed, contrary to the Government's interests, by an unwarranted acceptance of these representations of Mr. Rohl in the face of conflicting recommendations. (R. 3827-3828.)

There is no document that could be found by this board, despite its efforts to do so, and the demand of the Corps of Engineers and of Robinson to produce any document of this nature, in conformance with the contract, allowing rental. [286] (R. 3815-3816.) To allow rental under the guise of the sales price of the equipment by Rohl-Connolly Company to the government was irregular. This was well known by Wyman and Robinson when they conducted and consummated this transaction. Robinson testifies that he did this under Wyman's direction and with Wyman's full knowledge. (R. 3824-3825-3826.)

The reason for the great haste in making this transaction was given by Colonel Robinson. He said that Colonel Wyman was relieved as of the 15th and he wanted to close up this "loose end." (R. 3827.)

The claimed rental appears exorbitant, even if legally paid, because under the circumstances 26% for two to three months use for second-hand equipment was obviously high.

The Board believes that the plan to pay rental and include this amount in the purchase price of the equipment was an afterthought. It was not in contemplation of the parties, at the time of the agreement, to have the equipment delivered to the government. In Wyman's prepared statement, delivered under oath, he said :

It was decided in October 1941 that the equipment in question was needed on Christmas and Canton Islands in connection with the construction work being done there by Hawaiian Constructors under contract No. 1-414-eng-602. It was discovered that the Rohl Connolly Co. had the needed equipment available at a project it had just completed in Arizona, at Highgate Dam, Parker, Arizona.

The Government could either rent or buy this equipment. Since it was to be shipped to these remote islands, it was agreed that the equipment should be bought by the Government. (R. 3412-13.)

In view of this agreement to buy, it would have been more equitable and resulted in the better protection of the government's interests had a fair value for the equipment at the time of delivery in early December, 1941, at Los Angeles, been determined and paid. Such value could have been [287] established on March 12th very easily, as the equipment had been used little prior to that time.

The procedure to establish the right of Rohl-Connolly to collect rentals and the methods used in assessing the rental values all appear to be very irregular.

The second incident of the purchase of machinery that was against government interest was that involving the Hawaiian Contracting Company. This incident was the subject of inspections by the Inspector General, Colonel Hunt and by Colonel Nurse (R. 3999), the official bottleneck buster.

Here follows the story of the second purchase of equipment by the Corps of Engineers in Hawaii.

The testimony of Colonel Nurse on this subject is significant to the effect that he inspected this equipment, which was purchased by Colonel Wyman for \$156,411 from the Hawaiian Contracting Company.<sup>65</sup> He, (Nurse) found that since the date of the purchase much of it apparently was never used because it was worthless or obsolete. Some of it had never been moved from the original yard in which it was at the time of the appraisal and this despite the fact that during this entire period there was the greatest demand for this type of equipment. Colonel Nurse produced his contemporaneous reports as to this situation and we quote from his testimony as follows:

Colonel NURSE. In 1943, in one of our investigations, we became aware that there was considerable equipment stored in the Hawaiian Contractors' yard that belonged to the Government and never had been removed . . . (R. 3999.)

Colonel Nurse then read from the report that he had made, as follows:

[2887] —“found stored in the yard of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, a large amount of construction equipment and tools which had been acquired by the U. S. E. D. on 15 March 1942 for \$147,611.00. A good deal of this equipment is apparently in unserviceable condition, though it is felt that much of it could be put back in service or parts stripped for repair of other equipment. Some few items on the original purchase order had been removed and receiving reports are being checked to determine if it was received by the U. S. E. D. The list of equipment remaining includes such items as: automobiles, draglines, buckets, bulldozers, compressors, cranes, drill machines, finishers, graders, hammers (pile driving), hoists, mixers, pumps, road rollers, scrapers, shovels, spreaders, tractors, trucks, trailers, and also three lighting outfits (new). Apparently the fact that these belonged to the Government was overlooked until the curiosity of a B. B. was aroused through having done some snooping. This information, together with a list of equipment has been turned over to Captain Spencer, who will take immediate action in removing it to his Base Yard.” . . .

General FRANK. Do you have reason to believe or to know that after that equipment had been bought it had never been removed from the yard?

Colonel NURSE. Well, I saw it, a great deal of it, myself, and the grass and the weeds were grown up around it so that you couldn't—some of it was hard to find. They just had to go out there and dig it out, send men in there to cut the weeds and grass in order to get some of it out where they could move it. . . .

<sup>65</sup> Note the difference from Hawaiian Contractors



General FRANK. Well, were they extremely short of equipment over there, so that they normally were in need of it and would have used it?

Colonel NURSE. Yes, but a big portion of this equipment was unserviceable, and I was led to believe that it was remaining in this yard for repair at such time as the Hawaiian Constructors could get around to do the work, but the superintendent there of the Hawaiian Constructors told me that the U. S. E. D. had turned in so much other equipment for repair that he just was bogged down; he never had been able to get at the repair of this equipment that was purchased from them. (R. 4000-4002.)

Please contrast this finding of failure to use with Colonel Robinson's statement that they bought the equipment from Benson and the Hawaiian Contracting Company as a member of the Hawaiian Constructors because of the urgent need for the equipment. The facts completely refute his statement and a reasonable investigation of the records of the Corps of Engineers, [289] such as Nurse's report, would have prevented him from making such a statement. For instance:

General RUSSELL. Based on that list which you saw representing the items of equipment purchased and the list which you compiled of the unused part of those items, it is now your testimony that the greater part of this property was never used by the Government?

Colonel NURSE. That is my opinion, yes, sir, that is it was not used, with the exception of a few items which were unserviceable. Two lighting outfits were brand-new, never had been taken out of the box, but outside of that I think all the rest of the equipment in the yard, with the exception of a crane they had there that couldn't very well be moved, was unserviceable, and it was held, a good deal of it, with the idea of repairing it, although much of it was antiquated equipment there that—well, there were mule-drawn dump wagons and things of that sort that we never would use in this day and age.

Colonel TOULMIN. As a matter of fact, Colonel, it was a bunch of junk, wasn't it?

Colonel NURSE. That that remained in the yard, with the exception of a few items.

Colonel TOULMIN. With the exception of the two lighting outfits and the one crane, it was a bunch of junk, wasn't it?

Colonel NURSE. I would tell you that was pretty nearly true.

Colonel TOULMIN. Wasn't there a demand for good equipment in the Islands?

Colonel NURSE. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And anybody who bought that as a bunch of junk wouldn't be getting anything he could use, would he?

Colonel NURSE. Some of it could be repaired, and I think they had requisitioned parts for the repair of some of the items.

Colonel TOULMIN. That had never been done, had it?

Colonel NURSE. They hadn't received parts up to the time I made my investigation.

General FRANK. And this was a year after it was bought?

Colonel NURSE. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And in the interim of that year [290] there was a great demand for machinery, wasn't there?

Colonel NURSE. There was. (R. 4006-4007.)

A statement of this transaction is clearly set off in the report of the Inspector General, Colonel Hunt. He says:

The procedure was to base payment upon an appraisal to be made by a Mr. Bruce Gentry, representing the Hawaiian Constructors; a Mr. H. J. Roblee, employee of the Edward R. Bacon Company of Honolulu and a third man representing the owner. In the case of the equipment purchase now in question, the third party was Mr. Edward Ross, employee of the Hawaiian Contracting Company. These three appraised the equipment in question, placing an upper value of \$156,150 upon it. This appraisal was substantially the amount named in a letter addressed by Mr. Rohl to the District Engineer dated 9 January, 1942. In this case, the Government was not properly represented. Mr. Roblee, ostensibly the Government's representative, owed his livelihood to the Edward R. Bacon

Company, of which the Hawaiian Contracting Company was a substantial customer in equipment purchases, his interests relating to those of his employer and its substantial customer. Mr. Gentry was a contractor employee and Mr. Ross obviously served the interests of the vendor.

Page 14, paragraph "c":

The items hauled to salvage, unused, totaling \$9,100, were examined by the investigating officer. These items were so far obsolete as to warrant the description "archaic". Some of the Watson wagons (hand operated, bottom dump wooden wagons) were arranged for animal draft, while others had been equipped with trailer tongues. All had been robbed of metal parts before the purchase, some were badly rotted and others were termite eaten beyond any possible usefulness. Scrapers, scarifiers and like items were incomplete, badly rusted and of doubtful useability, even in an extremity. Other items accepted and taken into possession of the District Engineer subsequent to 1 July 1942 aggregated another \$20,511. These last items were useable, but their acquisition was totally unnecessary, suitable like items having been available in sufficient quantity prior to acceptance by the District Engineer's forces.

Page 15, paragraph "d":

This transaction was directed by Colonel Wyman on 13 March 1942, and payment was effected in the same manner as in the case of the Rohl-Connolly equipment (paragraph 7). The files yielded no correspondence in the matter other than that mentioned herein. In the course of Major Lunsden's inquiry, it developed that the District Engineer's appraiser had undertaken an appraisal of some items of this equipment, had been denied access to it on [291] the first attempt, and had later been permitted to examine it with the result that on the items inspected, values were recommended which were in substantial agreement with those later used in the actual purchases. Nothing further was done at that time, however, and when the purchase was finally directed, this appraisal was ignored and the new one made as indicated above." (R. 3828-3829-3830.)

When Colonel Robinson was asked why worthless equipment was bought along with equipment that was usable from the Hawaiian Contracting Company, he said that the contractor refused to sell the good without the worthless (R. 3614-3616), so the government bought worthless property and the usual government certificate was issued as the basis for the voucher certifying the bill was "correct and just". The purpose of the certificate is to prevent matters of this character from occurring.

Henry P. Benson, who headed the Hawaiian Contracting Company, took the position that he would not sell the good equipment to the government which it needed without taking the junk off his hands. The following is probably explanatory of the holdup of the government that Colonel Robinson and Colonel Wyman permitted.

Colonel TOULMIN. And playing fair, so-called, with the contractor at the government's expense by taking the junk off his hands, because he wouldn't sell you the good equipment without the junk: isn't that it? That what you testified to.

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, your wording is different than mine, sir, but it's all right. . . .

Colonel TOULMIN. Well, then do you want us to understand that all the equipment you bought was good equipment?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir. I have testified to the condition of the equipment.

Colonel TOULMIN. Some of it was good and some was worthless or substantially worthless; is that right?

[292] Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Benson told you that he wouldn't let you have the good equipment unless you took the other stuff that wasn't so good or was worthless with it; that is right, isn't it?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir. (R. 3615-3616.)

In this connection it is to be noted that Colonel Robinson said: "We desperately needed equipment." (R. 3616.) Contrast that statement of "desperately needed equipment", for which the price of



\$156,411 was paid, with the fact that it turned out to be either unnecessary because suitable items had been available in sufficient quantities at that time to the Corps of Engineers, or "items were so far obsolete as to warrant the description 'archaic'". (R. 3829-3830.)

The evidence before the Board lacks definiteness as to the exact value of the property purchased from the Hawaiian Contracting Company. The Board believes, however, that the evidence indicates that the price paid was very excessive and fails to establish a valid reason for paying any sum for worthless equipment. This matter should be further investigated.

#### C. SUMMARY

Colonel Wyman's conduct in the Hawaiian Islands resulted in many delays in the completion of essential defenses. His association with Hans Wilhelm Rohl, German alien, and an interested member of the Hawaiian Constructors, was improper in a government agent. The award of the contract to the Hawaiian Constructors was favoritism on the part of Wyman and resulted in selecting an organization that was put together for the purpose of the Hawaiian contracts and was not equipped with personnel, mechanical equipment or organization to promptly and effectively do the work; and the result was that delays occurred. Additionally, there were contractors, resident in [293] the Islands, and contractors from the mainland working in the Islands, who had organizations, equipment, personnel, and the facilities for doing the same work more promptly. These men and their organizations excluded arbitrarily by Colonel Wyman.

We find that Wyman committed the following overt acts amongst many others:

- (1) Knowingly made a false official statement as to his knowledge of Rohl's alien status.
- (2) Wyman refused to accept the low bidder on a Hawaiian contract and gave the bid to the high bidder, which exceeded the low bidder by a large sum.
- (3) Wyman made irregular purchases of equipment from the Hawaiian Constructors and their associate companies and directed payment incorrectly certifying the bills as "correct and just."

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#### CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS

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## CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS

## I. EXPLANATIONS

As a prelude to the citation of conclusions the following is pertinent:

*1. Scope*

Attention is called to the fact that the record developed by the investigation of this Board contains a great amount of evidence, both oral and documentary, relating to incidents and issues about which no conclusions are drawn. Evidence was introduced on these so that anything which might have had a bearing on the Pearl Harbor disaster would be fully explored. The Board considered that its mission implied the revealing of all pertinent facts to the end that charges of concealment would be fully met. In formulating its conclusions the Board has selected for treatment only those things which it considers material for a clear understanding of the events which collectively caused the Pearl Harbor disaster. The full report of the Board discusses and analyzes the testimony in its entirety and must be read for a clear understanding of the history of the Pearl Harbor attack.

*2. Estimates upon which action was based*

The responsible officers in the War Department and in the Hawaiian Department, without exception, so far as this Board has been able to determine, estimated the situation incorrectly. They were influenced in this estimate by facts which then seemed to impel the conclusion that initially the impending war would be confined to the land and seas lying south of the Japanese homeland, as forces of the Japanese Army and Navy were concentrating and [296] moving in that direction. British and Dutch forces were being organized and made ready to move in opposition. The Philippine Islands which were in this theater constituted a threat to the flank of the Japanese forces if the United States should enter the war. Supplies and reinforcements were being rushed to the Philippines. There was complete ignorance of the existence of the task force which attacked Pearl Harbor. Intelligent officers in high places made the estimate and reached the conclusions in the light of these known facts. They followed a sane line of reasoning. These statements are in explanation, not justification.

The estimate was in error. The procedure in arriving at it was faulty, because it emphasized Japanese probabilities to the exclusion of their capabilities. Nevertheless, the thinking of these officers was colored and dominated by this estimate and their acts were similarly influenced.



### 3. *Relationship of Commanders in Hawaii*

The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, the commanders of the Army and Navy forces in Hawaii, were very cordial. They were making earnest and honest efforts to implement the plans which would result in the two services operating as a unit in an emergency. These highly desirable ends had not been accomplished at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

### 4. *Interchange of information—State and War Departments*

The Board was impressed with the apparent complete interchange of information between the State Department and the War Department. As a result the War Department was kept in close touch with international developments and the State Department knew of the Army's progress and its preparations for war.

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## II. GROUPING OF CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions group themselves logically in two divisions: the Pearl Harbor attack, and operations of the Engineers in Hawaii. We shall consider these in the order stated.

### 1. *Pearl Harbor Attack*

a. The attack on the Territory of Hawaii was a surprise to all concerned: the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Department. It was daring, well-conceived and well-executed, and it caught the defending forces practically unprepared to meet it or to minimize its destructiveness.

b. The extent of the Pearl Harbor disaster was due primarily to two causes:

1. The failure of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department adequately to alert his command for war, and

2. The failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type of alert taken by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to direct him to take an adequate alert, and the failure to keep him adequately informed as to the developments of the United States-Japanese negotiations, which in turn might have caused him to change from the inadequate alert to an adequate one.

c. We turn now to responsibilities:

1. The Secretary of State—the Honorable Cordell Hull. The action of the Secretary of State in delivering the counter-proposals of November 26, 1941, was used by the Japanese as the signal to begin the war by the attack [298] on Pearl Harbor. To the extent that it hastened such attack it was in conflict with the efforts of the War and Navy Departments to gain time for preparations for war. However, war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of irreconcilable disagreements between the Japanese Empire and the American Government.

2. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

- (a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for

war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little.

(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war.

(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.

[299] (d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat of war.

3. Chief of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, Major General Leonard T. Gerow, failed in his duties in the following particulars:

(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, adequately informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the substance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary he approved the message of November 27, 1941, (472) which contained the confusing statements.

(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he failed to take corrective action.

(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans and agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of the two services in the manner contemplated.

[300] 4. Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, failed in his duties in the following particulars:

(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch.

(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible commanders.

(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

(d) To replace inefficient staff officers.



[301] 2. *Operations of Engineers in Hawaii*

a. The Board found no evidence to indicate that the lack of progress in construction activities in Hawaii and the delays connected therewith, were due to enemy agents, or to persons connected with such activities who, by intent, influenced the existing lack of progress and the delay that ensued.

b. The peacetime organization and conduct of the Corps of Engineers' construction activities, together with the red tape involved in staff procedure, priorities, and procurement, were such as made delay practically inevitable.

c. Chief of Engineers.

1. In the field the organization of divisions and districts of the Corps of Engineers, under the Washington office, was a very loose one, without sufficient supervision and inspection. This resulted in the improper conduct of Colonel Wyman in Los Angeles going without official detection and in his operations as District Engineer in Honolulu being inefficient.

2. Reports of inspections of Colonel Wyman's activities by Colonel John Hunt of the War Department Inspector General's Office and by Colonel Lathe B. Row of the Hawaiian Department Inspector General's Office, included adverse findings, some of which called for disciplinary measures, yet no corrective or disciplinary action seems to have been taken by the Chief of Engineers.

d. The Hawaiian Constructors had a loose and inefficient organization; was poorly managed; lacked means with which to successfully prosecute the work; and generally were incapable of doing a first-rate job, which resulted in lack of progress and delays.

[302] e. The District Engineer, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., CE, the contracting officer:

1. Was very aggressive and efficient in the execution of isolated jobs within his capabilities. He did not appreciate the magnitude of the task in Hawaii and lacked the capacity to measure up to its requirements. His manner was brusque, abrupt and objectionable, and resulted in discord and inefficiency in his administration.

2. In his associations with one Hans Wilhelm Rohl, a member of the Rohl-Connolly Contracting Company of the Hawaiian Constructors, he conducted himself in a highly indiscreet manner.

3. He was most inefficient in the handling of his office and in administrative matters, which indirectly caused delays.

4. He was negligent in his duties relating to the contract, in that he failed:

(a) To properly investigate the loyalty of Rohl.

(b) To adequately investigate the availability of qualified contractors before the award of the basic contract and the supplemental agreements thereto.

(c) To properly supervise the performance of the work by the contractors.

(d) To inform his higher headquarters of delays and deficiencies of the contractors.

(e) To take appropriate action to overcome [303] the delays and correct the deficiencies of the contractors.

5. He made false statements under oath to the Board.

6. He failed to protect the interests of the United States in the purchase of equipment for the Government from the Hawaiian Constructors and their associates.

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CHAPTER VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations: NONE.

GEORGE GRUNERT,  
*Lieut. General, U. S. Army,*  
*President.*

HENRY D. RUSSELL,  
*Major General, U. S. Army,*  
*Member.*

WALTER H. FRANK,  
*Major General, U. S. Army,*  
*Member.*

FRIDAY, 20 October 1944.